Ellington, Presiding Judge.
George Ivey, in his official capacity as mayor of the City of Warrenton, filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Appellees in their official capacity as City councilmembers.[1] Ivey contended that the City’s council (the “Council”) had enacted or amended certain City ordinances in an attempt to usurp the powers of the City’s mayor (the “Mayor”) as set forth in the City’s charter (the “Charter”), and that those ordinances are inconsistent with the Charter and therefore void. Following a hearing, the trial court found portions of two of the City’s General Ordinances to be inconsistent with the Charter and enjoined the Appellees from enforcing them. The trial court found that the other challenged ordinances did not conflict with the Charter, although it ordered that the Appellees rescind two of them. The trial court also awarded Ivey attorney fees. On appeal, Ivey contends that trial court erred in concluding that certain of the City’s General Ordinances did not conflict with the Charter. He also claims that the trial court failed to award reasonable attorney fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the case with direction.The relevant facts are not in dispute. Section 2.10 of the Charter provides that the governing authority of the City is “vested in a city council composed of a mayor and five councilmembers, one of whom shall be the mayor pro tempore.” Ga. L. 1990, p. 4631.[2] Further, under Section 2.16 (b) of the Charter, “the council shall have the authority to adopt and provide for the execution of such ordinances, resolutions, rules and regulations not inconsistent with [the] charter, the Constitution and laws of the State of Georgia[.]” Ga. Laws 1975, pp. 3970, 3981. The Mayor, under Section 3.10 of the Charter, is the City’s chief executive officer, and possesses “ all the executive and administrative powers contained in [the] charter.” Ga. L. 1975, pp. 3870, 3986.