Barnes, Presiding Judge.Timothy F. Coen appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his complaint alleging abusive litigation against his former employer, the employer’s law firm, and several other defendants. The complaint alleged that the defendants engaged in abusive litigation under OCGA § 51-7-80 et seq. based on their conduct and tactics in a prior lawsuit and sought damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6 and punitive damages under OCGA § 51-12-5.1. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it lacked allegations of special damages sustained by Coen and because punitive damages were not available for statutory abusive litigation claims. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that a plaintiff pursuing a statutory abusive litigation claim is not required to plead special damages and instead can elect to seek general damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6 for a defendant’s malicious, wilful, or wanton misconduct in the underlying litigation. In contrast, we conclude that, as established by our precedent, a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 for a statutory abusive litigation claim. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s dismissal of Coen’s complaint for abusive litigation.We begin with the wellsettled standard that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of the relief sought by the claimant, the complaint is sufficient and a motion to dismiss should be denied. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party’s favor. On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted is reviewed de novo. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) RESGA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 445-446 (807 SE2d 381) (2017). Guided by these principles, we turn to the record in the present case. The Contract Lawsuit. The allegations of abusive litigation relate to a breach of contract lawsuit that Coen filed in 2012 against his former employer, CDC Software Corporation, in the State Court of DeKalb County in which Coen sought severance payments allegedly owed to him as part of his discharge from the company (the “Contract Lawsuit”).[1] In the Contract Lawsuit, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to Coen on several counts of his complaint, including breach of contract. Pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) and (b), the trial court thereafter entered an order granting attorney fees and expenses to Coen against CDC Software, its law firm, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP n/k/a Eversheds Sutherland (the “Sutherland Firm”), and Aptean. The trial court found that the defendants had “adopted a strategy of litigation by attrition” and had “vigorously litigated baseless defenses in the hopes of litigating [Coen], an individual with very limited resources, to the point where he could no longer afford to continue without settling for a lesser sum.” The trial court concluded that the defendants’ “strategy constitutes the very bad faith OCGA § 9-15-14 exists to prevent, and the very bad faith that warrants an award of attorney[] fees and expenses.” Based on its findings and conclusions regarding the defendants’ misconduct, the trial court awarded Coen $174,400.00 in attorney fees and $2,084.80 in expenses. The Initial Abusive Litigation Lawsuits. Coen voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims in the Contract Lawsuit in September 2014. In 2015, Coen filed three abusive litigation actions in the State Court of Fulton County, relying on the trial court’s findings of misconduct in the Contract Lawsuit.[2] Specifically, in February 2015, he filed an abusive litigation lawsuit against the Sutherland Firm and Allegra LawrenceHardy, a partner in the Sutherland Firm who was involved in CDC Software’s defense in the Contract Lawsuit. In September 2015, Coen filed an abusive litigation lawsuit against Gabriel Mendel, an associate with the Sutherland Firm involved in the Contract Lawsuit.[3] In June 2015, Coen filed an abusive litigation lawsuit against CDC Software, its successor Aptean, and several of their corporate officers and directors[4] (collectively, the “CDC Software Defendants”). Coen voluntarily dismissed without prejudice these abusive litigation lawsuits in May 2016.[5] The Present Abusive Litigation Lawsuit. In September 2016, Coen filed the present abusive litigation action against the CDC Software Defendants and the Sutherland Firm, LawrenceHardy, and Mendel (collectively, the “Sutherland Defendants”) in the State Court of DeKalb County, alleging that the present action was a valid renewal of the prior abusive litigation lawsuits that Coen had voluntarily dismissed.[6] The complaint alleged that the CDC Software Defendants and the Sutherland Defendants had acted with malice and without substantial justification in the Contract Lawsuit by denying that CDC Software owed any payment whatsoever to Coen, despite an employment contract to the contrary, and by asserting baseless, boilerplate affirmative defenses without substantial justification for a wrongful purpose. The complaint further alleged that as a result of the aggressive, unfounded conduct of the defendants in the Contract Lawsuit, Coen was forced to litigate over a protracted period of almost two years against a defense with no basis whatsoever in order to recover a valid debt. