Nahmias, Justice.After a six-day trial, a jury found Craig Johnson guilty of malice murder and other crimes related to the stabbing death of Nicole Judge. All of the original verbatim trial transcript materials were later destroyed in a fire at the court reporter’s house. The State ultimately provided Johnson with a 14-page, double-spaced document purported to be a complete narrative recreation of the trial transcript. As explained below, we conclude that the recreated transcript is not sufficiently detailed to allow Johnson a fair opportunity to appeal or to allow meaningful appellate review. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for new trial.[1]The Trial1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence available for review on appeal, which includes the recreated trial transcript, Johnson’s videotaped custodial statement, and most of the exhibits admitted at trial, shows the following.[2] On the night of February 28-29, 2008, Judge was stabbed to death. She suffered 36 separate stab wounds, including 10 to her head, three to her neck, six to her liver, and 14 to her back. She also had multiple cuts on her arms. Judge was found in her apartment on the floor of her children’s play room with a knife in her neck. Blood was found outside and inside the apartment, including blood stains on the driveway and porch, projected blood stains in the hallway and play room, bloody footprints in the kitchen and bathroom, and blood spots in the cutlery drawer in the kitchen. Bloody fingerprints on the door of the apartment and on a toy in the apartment matched Johnson’s fingerprints. When GBI agents searched Johnson’s house a few days after Judge’s death, they found socks and a shirt with her blood on them. In addition, a bank ATM video showed Johnson trying to use the victim’s ATM card on the night of her death, and Judge’s driver’s license and social security card were found in the bank parking lot.Four days later, Johnson was arrested, and GBI agents interviewed him for almost four hours. He was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and he signed a waiver of those rights. Johnson first told the agents that he was not at Judge’s apartment when she died. He then admitted that he had been there and claimed that he and Judge had sex, she said she wanted to be with him, he said no, she began stabbing herself, and he tried to stop her before running away. After an agent told Johnson that Judge’s stab wounds were not self-inflicted, he again changed his story, saying that while Judge was stabbing herself, her “boyfriend” (whom Johnson identified only as “T-man”) arrived, Judge and her boyfriend started fighting, Johnson ran to the kitchen to get a knife to defend himself, he returned when he heard Judge scream, he fought with the boyfriend, he then ran away, and the boyfriend followed him and forced him to use the victim’s ATM card.After being told that the physical evidence did not match this account either, Johnson admitted that there was no boyfriend and told the following story: When he rejected Judge, she threatened to tell his wife about their affair. Judge then pulled out a knife and tried to stab him. While they were fighting over the knife, Judge was stabbed and Johnson cut his hand. He then went to the kitchen to get a knife. He returned to the room where Judge was. She had dropped her knife but rushed at him, and he stabbed her. She then took his knife, and he went to the kitchen for another knife. He returned, and they fought more. At some point, he stabbed her in the back. She eventually fell to the floor, and he stabbed her again. He left her lying on the floor, went to the bathroom, cleaned up, and then fled. He tried to use her ATM card because he wanted to get money for her children.Johnson did not testify at trial. The jury was instructed on self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. It found him guilty of all counts tried. The evidence summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to return those guilty verdicts. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009).Post-Trial Procedural History2. On October 22, 2009, Johnson’s trial counsel filed a timely motion for new trial – a two-page document that summarily alleged only that the verdicts were contrary to the evidence and the law. On March 3, 2010, while presumably still represented by trial counsel, Johnson wrote the trial court’s clerk asking for a transcript of his trial; the clerk’s office told him to contact the court reporter. On September 24, 2010, Johnson asked the clerk’s office for a public defender to represent him on appeal; the clerk’s office told him to contact the public defender’s office. On March 14, 2011, appellate counsel from the circuit public defender’s office was finally appointed to represent Johnson.[3]Appellate counsel requested the trial transcript. Before the verbatim transcript, which had not yet been completed, was provided, a fire at the court reporter’s house on November 13, 2011 destroyed the tapes and other materials from which the verbatim transcript was to be prepared. At a motion for new trial hearing on April 30, 2012, Johnson argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial transcript was unavailable. The State replied that the procedures of OCGA § 5-6-41 (f) and (g) should be used to recreate the transcript. After briefing by both parties, on November 15, 2012, the trial court ordered the State to recreate the transcript and then provide Johnson time to offer alterations or additions; if the parties could not agree on the transcript, the court would hold a hearing. The State ultimately produced a 14-page, double- spaced narrative transcript of the six-day trial, and Johnson, while not conceding that the recreated transcript was sufficient, filed 12 minor suggestions for changes.On July 26, 2016, Johnson filed an amended motion for new trial, raising five enumerations of error, including a claim that the lack of the original trial transcript denied him a full opportunity to present an appeal and that the recreated transcript was not complete.