A police officer charged with committing a felony or a misdemeanor while in the performance of his duties is entitled to certain procedural protections under OCGA § 17-7-52, including the right to be prosecuted only upon a grand jury indictment.1 But the protections afforded by OCGA § 17-7-52 do not apply to one who is no longer a police officer when a prosecution against him is commenced.2 Robert Dudley was the police chief in the town of Pineview when, during a traffic court proceeding, he had an argument with a city councilwoman and tried to arrest her for alleged disorderly conduct. During the incident, Dudley sprayed the councilwoman and others in court with pepper spray. About a month after the incident, Dudley resigned from the Pineview police department. After his resignation, the state charged Dudley by accusation with four counts of simple battery for having used the pepper spray, and he was eventually convicted of three of the counts. Were the misdemeanor charges by accusation improper because under OCGA § 17-7-52 Dudley could only be prosecuted upon a grand jury indictment We hold that the accusation was not improper because it was filed after Dudley resigned from the police department, so he was no longer entitled to the rights given to police officers under OCGA § 17-7-52. Because Dudley’s challenge to the accusation lacks merit, as do his challenges to the evidence sufficiency and to his sentence, we affirm his simple battery convictions.
Robert Dudley became the police chief of Pineview, Georgia in January of 1996. During his time as chief, Dudley had several disagreements with Pineview City Council member Glenda McMillar. On the evening of January 2, 1997, Dudley was in the city court for hearings. McMillar was also present in the courtroom that evening to sign a property bond for a party appearing before the court.