Appellant Thomas E. Brissey, a resident of Glynn County, Georgia, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Superior Court of Glynn County, seeking an order compelling the superior court clerk to cancel all notices of federal tax liens recorded in the Superior Court of Glynn County.1 The petition for mandamus was based on appellant’s assertion that the notices’ recordation violated OCGA § 44-14-572 because the notices were “uncertified.”2 After the trial court joined the Internal Revenue Service as a party defendant, the case was removed from the superior court to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. That court, noting that none of the four notices of federal tax liens attached to Brissey’s complaint had been filed against Brissey, found that Brissey lacked standing to maintain the action in federal court under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and remanded the matter to the Superior Court of Glynn County. The superior court then dismissed the petition for mandamus after concluding that Brissey lacked standing to bring the action since he was not challenging federal tax liens filed against him.3 Contending that he has standing under OCGA § 9-6-24, Brissey appealed the judgment entered on the order of dismissal.
A writ of mandamus may issue to compel a due performance of an official duty. OCGA § 9-6-20. It is “the remedy for inaction of a public official.” Hilton Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 245 Ga. 533 4 266 SE2d 157 1980. In most instances in which a writ of mandamus is sought, the petitioner must have a heightened interest in the outcome in order to have standing to bring the petition: to enforce by mandamus a corporation’s performance of a public duty, an individual must have a “special interest” OCGA § 9-6-23; to use mandamus to enforce a private right, one must show a pecuniary loss not compensable in damages. OCGA § 9-6-25. However, OCGA § 9-6-24, upon which appellant Brissey relies, confers standing to seek mandamus on one who does not have a “special interest” in the circumstances that give rise to the petition for judicial relief: “Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.” OCGA § 9-6-24. The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Board of Commissioners of City of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 153 SE 34 1930 see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 2 109 SE2d 798 1959, whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Board of Trustees of the Employee Retirement System of Georgia, 257 Ga. 579 361 SE2d 805 1987; League of Women Voters of Atlanta-Fulton County v. City of Atlanta, 245 Ga. 301 1 264 SE2d 859 1980; Stephens v. Moran, 221 Ga. 4 1 147 SE2d 845 1965. But see Dekalb County v. Druid Hills Civic Assn., 269 Ga. 619 502 SE2d 719 1998; Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519 265 SE2d 811 1980 special interest needed to contest zoning determinations.
