Per Curiam.This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report of Special Master Michael E. Sumner, who recommends that the Court accept the petition for voluntary discipline filed by Respondent Edward Neal Davis (State Bar No. 208220), pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (c), following the issuance of a Formal Complaint charging him with a variety of violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, including, but not limited to, violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (II) (b), and 8.4 (a) (4), see Bar Rule 4-102 (d). After discovery and settlement negotiations, Davis, with the approval of the State Bar, agreed that he would submit the underlying petition, admitting only that he violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (b), and seeking a Review Panel Reprimand, although the maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.15 (I) and (II) is disbarment.In his petition, Davis admitted conduct which would appear to violateRules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II)[1] and recited factors he believed should mitigate the level of discipline to be imposed. He also addressed the conduct underlying the alleged violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4),[2] but refused to admit that he had violated that Rule. The Bar did not oppose Davis’s petition for voluntary discipline, which resulted from negotiations that concluded prior to the issuance of this Court’s decisions in In the Matter of West, 300 Ga. 777 (798 SE2d 219) (2017) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline in part because admitted facts showed what seemed to be a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) but attorney denied any such violation, and the Bar took no position on the matter), and In the Matter of Iwu, 301 Ga. 52 (799 SE2d 155) (2017) (rejecting a petition for voluntary discipline where attorney admitted facts that supported the conclusion that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4), but he declined to admit such a violation). In light of those two opinions, the Bar repeatedly urged Davis to include in his petition an admission that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by notarizing a signature on a deed which had not been executed in his presence, but Davis refused to do so, claiming instead that he did not violate the Rule because he had no intent to violate the Rule when he notarized the deed and because no harm flowed from his actions.But Rule 8.4 (a) (4) plainly states that “[i]t shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation.” It contains no requirement that harm result from an attorney’s conduct and, to the extent that Rule 8.4 (a) (4) contains an implicit intent element, that element is not focused on whether the attorney intended to violate the rule. See In the Matter of West, 301 Ga. 901 (804 SE2d 340) (2017) (accepting West’s renewed petition for voluntary discipline and recognizing the State Bar’s position that Rule 8.4 (a) (4) contains an implicit requirement that the attorney’s conduct be intended or likely to mislead or deceive another)[3] To be sure, Davis’s professed lack of intent to violate Rule 8.4 (a) (4) and the absence of harm resulting from his violation of that Rule may well provide mitigating circumstances with regard to the level of discipline to be imposed, see In the Matter of Swain, 290 Ga. 678, 679 (725 SE2d 244) (2012) (recognizing lack of intent to cause harm as a factor in mitigation of discipline for violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4)); see also In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232) (1996) (this Court looks to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction); ABA Standards 4.6, 5.1, 6.1, and 7.0 (addressing factors to be considered in determining the appropriate level of discipline for various types of cases involving an attorney’s dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and ABA Standard 9.3 (listing factors in mitigation of discipline). Nevertheless, the fact remains that Davis admitted knowingly notarizing a signature on a deed, thereby attesting-falsely as it turns out-that the deed had been signed in his presence by the person whose “signature” appeared thereon. In light of Davis’s admissions and the fact that the Bar has taken no position on whether the evidence is sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Davis’s actions amount to a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4), compare In the Matter of West, 301 Ga. at 904 (acknowledging the Bar’s admission that, in light of the specific circumstances of West’s case, “it is not a foregone conclusion that a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) could be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence”), the Court rejects Davis’s petition for voluntary discipline.Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.
