Doyle, Presiding Judge.This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment filed by the City of Saint Marys in a trip and fall action filed by Eunice Reed, who sustained a fractured arm and other injuries after she fell on a sidewalk she claims is owned and maintained by the City. After the trial court denied the motion, it issued a certificate of immediate review, and this Court granted the City’s application for interlocutory appeal. The City claims on appeal that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, and we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.[1]
So viewed, the record reveals that Reed was injured in June 2007 while walking for exercise when she tripped and fell on a sidewalk, breaking her arm.[2] Reed testified that it was a clear day, nothing was obstructing the sidewalk, and she could have seen the crack in the sidewalk but did not notice it that day. Photographs of the sidewalk show a seam along two slabs causing one slab to be about 1.5 to 2 inches taller than the neighboring slab. Reed could not say for sure whether she tripped over the raised portion of the slab, but she “just knew that [her] feet hit something.” She could not say the exact point on which she tripped, only that it was at that slab. After falling, she called her daughter and 911, and a fire truck responded. Reed’s daughter transported her to the hospital, and the following day, Reed met with an officer, reporting her injury, and the officer prepared a report. The City filed numerous motions for summary judgment, and the trial court denied them, finding that questions of fact existed, inter alia, as to whether the City had constructive notice of the defect. We disagree and reverse.By statute, a municipality is relieved of liability resulting from a defect in a public road or sidewalk when it has no actual notice thereof or when such defect has not existed for a sufficient length of time for notice thereof to be inferred. Implied or constructive notice of a defect may be shown in a variety of ways; for example, testimony as to how long the defect had existed prior to the accident, objective evidence that the defect had existed over time, or evidence that other persons had also fallen as a result of the same condition over a period of years. Notice may also be imputed to the city from the knowledge of its own agents or employees.[3]