[4] More than seven years after the trial, on October 13, 2016, the trial court held a hearing to consider the recreated transcript as well as the amended new trial motion. After first hearing argument regarding the transcript issue, the court said that Johnson’s 12 suggested changes were “well taken,” but that they were “form over substance.” The court declined to make any changes and rejected Johnson’s argument that the recreated transcript was not complete, ruling that “the transcript, as proposed, in and of itself is sufficient to be made the transcript of this trial along with the evidence and [should be] prepared by my court reporter and the clerk of court for an appropriate appeal.”[5] Based on the recreated trial transcript and the rest of the record, the trial court then heard argument on Johnson’s remaining contentions. On November 1, 2016, the court entered a written order summarily denying the motion for new trial. Johnson then filed this appeal.3. Our decision in this case rests on two fundamental principles: a defendant convicted of a crime has a right to appeal, and a defendant convicted of a felony has a right to a transcript of the trial to use in bringing that appeal. See Wilson v. State, 246 Ga. 672, 675 (273 SE2d 9) (1980). If an appellant is deprived of an adequate transcript, he has effectively been deprived of his right to appeal. See Sheard v. State, 300 Ga. 117, 120 (793 SE2d 386) (2016); Wade v. State, 231 Ga. 131, 133 (200 SE2d 271) (1973). Because Johnson was deprived of an adequate trial transcript, he has been denied his right to appeal, and he is therefore entitled to a new trial.(a) This is a felony case, and in felony cases the State is responsible for ensuring that a correct and complete transcript is created, preserved, and provided to the defendant upon his request. OCGA § 17-8-5 (a) says:On the trial of all felonies the presiding judge shall have the testimony taken down and, when directed by the judge, the court reporter shall exactly and truly record or take stenographic notes of the testimony and proceedings in the case, except the argument of counsel. In the event of a verdict of guilty, the testimony shall be entered on the minutes of the court or in a book to be kept for that purpose.See also OCGA § 5-6-41 (a) (“In all felony cases, the transcript of evidence and proceedings shall be reported and prepared by a court reporter as provided in Code Section 17-8-5 or as otherwise provided by law.”). This Court has explained that “it is the duty of the state to file the transcript after a guilty verdict has been returned in a felony case. Such is the law in this state, and in this legal era of numerous appeals and numerous post-conviction reviews it is a wise and reasonable requirement.” Wade, 231 Ga. at 133.Although not every portion of a criminal trial is required to be transcribed, most must be reported verbatim, with the express purpose of creating an appropriate record for appeal:Where a trial in any civil or criminal case is reported by a court reporter, all motions, colloquies, objections, rulings, evidence, whether admitted or stricken on objection or otherwise, copies or summaries of all documentary evidence, the charge of the court, and all other proceedings which may be called in question on appeal or other posttrial procedure shall be reported; and, where the report is transcribed, all such matters shall be included in the written transcript, it being the intention of this article that all these matters appear in the record. Where matters occur which were not reported, such as objections to oral argument, misconduct of the jury, or other like instances, the court, upon motion of either party, shall require that a transcript of these matters be made and included as a part of the record. . . .OCGA § 5-6-41 (d). See also Dunlap v. State, 291 Ga. 51, 53 (727 SE2d 468) (2012) (holding that jury voir dire and the opening and closing arguments of the attorneys are not required parts of a transcript of a non-death-penalty felony trial).If a verbatim transcript is not created or is lost before a defendant appeals, the defendant is not automatically entitled to a new trial, as the State can try to recreate the transcript under OCGA § 5-6-41 (f) and (g).[6] If “the transcript or record does not truly or fully disclose what transpired in the trial court,” OCGA § 5-6-41 (f) allows the transcript to be produced by recollection. If the parties do not agree about what occurred, “the trial court shall set the matter down for a hearing with notice to both parties and resolve the difference so as to make the record conform to the truth.” Id. OCGA § 5-6-41 (g) explains that a transcript prepared from recollection is entitled to “the same binding effect as a transcript filed by the court reporter,” but only if the parties agree. If the parties do not agree, the trial judge must decide. Id.[7] Here, the trial court concluded that the recreated transcript is correct and sufficient for appeal.(b) The first part of the trial court’s ruling – that the recreated transcript is correct – is not reviewable by this Court. See OCGA § 5-6-41 (g) (“In case of the inability of the parties to agree as to the correctness of such transcript, the decision of the trial judge thereon shall be final and not subject to review[.]