Rickman, Judge.The biological father of E. M. appeals from a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his minor child. For the reasons given below, we affirm. The record shows that in December 2015, the Juvenile Court of Murray County entered a dependency removal order for three children, including E. M. (then age five), arising in part from the children’s mother having tested positive to multiple controlled substances at the time she gave birth to the youngest of the three children. The children were placed in foster care. The local Department of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) thereafter filed a petition alleging that the children were dependent, and the court entered a preliminary protective order. At the hearing on the petition, the mother testified that the appellant, the biological father of only E. M.,[1] was incarcerated for “family violence” and that the couple was not married. The appellant was not present for the hearing. In January 2016, the court found that the children were dependent because the appellant was incarcerated, the other two biological fathers had no bond with their children, and the mother was an unrehabilitated drug user; the court therefore placed custody of the children with DFCS. All parents were ordered to contact the office of child support enforcement immediately to establish an account for the payment of any child support obligation, which was set, at a minimum, at $45 per week for one child pending further determination.Separately, the appellant was issued a “reunification/adoption” case plan that required him to comply with numerous conditions, including that he begin supervised visits with E. M. once he was released from incarceration “if approved by the courts.”As of a February 2016 case plan review, the appellant had been appointed counsel, but he remained incarcerated and did not appear; he was expected to come up for parole in May 2016. In that same month, he moved to legitimate E. M. In December 2016, DFCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of all three children. A hearing on the matter was held on June 20, 2017. The appellant was still incarcerated at the time of the hearing and not present, although he was represented by counsel. At the termination hearing, DFCS presented two witnesses, and the court took judicial notice of the entire record with certain exceptions not relevant here. The mother was not present because she recently had been arrested on a new drug charge and was incarcerated. The guardian ad litem and the court-appointed special advocate (CASA), who were present at the hearing, did not testify, but the CASA’s reports are included in the record.Following the hearing, the juvenile court terminated all of the parents’ parental rights, including the appellant’s. The trial court found (1) that all parents had wantonly and willfully failed to comply with orders to support their children; (2) that the children had been abandoned by their parents; and (3) that the children were dependent due to a lack of proper parental care or control by their parents, that reasonable efforts to remedy the circumstances were unsuccessful or not required, that the cause of the dependency of each child was likely to continue or not be remedied, and that continued dependency would cause or was likely to cause serious harm to the children. With regard to the appellant specifically, the court found that he had been incarcerated during the entirety of the case and had failed to complete any case plan goals; that he “ha[d] a history of use and abuse of illegal drugs and ha[s] unrehabilitated substance abuse issues”; that he had a “history of repeated criminal behavior and incarcerations which have had a demonstrably negative effect on the quality of relationship with his child”; that he has had no relationship with his child since she entered care; and that he had sent the child only one card and no gifts or support.Finally, the court found that the children were bonded to the current foster parents and vice versa, that DFCS had made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan, and that it was in the best interests of the children that termination of parental rights be granted.We granted the appellant’s application for discretionary review, and this appeal followed.1. The appellant first contends that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was not personally served with process regarding the termination of his parental rights. This assertion of error, however, is not properly before this Court. An application for discretionary review must “enumerat[e] the errors to be urged on appeal,” OCGA § 5-6-35 (b), and so, when we grant discretionary review, it necessarily is limited to the errors actually enumerated in the application.
Zekser v. Zekser, 293 Ga. 366, 369 (2) (744 SE2d 698) (2013); see also OCGA § 15-1-2 (“lack of jurisdiction of the person may be waived”). Here, the appellant did not enumerate lack of personal jurisdiction as an error in his application for discretionary review, and therefore that enumeration is waived. See, e.g., Lutz v. Lutz, 302 Ga. 500, 502 (1) (807 SE2d 336) (2017).2. The appellant contends that insufficient evidence was presented to warrant termination of his parental rights.On appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent’s rights to custody have been lost. We neither weigh evidence nor determine witness credibility, but defer to the juvenile court’s findings of fact and affirm unless the appellate standard is not met.
