John and Florence Cotton were divorced in 1986. The final divorce decree, which incorporated a settlement agreement, awarded Ms. Cotton alimony of $2500 per month until her death or remarriage. In 1996, Mr. Cotton sought a downward modification of his alimony obligation. Prior to trial, Ms. Cotton made a motion in limine to exclude the original divorce decree from evidence. The trial court granted the motion, and also excluded any testimony, or evidence or argument as to the aggregate amount of alimony paid by Mr. Cotton over the years. Although the jury reduced Mr. Cotton’s monthly obligation to $1950, he filed an application for discretionary appeal, which we granted in order to address the trial court’s rulings.
1. The merits of Ms. Cotton’s entitlement to receive alimony until her death or remarriage is not a material issue here, as the 1986 divorce decree establishes her right in that regard. In accordance with OCGA § 19-6-20, the only relevant inquiry is whether the subsequent income and financial status of either Mr. or Ms. Cotton have changed so substantially as to authorize a downward revision in monthly alimony of $2500. The original divorce decree is certainly relevant to this question, however, since that document constitutes the very award which Mr. Cotton now seeks to have modified. “The purpose of a modification action is to decide whether the existing alimony or child support comports with the current financial circumstances.” Emphasis supplied. Howard v. Howard, 262 Ga. 144, 145 1 414 SE2d 203 1992. Because the controlling terms of Mr. Cotton’s existing alimony or child support obligation are established by the original 1986 decree, that document is the very essence of this modification action. “Until the parties’ divorce decree is so modified it remains a valid judgment binding on the parties and enforceable according to its terms. Cits.” Kight v. Kight, 242 Ga. 563, 565 3 250 SE2d 451 1978, overruled on other grounds, Perteet v. Sumner, 246 Ga. 182, 183 269 SE2d 453 1980. The question presented for resolution is, therefore, whether a trial court presiding over a modification action errs in refusing to allow the introduction into evidence of that previous judgment.