“); Leeks v. State, 296 Ga. 515, 518 (769 SE2d 296) (2015). Appellate review is available, however, as to whether the recreated transcript is complete – meaning sufficient for Johnson to identify errors and this Court to evaluate the errors then enumerated. An appellant is entitled to a “complete and correct” transcript, Wilson, 246 Ga. at 675, one that “disclose[s] what transpired in the trial court” not only “truly” but “fully,” OCGA § 5-6-41 (f).Complete does not always mean verbatim; “where the trial is not reported or the transcript of the proceedings for any other reason is not available and the evidence is prepared from recollection, it may be prepared in narrative form.” OCGA § 5-6-41 (d). But even a narrative transcript must be sufficiently detailed to allow the defendant to identify alleged errors and to allow meaningful appellate review. When extensive and important parts of the trial transcript have been lost, recreating a complete transcript may, for example, require calling witnesses who testified or other individuals who were present for the trial. See, e.g., Mosley v. State, 300 Ga. 521, 524-526 (796 SE2d 684) (2017) (concluding that Mosley was not entitled to a new trial when the State recreated the transcript of one missing day of trial based on a hearing at which three of the four witnesses called that day testified along with Mosley’s trial counsel and the prosecutor).Such measures were not taken to recreate the transcript in this case. On the contrary, at the hearing on the recreated transcript, the prosecutor explained that the State prepared it from the trial court’s notes, the notes of an investigator from the district attorney’s office who was present at the trial, and the notes of the different prosecutor who tried the case. In evaluating the new transcript, the trial judge relied solely on those three sets of notes and his own recollection of the trial held more than seven years earlier.[8] The State apparently made no attempt to interview or call to testify anyone who had been a witness or present for the trial. Johnson’s appellate counsel said that he spoke with his client about what had occurred during the trial, but he represented to the court without objection that he was unable to obtain any assistance from Johnson’s trial counsel, who “had no notes and no recollection” and “basically refused and failed to assist” in preparing the transcript; by the time of the hearing, trial counsel had died.The result of this lackluster information-gathering process was a 14-page transcript – double-spaced, with wide margins and much additional white space – purporting to summarize a six-day trial and sentencing hearing. This elliptical transcript consists of brief summaries of the trial testimony given by the State’s 14 witnesses. It mentions the cross-examination of only two witnesses, but it is not clear whether that is because Johnson’s trial counsel did not cross- examine the other witnesses or because the transcript simply does not delineate between testimony given on direct examination and testimony given on cross- examination.[9] It is likely the latter, because in the brief summary of one witness, which contains no mention of cross-examination, the transcript notes that “Defendant’s Exhibit 1″ was admitted. More details generally are given about the 5 8 exhibits offered into evidence, including which witness testified about the exhibit and if it was admitted. All but one of the exhibits were admitted; the exception was an ATM log tendered as a “business record.” The recreated transcript does not explain why this evidence was not admitted and does not indicate that Johnson raised any objection to it.More troubling, although the recreated transcript notes that Johnson raised 14 objections to the admission of evidence, all of which were overruled, it does not describe the basis for any of these objections or for any of the trial court’s rulings. The recreation also notes that Johnson moved for a mistrial twice based on violations of two granted motions in limine and that the trial court denied both motions. In one instance, the court instructed the jury to disregard the witness’s use of the word “murder.” In the other instance, the transcript says that after the first responding police officer testified that he found Judge’s children when he arrived on the scene, in violation of a motion in limine granted on the first day of trial “to exclude any evidence of the victim’s young children being found in the apartment with the deceased victim,” the trial court concluded there was no prejudice from the witness’s mention of the victim’s children because the victim’s father “previously testified that the children were with their mother, the victim.” No such testimony, however, is reflected in the account of the father’s testimony in the recreated transcript. The court also gave a curative instruction “crafted and approved by counsel for both sides.” The substance of the instruction, however, is not described.A similar problem is found in the description of a GBI agent’s testimony. The recreated transcript says that when the agent “mentioned that Defendant had been arrested as a juvenile,” the trial court “objected” to this testimony (although objecting is normally done by the opposing party, rather than the court) and “restricted him from testifying as to that matter.” Again, important details are not provided, including whether a curative instruction was requested or given.Also unfortunately cursory is the recreated transcript’s account of the jury charge, which consists only of a list of pattern jury instruction numbers and titles that were given. There is no indication as to what instructions were requested by either party or discussed at the charge conference, whether the court denied any instructions requested by Johnson, or whether (and if so, how) the court modified these pattern instructions to fit the facts of the case.[10] Finally, the recreation recites that no objections were made by the parties during jury selection, opening statements, and closing arguments.