Miller, Presiding Judge. This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. In Kautz v. Powell, 297 Ga. 283 (773 SE2d 690) (2015) (Kautz I), the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed this Court and the trial court by finding that Kelly D. Kautz had authority to terminate the City Attorney when she was mayor of the City of Snellville. Id. at 284. On remand, the trial court awarded Kautz the attorney fees she incurred in successfully pursuing her appeal in Kautz I. In this case, Dave Emanuel, in his official capacity as Council Member, along with the other city council members (collectively the “City”), appeal from the trial court’s award of fees, alleging that an award of appellate attorney fees is not permitted. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Kautz was entitled to an award of reasonable fees for the work done on appeal which was necessitated by her inability to obtain the relief requested from the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s award of appellate attorney fees to Kautz.Although the facts surrounding the various disputes between Kautz and the City are lengthy and have sparked three separate appeals,[1] the facts relevant to the present appeal are simple. Due to a conflict of interest between Kautz and the City Attorney that she was seeking to terminate, Kautz, in her official capacity, retained independent counsel to litigate the issue of her authority to terminate the City Attorney. After prevailing in Kautz I, Kautz moved for attorney fees in the trial court. It is undisputed that the City and Kautz reached a resolution concerning payment of fees incurred by Kautz at the trial level. At issue in this appeal are solely the attorney fees billed for the successful appellate work in Kautz I. The trial court held hearings, heard testimony, and ultimately awarded Kautz $52,005.00 in appellate fees and $8,094.45 in appellate expenses.1. The City contends that the trial court erred in awarding fees incurred for appellate work to Kautz. We disagree. [W]here, as here, an official, acting in [her] official capacity, is required to hire outside counsel to assert a legal position the local government attorney cannot (because of a conflict in representing the local government) or will not assert, and the official is successful in asserting his or her position, the local government must pay the official’s attorney fees. This is not because of any bad faith or improper conduct on the part of the local government . . . Rather, attorney fees in this instance are simply an expense of government operation.
