Benham, Justice.Appellant Philmore Reed, Jr. resided at a property located at 1020 Donald Lee Hollowell Parkway and operated businesses there and at other contiguous parcels. He was in his mid-seventies when these offenses occurred.[1]At trial, evidence was presented to show that commencing in 2009, appellantwas involved in a civil dispute with other parties concerning ownership of theseparcels. In late 2010, the party who claimed to be the rightful owner of theparcel on which appellant resided, by virtue of a judicial sale of the property,hired a tow company to enter the property to remove old vehicles parked on it.That tow truck operator left after appellant threatened his life if he came back.In February 2011, the owner hired a different company, and employees TravisFenty and James Donegan went to the property three different times. OnFebruary 3, appellant called the police, and when the police arrived, Fenty andDonegan stated they would not return without the proper documentation toshow they had authority from the true owner of the property. On February 24,they came to the property again and towed several vehicles away. When theyreturned later that day, they saw appellant standing on the roof of the buildingwith a shotgun. Fenty commenced calling 911 and asked appellant to comedown to talk, telling him they had with them a copy of the deed showing theperson who hired them owned the property. Appellant told the men he wasthrough talking and fired two shots at them. Fenty was struck in the chest withthe spray of shotgun pellets from the first shot, and died from his wounds. Theevidence showed appellant fired a second shot which hit one of the truck tires.The police arrived at the scene and took appellant into custody. After beinginformed of his rights, appellant voluntarily gave a statement in which he confessed to the shooting.Appellant was charged with murder and other offenses. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, as well as the count alleging aggravated assault upon Donegan. Appellant was found guilty of all remaining counts, and the trial judge sentenced him to life in prison for malice murder plus five years to serve for the possession of a firearm offense. He now appeals. Although appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him, it is this Court’s practice to examine the sufficiency of the evidence in murder cases. Viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdicts, we conclude the evidence, as summarized above, was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). The trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction on no duty to retreat. Appellant asserts that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury on the principle of no duty to retreat. We disagree. We start by noting that the trial court gave an appropriate charge on the appellant’s sole defense, the defense of habitation. As part of his theory of defense, appellant claims he reasonably believed the victim and his co-worker entered his property for the purpose of committing the felony of theft by taking his vehicles from the property and that his use of force was necessary to prevent that felony, thereby establishing, according to appellant, one of the grounds for the permissible use of force in defending an unlawful entry into a habitation. See OCGA § 16-3-23 (3).[2] In response to appellant’s request, the trial court gave an instruction on theft by taking. Appellant asserts, however, that the State inserted the issue of duty to retreat into the proceedings when the prosecutor raised during appellant’s cross-examination, and in the State’s closing argument, that appellant could have called the police instead of confronting Fenty and Donegan. At a charge conference, appellant’s counsel made a written request for instructions on what he referred to as “the general principle of justification” and on the principle of no duty to retreat. Both of these instructions were denied, although, as noted, the trial court agreed to give an instruction on defense of habitation. Trial counsel asked to reserve his objection regarding the failure to give these requested instructions until afterthe all the evidence was presented. Appellant made no further request for these two instructions, however, and made no objection to the failure to give the instructions after the trial court delivered the jury charge. Accordingly, appellant acknowledges that he must show plain error in order to prevail on his assertion that the trial court’s failure to give these instructions constitutesreversible error. See Willis v. State,_____ Ga.___ (2) (c) (816 SE2d 656) (CaseNo. S18A0035, decided June 29, 2018). As this Court has repeatedly stated:In order to establish reversible error under the plain error standard of review for jury instructions, the instruction must not only be erroneous; the error must be obvious; the error must not have been affirmatively waived; and the appellant must make an affirmative showing that the instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings. See State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011); see also Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 873 (2) (742 SE2d 707) (2013). Only if the appellant has met the burden of proof with respect to these three prongs of the plain error test, the appellate court may, in its discretion, remedy the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. [Cit.]Id. at___ (2) (c). Citing Price v. State,[3] appellant claims the trial court’s failureto give a charge on no duty to retreat was erroneous because a trial court must charge the jury completely on a defendant’s sole theory of defense, even absent a request to do so, if there is some evidence to support the charge.[4] With respect to the principle of no duty to retreat, appellant argues that the jury charge as a whole was incomplete and not adjusted to the evidence because the jury was not instructed that an individual who is not the aggressor is not required to retreat, and has the right to stand his or her ground and use force in defense of habitation in the manner set forth in OCGA § 16-3-23 (1) or (3).[5]See OCGA § 16-3-23.1.