Northeast Georgia Medical Center, Inc. Hospital granted staff privileges to Dr. James A. Davenport. Thereafter, the Hospital’s Peer Review Committee investigated several complaints regarding Dr. Davenport and it recommended that he be placed on probation. The Executive Committee accepted this recommendation and, after additional complaints, extended the probationary period. The Peer Review Committee subsequently found that Dr. Davenport violated the terms of his probation, and the Executive Committee decided to revoke his medical staff membership. The Hospital notified Dr. Davenport of the decision on February 22, 1995 by certified mail. Another letter on April 4 notified him that pursuant to his request, an evidentiary hearing was scheduled. After several hearings before the Judicial Review Panel, the Executive Committee again voted to revoke Dr. Davenport’s medical staff privileges. On appellate review, the Hospital’s Governing Board also voted to revoke his privileges. Dr. Davenport then brought suit for damages, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on the ground that the Hospital Care Quality Improvement Act HCQIA afforded the Hospital immunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 11111 a 1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Hospital was not entitled to summary judgment on its immunity defense, because a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether it gave Dr. Davenport adequate notice of the reasons for the proposed revocation of his staff privileges. Davenport v. Northeast Ga. Medical Center, 237 Ga. App. 252, 256 515 SE2d 162 1999. We granted certiorari to consider what constitutes “adequate notice” under 42 U.S.C. § 11112 a 3. We conclude that the HCQIA neither requires that the notice set forth the reasons for the proposed action in a formal and precise manner nor does it mandate that the reasons be limited in number and scope or always be restated in the same terms. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for consideration of the remaining enumerations of error.
One of the prerequisites for immunity under the HCQIA is that the peer review action be taken “after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 11112 a 3. “Assessing the ‘circumstances’ requires a fact-driven analysis.” Rogers v. Columbia/HCA of Central Louisiana, 971 FSupp. 229, 236 III C 3 W.D. La. 1997. The HCQIA does not invariably require that any reason be given to the doctor prior to the initial hearing or a temporary suspension of medical privileges. See Rogers v. Columbia/HCA of Central Louisiana, supra at 236-237 III C 3 the HCQIA does not even necessarily require a pre-deprivation hearing; Maewal v. Adventist Health Systems, 868 SW2d 886, 891 Tex. App. 1993. Of course, providing the physician with a prior statement of reasons is preferable and, to this end, a hospital may be “deemed to have met the adequate notice and hearing requirement of subsection a 3″ if it meets several conditions, including notice which states the “reasons for the proposed action . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 11112 b 1 A ii. The Court of Appeals erroneously holds that this notice of reasons specified in subsection b must be in writing. Davenport v. Northeast Ga. Medical Center, supra at 255-256. Subsection b “does not require written notice; adequate notice is the requirement. Cit.” Emphasis in original. Maewal v. Adventist Health Systems, supra at 891. More importantly, a failure to meet the conditions enumerated in subsection b “shall not, in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of subsection a 3 . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 11112 b. “In other words, § 11112 b describes a ‘safe harbor’ for immunity, but it is not necessary to satisfy § 11112 b to receive immunity.” Smith v. Ricks, 31 F3d 1478, 1485 II, fn. 5 9th Cir. 1994. See also Bryan v. James E. Holmes Regional Medical Center, 33 F3d 1318, 1336 III C 3 11th Cir. 1994.