[11](c) For these reasons, when considered as a whole, the recreated narrative transcript lacks sufficient accounts of crucial parts of Johnson’s trial. See Sheard, 300 Ga. at 121 (“[T]he jury charge – which is missing here – is a crucial portion of trial in which jurors are instructed on the applicable law, on how to evaluate the evidence, and on how to deliberate and reach a verdict[.]“); OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (authorizing plain error review of jury instructions not objected to at trial). See also Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (84 SCt 424, 11 LE2d 331) (1964) (“We conclude that [new appellate] counsel’s duty cannot be discharged unless he has a transcript of the testimony and evidence presented by the defendant and also the court’s charge to the jury, as well as the testimony and evidence presented by the prosecution.”). The lack of sufficient detail is particularly problematic because Johnson is represented by new counsel on appeal. See Sheard, 300 Ga. at 121 (“[F]orcing appellate counsel – who was not involved in the original trial – to divine error without the aid of a transcript is not only fruitless but also hinders counsel’s ability to adequately and zealously represent [his client] on appeal.”). See also Hardy, 375 U.S. at 279280 (“[W]hen, as here, new counsel represents the [defendant] on appeal, how can he faithfully discharge the obligation which the court has placed on him unless he can read the entire transcript?”).[12]Johnson asserts that there may have been errors made by the trial court or his trial counsel during the trial, but that without an adequate transcript he has no way of knowing. We agree. In cases where a verbatim transcript is missing just one or a few parts of the trial, particularly parts that are not required to be transcribed in the first place, this Court has held that the appellant is not entitled to a new trial unless he can point more specifically to some error that allegedly occurred during the omitted part. See, e.g., Ruffin v. State, 283 Ga. 87, 88 (656 SE2d 140) (2008) (“[T]he absence of a transcript of voir dire, opening statement, bench conferences and the polling of the jury . . . ‘cannot be reversible error absent an allegation of harm resulting from the deletion.’” (quoting Smith v. State, 251 Ga. 229, 230 (304 SE2d 716) (1983)). See also Sheard, 300 Ga. at 120 (“The mere fact that a portion of a transcript is missing does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial. Such omissions cannot be reversible error absent an allegation of harm resulting from the deletion. However, where the missing transcript prevents adequate review of the trial below, a new trial is warranted.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).We do not normally assume that an error occurred during a mere gap in a trial transcript. On the contrary, we presume that a trial court followed the law and that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance. See Edwards v. State, Case No. S17A0929, 2017 WL 3686633 at *3 (decided Aug. 28, 2017); Batten v. State, 295 Ga. 442, 445 (761 SE2d 70) (2014). Those presumptions, however, are just that – presumptions, which can be rebutted by what is shown in the record.An appeal is Johnson’s chance to point to the record and overcome those presumptions. He can only do that with an adequate transcript. In this case, where the whole original verbatim transcript of his trial is lost and the narrative recreation is manifestly inadequate, Johnson has not been given a fair opportunity to identify any trial errors and resulting harm or deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. See Sheard, 300 Ga. at 120121 (ordering a new trial where the transcript of the final day of trial, which included crucial parts of the trial, was missing and was not adequately recreated); Wilson, 246 Ga. at 674-675 (concluding, when 21 of the 34 trial tapes were missing, that “the omissions in the transcript preclude us from finding that [the omissions] were immaterial and harmless”); Montford v. State, 164 Ga. App. 627, 628 (298 SE2d 319) (1982) (ordering a new trial when the court reporter refused to make the transcription and all of the tapes of the trial “were very difficult to understand and contained much which was inaudible,” making them impossible for another court reporter to fully transcribe). See also McKinney v. State, 300 Ga. 562, 562 n.1 (797 SE2d 484) (2017) (noting that McKinney was retried because the transcript of his first trial was lost); Godbee v. State, 153 Ga. App. 115, 115 (264 SE2d 578) (1980) (noting that Godbee’s motion for new trial was granted because the transcript of the trial was lost).[13](d) Besides arguing that the recreated transcript is an adequate representation of the trial, the State contends here, as it did at the hearing on the recreated transcript, that the narrative recreation is sufficient simply because it shows that the evidence that Johnson murdered Judge was overwhelming, largely due to his videotaped statement; thus, the State insists, any errors that trial counsel or the trial court might have committed were necessarily harmless. But this Court cannot evaluate the strength of the evidence without a complete account of the overall evidence, and we certainly cannot evaluate the effect of unknown errors. See Montford, 164 Ga. App. at 628 (“It is true that where the transcript itself shows error is harmless, it may so be declared. Here, however, the transcript omissions preclude us from ascertaining if errors were made and if so, whether they were harmless.”). Engaging in such speculation would not provide Johnson the appeal to which he is entitled. We cannot hold that an appellant is not entitled to a complete trial transcript simply because it appears from the record that exists that he is clearly guilty. Because Johnson has been deprived of the ability to appeal his convictions, the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial.[14]Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
