Defendant Joseph R. Garrard was indicted on July 31, 1992 by the Upson County grand jury for two violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations RICO Act, OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq. The indictment alleged defendant engaged in an enterprise involving a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of theft by taking, false statements, and forgery arising out of the sale of timberland. On August 11, 1993, more than a year later, a Newton County grand jury returned its indictment of the defendant in the case sub judice the “Newton County indictment”, again indicting defendant for violation of the RICO statute in connection with the timberland sales underlying the Upson County indictment. On June 19, 1995, a jury found defendant guilty of one1 of the RICO violations upon which the defendant had been indicted in Upson County. The Upson County trial court granted defendant’s motion for new trial2 on April 23, 1998 and is currently pending retrial in Upson County. On pre-trial direct appeal, see Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875, 877 287 SE2d 7, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his double jeopardy plea in bar, arguing the applicability of OCGA § 16-1-7 b barring successive prosecution and OCGA § 16-1-8 b barring prosecution if the accused was formerly prosecuted and the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Held:
Pointing to OCGA § 16-1-7 b, defendant argues that the Newton County indictment should be dismissed in that it arises from the same conduct upon which the Upson County RICO charges had been based and the State’s attorney responsible for prosecuting the Upson County indictment knew or should have known of all RICO-related violations alleged against defendant at that time but failed to prosecute them. We disagree.
