McFadden, Presiding Judge.Oconee Investment Group, LLC (“Oconee”) brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment as to various claims brought by Lisa Denton Turk in connection with referral services she provided to Oconee in a real estate transaction. On appeal, Oconee claims that OCGA § 43-40-24 (a) bars Turk from bringing this action to recover commissions or compensation for those services because she does not possess a valid Georgia real estate brokerage license. But Turk’s activities fell within an exception to the statute’s prohibition, so we affirm. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Home Builders Assn. of Savannah v. Chatham County, 276 Ga. 243, 245 (1) (577 SE2d 564) (2003).So viewed, the evidence shows that Oconee, through its agent, offered to sell Turk multiple lots and trailers in a real estate development. Turk declined the offer because she did not have the funds for the purchase. Oconee and Turk then reached an agreement whereby Oconee would give Turk a specific lot and trailer in the development if Turk referred to Oconee a bona fide purchaser for the remaining lots and trailers and a specified minimum price per lot. When the parties entered into this agreement, Turk did not hold a Georgia real estate brokerage license.Turk referred to Oconee a buyer who ultimately purchased the lots and trailers. But Oconee refused to pay Turk either the agreed-upon referral compensation of a lot and trailer or, alternatively, a fee of $20,000 that Turk agreed to accept in lieu of the lot and trailer. Instead, Oconee offered to pay Turk a cash fee of $7,200 or a credit toward the purchase of the lot and trailer. Turk declined this offer. Turk sued Oconee for breach of contract, fraud, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. She sought specific performance of her agreement with Oconee in the form of the lot and trailer or, alternatively, damages of either $20,000 or a sum representing the reasonable value of her services. Oconee moved for summary judgment on these claims, the trial court denied Oconee’s motion, and we granted interlocutory appellate review.Oconee argues on appeal that it is entitled to summary judgment on the ground that OCGA § 43-40-24 (a) bars each of Turk’s claims because she did not have a Georgia real estate brokerage license. We disagree.Chapter 40 of Title 43 prohibits an unlicensed person from “[h]old[ing] himself or herself out as a referral agent for the purpose of securing prospects for the listing, sale, purchase, exchange, renting, lease, or option for any real estate[.]” OCGA § 43-40-1 (2) (B). Among the sanctions for violations of that prohibition is a bar from collecting fees. OCGA § 43-40-24 (a) provides, “ No person shall bring or maintain any action in the courts of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any of the acts mentioned in this chapter [Chapter 40] without alleging and proving that he was a licensed broker in Georgia at the time the alleged cause of action arose.” But there are statutory exceptions. OCGA § 43-40-29 (a). While certain of those exceptions, and a prior version of the exceptions statute as a whole, have been construed to not contemplate recovery of fees, in its current version, the exception at issue here expressly contemplates fees. It provides that Chapter 40 does not apply to[a]ny person acting as a referral agent who is not involved in the actual negotiations, execution of documents, collection of rent, management of property, or other related activity which involves more than the mere referral of one person to another and who:
(A) Does not receive a fee for such referral from the party being referred;
