James Little’s personal residence in the City of Lawrenceville is adjacent to property owned by Mahlon Burson, who is a member of the City Council, and Burson’s two sons Rezoning Applicants. Rezoning Applicants began utilizing their property to store materials for use in an automobile and tire business. Several years later, Little complained to the City about this outdoor storage and eventually filed an official zoning complaint. Rezoning Applicants then filed an application to rezone their property from a residential to a light manufacturing classification. The City’s Planning Staff recommended denial of the rezoning, but the Planning Commission recommended otherwise, and the City Council approved the rezoning application. Little appealed from this rezoning decision, naming as defendants the City, the City Council, and Rezoning Applicants Appellees, and also sought injunctive relief against Rezoning Applicants. Although the trial court found that Burson violated the zoning conflict-of-interest law, OCGA § 36-67A-1 et seq., it nevertheless concluded that the rezoning was valid, that the City properly followed the procedures set out in the City Charter and the zoning ordinance, and that Little failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies for determining whether the activities conducted on the property violate the zoning ordinance even after the rezoning. Little appeals pursuant to this Court’s grant of an application for discretionary appeal. Although it now appears that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case, we have retained it for reasons of judicial economy. See Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn., 271 Ga. 745, 747 2 __SE2d__ 1999 where primary issue is legal in nature, an accompanying claim for equitable relief does not bring case within this Court’s equity jurisdiction; Douglas v. Wages, 271 Ga. 616, 617, fn. 2 __SE2d__ 1999 consideration of merits of appeal in interest of judicial economy.
1. Little contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the City properly followed the procedures set forth in the City Charter for enacting ordinances. The provisions of the City Charter may once have controlled zoning procedure in accordance with the former Georgia Constitution of 1976, which forbade the legislature from regulating municipal zoning authority. Warshaw v. City of Atlanta, 250 Ga. 535, 536-537 299 SE2d 552 1983. At present, however, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. IV of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 permits the governing authority of each county and municipality to exercise the power of zoning, but also provides that “this authorization shall not prohibit the General Assembly from enacting general laws establishing procedures for the exercise of such power.” Indeed, the General Assembly has done precisely that by enacting the Zoning Procedures Law ZPL. OCGA § 36-66-1 et seq. That general law is mandatory and applies to the entire process of adopting or amending a zoning ordinance. City of Cumming v. Realty Development Corp., 268 Ga. 461, 463 3 491 SE2d 60 1997; McClure v. Davidson, 258 Ga. 706, 709 3 373 SE2d 617 1988. The preemption doctrine precludes all other local or special laws on the same subject. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV a and Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I c; Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms, 270 Ga. 272, 275 2 507 SE2d 460 1998. Powers which the legislature sets out in city charters “are subject to limitations and preemptions imposed by general law.” Peacock v. Ga. Municipal Assn., 247 Ga. 740, 742 2 279 SE2d 434 1981. Therefore, we hold that the ZPL has preempted the provisions in the City Charter for the purposes of the adoption and amendment of zoning ordinances. Accordingly, even assuming that the City did not follow the procedural provisions of its own Charter, we find no error in this rezoning case.
