Rickman, Judge.Marquis Lester was indicted for aggravated battery (OCGA § 16-5-24) and aggravated assault (OCGA § 16-5-21) for striking a woman in the face with a pool stick (also known as a pool cue), ultimately resulting in the loss of her eye. The jury found Lester guilty of aggravated assault and not guilty of aggravated battery. Lester appeals his conviction and the denial of his motion for new trial, contending that the trial court abused its discretion when it barred Lester’s counsel from asking certain questions during voir dire, thereby denying Lester the opportunity to expose possible bias in the potential jurors, and that the trial court erred in denying Lester’s motion to strike the venire after the State displayed demonstrative versions of a pool stick in the courtroom during voir dire. For reasons that follow, we affirm. On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). So viewed, the evidence showed that on February 1, 2010, the victim (Lester’s former girlfriend) went to a bar that Lester frequented regularly and saw Lester sitting at a table. As she walked past Lester on her way to the bar to buy a drink, he verbally insulted her. After she purchased a drink, she went outside and then returned to use the restroom. When she was headed toward the restroom, Lester continued to make insulting comments to her, while tossing a pool stick back and forth between his hands. The victim testified that “after the continuous taunts,” she threw her drink in his face. She then remembers being hit in the head, and feeling excruciating pain, but could not remember further details. The victim was shown a video surveillance tape of the incident, which was published to the jury, and testified that the video shows she put her hand up in an attempt to block a pool stick that Lester used to hit her. After she had been struck, she bent over and Lester pushed her out of the way and walked out laughing, with the pool stick in his hand. An employee of the bar helped her up and gave her a towel for her face, which was bleeding profusely. The victim then went to the hospital. The injuries she sustained included a split eyelid and a ruptured globe, and she ultimately lost her eye.[1] While she was at the hospital, the victim told police officers that Lester is the person who had caused her injuries. Lester contacted her after the incident and said that he was sorry and did not mean to do it. At trial, the victim identified Lester as the person who struck her in the face with a pool stick on February 1, 2010. Lester testified at trial and admitted hitting the victim with the pool stick, but claimed that he was acting in self-defense. He testified that he was not trying to hurt her.1. Lester contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to let him ask potential jurors two questions — (1) Is there anyone here who believes that a woman cannot be the aggressor in an argument with a man? and (2) Is there anyone here who believes a man cannot defend himself from physical violence by a woman? He argues that the trial court’s ruling denied him the opportunity to expose possible bias in potential jurors.The limits a court may place on voir dire questions lie largely within the sound discretion of the court, and we will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless it is manifestly abused. Ganas v. State, 245 Ga. App. 645, 647 (2) (537 SE2d 758) (2000). OCGA § 15-12-133 delineates the proper scope of questions during jury selection and provides: . . . In all criminal cases, both the state and the accused shall have the right to an individual examination of each prospective juror from which the jury is to be selected prior to interposing a challenge. The examination shall be conducted after the administration of a preliminary oath to the panel or in criminal cases after the usual voir dire questions have been put by the court. In the examination, the counsel for either party shall have the right to inquire of the individual prospective jurors examined touching any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the prospective juror in the case, including any opinion as to which party ought to prevail, the relationship or acquaintance of the prospective juror with the parties or counsel therefor, any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias which the prospective juror might have respecting the subject matter of the action or the counsel or parties thereto, and the religious, social, and fraternal connections of the prospective juror.