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the misconduct of the CDC Software Defendants and the Sutherland Defendants had been conclusively established by the trial court in its order granting attorney fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-15-14 in the Contract Lawsuit. Among other claims in his complaint,[7] Coen asserted a claim for abusive litigation under OCGA § 51-7-80 et seq. and sought damages for injury to his peace, happiness, and feelings under OCGA § 51-12-6,[8] alleging that the defendants’ misconduct in the Contract Lawsuit caused him mental distress and was malicious, wilful, and wanton. Coen also sought punitive damages under OCGA § 51-12-5.1.[9] Coen did not seek special damages, including any special damages for the attorney fees and expenses he had incurred in the Contract Lawsuit because, as previously noted, the trial court had awarded him those fees and expenses pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14 as part of that prior litigation. The trial court subsequently granted motions to dismiss the present action filed by the CDC Software Defendants and the Sutherland Defendants, concluding that while Coen had filed a timely renewal action, he had failed to allege all of the requisite elements of a claim for abusive litigation. In this regard, the trial court found that OCGA § 51-7-83[10] and precedent of this Court required that special damages be specifically pled in the complaint to support an abusive litigation claim. The trial court further concluded that damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6 “could not serve as the basis for special damages” and that punitive damages under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 were not available for an abusive litigation claim. Consequently, the trial court concluded that Coen had failed to allege the types of damages necessary to support a separate cause of action for abusive litigation, such that his sole remedy was a motion for attorney fees and expenses under OCGA § 91514, which Coen already had successfully pursued in the Contract Lawsuit. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed with prejudice Coen’s complaint in its entirety. Coen thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.[11]1. Coen contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his abusive litigation claim on the ground that he failed to plead any special damages. According to Coen, a party asserting a statutory abusive litigation claim is entitled to forego special damages and pursue general damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6 for malicious, wilful, or wanton misconduct in the underlying litigation, as Coen chose to do in his complaint. We agree. As an initial matter, we note that “[s]pecial damages are those which actually flow from a tortious act; they must be proved in order to be recovered.” OCGA § 51-12-2 (b). In contrast, “[g]eneral damages are those which the law presumes to flow from any tortious act; they may be recovered without proof of any amount.” OCGA § 51-12-2 (a). Damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6 are a form of general damages. See Land v. Boone, 265 Ga. App. 551, 553 (a) (594 SE2d 741) (2004). OCGA § 51126 does not itself create a cause of action for mental distress; rather, it “prescribes the measure of recovery” for mental distress damages where an underlying tort already exists that supports a recovery of that type of damages. See Reeves v. Edge, 225 Ga. App. 615, 619 (4) (484 SE2d 498) (1997). If the underlying tort authorizes the recovery of mental distress damages under OCGA § 51-12-6, then the plaintiff may elect to forego special damages and instead pursue general damages for mental distress. See Vogtle v. Coleman, 259 Ga. 115, 116 (1) (376 SE2d 861) (1989). However, “[i]f damages for mental pain and suffering sought under this section are not accompanied by physical or pecuniary loss, recovery is allowed only if the conduct complained of was malicious, wilful or wanton.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sletto v. Hosp. Auth., 239 Ga. App. 203, 204-205 (1) (521 SE2d 199) (1999). See Dierkes v. Crawford Orthodontic Care, P.C., 284 Ga. App. 96, 101 (4) (643 SE2d 364) (2007). Against this legal backdrop, we turn to whether a party pursuing an action for abusive litigation must plead and prove special damages or instead can elect to seek general damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6. In Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92, 95-96 (12), (13) (344 SE2d 414) (1986), the Supreme Court of Georgia redefined into a single cause of action the common law torts pertaining to abusive litigation of malicious abuse of process and malicious use of process. See Great Western Bank v. Southeastern Bank, 234 Ga. App. 420, 421 (507 SE2d 191) (1998). Subsequently, in 1989, the General Assembly created a new statutory cause of action for abusive litigation, codified at OCGA § 51-7-80 et seq., which revised and replaced all common law torts for abusive litigation, including the tort enunciated by our Supreme Court in Yost. See Ga. L. 1989, p. 408, § 2. See also OCGA § 51-7-85;[12] Great Western Bank, 234 Ga. App. at 421. Unlike prior common law torts for abusive litigation, the new statutory regime “creates an independent cause of action [that] is not procedurally ancillary to the underlying proceeding, except where only attorney fees are sought.” Great Western Bank, 234 Ga. App. at 422. See OCGA §§ 51-7-83 (b); 51-7-84 (b).