Appellee-defendant City of Warner Robins, by and through its Mayor and Council and John H. Lewis the “City”, approved a request to annex and rezone a parcel of real property owned by John H. Lucas. Appellant-plaintiff Lamar M. Merritt thereafter brought this action for injunctive relief seeking to “prohibit and prevent the City and Lucas from acting upon or enforcing any permits or rights granted by virtue of the annexation and rezoning.” The superior court later granted summary judgment to the City finding that the plaintiff whose property was contiguous to the Lucas property lacked standing to challenge the City’s rezoning decision in that he failed to demonstrate that he met the “substantial interest-aggrieved citizen” test for standing to challenge. See Dunaway v. City of Marietta, 251 Ga. 727, 728 1 308 SE2d 823 and Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commission v. Vineville Neighborhood Association, 218 Ga. App. 668, 669 1 462 SE2d 764. In granting summary judgment to defendant, the superior court recognized that any zoning action necessarily changes the character of a neighborhood in some degree, but nonetheless found that the evidence showed only that the “damages complained of are an unavoidable result of normal, urban development.” See Lindsey Creek Area Civic Association v. Consolidated Government of Columbus, Georgia, 249 Ga. 488, 491 291 SE2d 61. Noting that the plaintiff offered his own testimony alone to support his claim that the rezoning of the Lucas property from R-1 to R-3 would disturb the property’s initial character, the superior court found that plaintiff had not supported his predictions as to increased traffic and crime by “any expert testimony or proffer that he will ‘bear the brunt of the changed condition.’ AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Leafmore Forest Condominium Association of Owners, 235 Ga. App. 319, 320 1, 321 509 SE2d 374 1998.” The court also pointed out: 1 that a homeowner’s sole opinion as to diminished property value standing alone does not satisfy the “aggrieved citizen test for standing, Lindsey Creek Area Civic Association v. Consolidated Government of Columbus, Georgia, 249 Ga. 488, 492, supra”; and 2 that Georgia law does not recognize a claim for special damages based only upon traffic congestion. Dunaway v. City of Marietta, 251 Ga. 727, 7281, supra. While we find no grounds to reverse the superior court’s findings, Lau’s Corporation, Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 405 SE2d 474, we are unable to reach them for lack of jurisdiction even if such grounds for reversal existed.
The plaintiff filed the instant direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 a, contending that he appealed from the final judgment of the superior court. Thereafter, the City moved to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff appealed from a decision of the superior court in a zoning case as to which an application is required. Trend Development Corporation v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425 1, 425-426 383 SE2d 123 zoning case appeals require application for discretionary review for status, in effect, as court decisions reviewing administrative agency decisions within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 a 1.
