This Court granted a discretionary application to consider whether the trial court erred in ruling that the procedures associated with a Department of Public Safety “DPS” administrative appeal of the suspension of a driving license violate the procedural due process requirements of our State and Federal Constitutions. Having considered the entire scope of the administrative and statutory procedures available to appeal the suspension of a driving license, we conclude that they afford adequate procedural due process protections by means of a de novo review to be conducted pursuant to a hearing held in the Superior Court. As explained more fully below, such de novo review is available to all licensees who make a timely request, and is not precluded when a licensee opts to first pursue a DPS administrative review of their license suspension. Accordingly, we reverse.
Appellee was cited by the Lithonia Police Department for speeding and attempting to elude a police officer. She was convicted in the Recorder’s Court of both charges, and her driver’s license was suspended for 12 months by DPS. Wishing to pursue an appeal of her suspension, appellee had two options available to her: 1 pursue a de novo appeal in the superior court pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-66; or 2 defer the de novo appeal and pursue a DPS administrative review under DPS Rule 570-1-.06. Appellee elected to first pursue the latter option and requested an administrative review with DPS, stating that she felt her license was “unjustly suspended.”1 That optional in-house DPS administrative review was conducted pursuant to DPS Rule 570, which authorizes DPS to review license suspensions without a hearing if “a decision can be rendered on the face of the request without further proceedings.”2 On November 2, 1998, DPS determined that it could render a decision on the face of appellee’s appeal without a hearing, and it subsequently upheld her suspension.3 Appellee was not afforded the opportunity to personally appear at the optional DPS administrative review.