[13] Under the abusive litigation statutory scheme, “any person who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or procurement of civil proceedings against another shall be liable for abusive litigation if such person acts: (1) with malice; and (2) without substantial justification.” (Punctuation omitted.) Bacon v. Volvo Svc. Center, 288 Ga. App. 399, 400 (654 SE2d 225) (2007), quoting OCGA § 51-7-81. A party who prevails on a statutory abusive litigation claim is “entitled to all damages allowed by law as proven by the evidence, including costs and expenses of litigation and reasonable attorney[] fees.” OCGA § 51-7-83 (a). If the party previously filed a motion for attorney fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-15-14 in the underlying litigation, then the party cannot seek fees and expenses as part of their independent statutory claim for abusive litigation under OCGA § 51-7-80 et seq., although the party can still seek other damages that were incurred. See OCGA § 51-7-83 (c). Given this statutory language and framework, the trial court erred in holding that Coen was required to plead special damages to support an abusive litigation claim and could not instead elect to pursue general damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6. As previously noted, OCGA § 51-7-83 (a) permits a party who prevails on an abusive litigation claim to recover “all damages allowed by law as proven by the evidence” and, as a general rule, “all means all, every single one.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Waste Mgmt. of Metro Atlanta v. Appalachian Waste Systems, 286 Ga. App. 476, 481 (1) (649 SE2d 578) (2007). Accordingly, we discern no reason under the statutory language and scheme for requiring a party asserting an abusive litigation claim to plead and prove special damages; rather, a party can forego special damages and pursue an award of general damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6 based on the opposing party’s litigation conduct that was malicious, wilful, or wanton.[14] See Freeman v. Wheeler, 277 Ga. App. 753, 757 (627 SE2d 86) (2006) (indicating that a plaintiff asserting a statutory abusive litigation claim can seek damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6 if there is wilful misconduct, but concluding that the plaintiff’s claim failed because there was no evidence that the defendants’ litigation conduct was wilful). It is true that “[t]he abusive litigation tort set forth in OCGA § 51-7-80 et. seq. is in derogation of the common law, and must be strictly limited to the meaning of the language used, and not extended beyond the plain and explicit statutory terms.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Baylis v. Daryani, 294 Ga. App. 729, 731-732 (2) (669 SE2d 674) (2008). See Davis v. Wallace, 310 Ga. App. 340, 345 (2) (713 SE2d 446) (2011). But, even if OCGA § 51-7-83 (a) is strictly construed to mean that a prevailing party can recover all damages allowed at common law for abusive litigation, that does not change the result here. Under the common law tort of abusive litigation as redefined in Yost, a prevailing party could forego special damages and instead pursue general damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6 where there was malicious, wilful, or wanton misconduct. See Vogtle, 259 Ga. at 116 (1); Yost, 256 Ga. at 95 (10); Woodall v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, 198 Ga. App. 624, 626 (402 SE2d 359) (1991); Cassidy v. Wilson, 196 Ga. App. 6, 8 (395 SE2d 291) (1990); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Phillips, 193 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) (387 SE2d 34) (1989).[15] Hence, even when construed strictly, OCGA § 51-7-83 (a) permits a party to forego special damages and pursue general damages for mental distress under OCGA § 51-12-6 based on malicious, wilful, or wanton misconduct in the underlying litigation.As noted by the trial court and the defendants, in Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 326-327 (3) (a) (606 SE2d 336) (2004), this Court stated that “the lawsuit contemplated by OCGA § 51780 et seq. is appropriate in only two circumstances: when the allegedly abusive civil litigation occurs in a court other than one of record, or when the allegedly abused litigant can prove special damages in addition to the costs and expenses of litigation and attorney fees.” Notably, however, Condon addressed the application of OCGA § 9-15-14 and whether a motion under that statute could be renewed under OCGA § 9-2-61 (a), and deciding the full scope of damages available for a statutory abusive litigation claim was not essential to that determination. Read in context, the quoted language from Condon was simply intended to highlight that damages other than attorney fees and expenses can be recovered as part of a statutory abusive litigation claim, in contrast to motions filed under OCGA § 9-15-14, which are limited to the recovery of such fees and expenses. Nothing in the comparison turned on which particular damages other than attorney fees and expenses could be recovered as part of a statutory abusive litigation claim. It follows that the passing reference to “special” damages in Condon was obiter dicta lacking the force of an adjudication because it was a statement in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand. As the U.S. Supreme Court [has] noted, we are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case where the point now at issue was not fully debated.[[16]] General expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for adjudication.