[6]Even assuming the evidence showed appellant was not the aggressor and that the jury could find his use of force was justified, and also assuming,without deciding, that the prosecutor’s questions to appellant about why he didnot call the police raised the issue of retreat, the trial court’s failure to instructthe jury that a person who is justified in using force to defend a habitation hasno duty to retreat does not mandate reversal because the given charge fairlypresented appellant’s defense to the jury. See Price, supra, 289 Ga. at 460 (2).The trial court’s instructions covered the law of justification in general. It alsospecifically covered the law of justification with respect to use of force indefense of habitation “such that all of [appellant's] defenses could be properlyconsidered, and any . . . additional specific instructions by the court on theduty to retreat were unnecessary.” Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 250 (3) (773SE2d 254) (2015). The trial court charged the jury that “[a] person is justifiedin threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that hereasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to prevent orterminate such other’s unlawful entry into or attack upon habitation.” Itcharged that the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or bodilyharm is justified only, among other reasons, if “the person using such forcereasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the purpose ofcommitting a felony therein, and that such force is necessary to prevent thecommission of the felony.” Having reviewed the trial transcript and the entirejury charge, we conclude appellant has failed to make an affirmative showing that the alleged erroneous instructions likely affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 873-874 (2) (742 SE2d 707) (2013) (rejecting appellant’s assertion that a charge on no duty to retreat should have been given because he failed to show the alleged error probably affected the outcome since he had a fair opportunity to present his defense of self- defense and the transcript showed the trial court adequately charged the jury on the justification of self-defense). Because appellant has failed to meet the burden of proof to establish one of the mandatory prongs of the plain error test, he cannot prevail on his assertion that the trial court’s jury instructions created reversible error. See Willis v. State, supra,____________________________ Ga. at___ (2) (c).3. The trial court’s failure to give jury instructions on involuntarymanslaughter and criminal negligence. Appellant testified at trial and told thejury that when he fired the shotgun he was not aiming at Fenty but was aimingfor the nose of the tow truck to disable it and stop the men from leaving untilhe could dress and go downstairs to speak to them. Appellant asserts that thetrial court committed plain error when it refused to give appellant’s requestedcharges on criminal negligence and on involuntary manslaughter as a lesserincluded offense of murder. The trial judge announced at the charge conference that he would give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter but that he would not instruct on criminal negligence or involuntary manslaughter because, in his judgment, the evidence did not support the giving of these instructions. Appellant objected at that time, but failed to renew his objection after the court charged the jury. Appellant again acknowledges that he must show plain error in the jury instructions to prevail on his assertion that the failure to give these charges created reversible error.Appellant argues the jury could have found that he acted simply with criminal negligence and therefore could have found him guilty of the offense of involuntary manslaughter by causing the death of another, without any intention to do so, by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.[7]Though appellant admitted he fired the gun intentionally, he denied he intentionally shot Fenty and, instead, claimed he was attempting merely to shoot at and disable the tow truck. Appellant testified he knew that pellets from a shotgun blast spread, but he nevertheless argues the jury was entitled to find he acted recklessly, and not with intent to assault Fenty with a deadly weapon. To prevail on this argument requires appellant affirmatively to establish all four prongs of the plain error test, which is a difficult standard to satisfy. See State v. Kelly, supra, 290 Ga. at 33 (2) (a). Even assuming the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on involuntary manslaughter and criminal negligence, appellant has failed to satisfy the third element of the plain error test in that he has failed to make an affirmative showing that the error likely affected the outcome of the trial.The jury convicted Appellant of malice murder and aggravated assault,and the evidence amply supported those verdicts. Donegan testified that afterhe told Fenty a second time that he saw appellant on the roof with a raised gun,Donegan ran and Fenty looked up, commenced dialing 911, and askedappellant to come down and talk. Appellant then said that he was throughtalking and fired the gun. Appellant notes that aggravated assault with a deadlyweapon requires a showing that the accused committed simple assault, and thatsimple assault, as defined by OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), involves “an act whichplaces another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violentinjury.” From Donegan’s testimony, appellant argues that insufficientevidence was presented to show Fenty experienced such reasonable10apprehension. But simple assault is also defined as at attempt to commit a violent injury to another person. See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1). Based on its reading of the indictment, the trial court twice charged the jury that it could find appellant guilty of aggravated assault only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant “attempted to cause a violent injury to the alleged victim.” Moreover,by finding Appellant guilty of malice murder, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot at the victim with malice aforethought.[8]Appellant has not shown that the failure of the trial court to give the charges at issue likely affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, Appellant has failed to demonstrate plain error for the failure to give these requested instructions.Judgment affirmed. Melton, C.J., Nahmias, P.J., Hunstein, Blackwell, Boggs, and Peterson, J.J., concur.
