Dillard, Chief Judge.Joshua Brumbelow appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to legitimate his biological son, E. M., and its subsequent denial of his motion for a new trial. Specifically, Brumbelow argues that the trial court erred in finding that he abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a parent-child relationship with E. M. and that its judgment was not supported by the evidence.[1] For the reasons set forth infra, we reverse and remand the case with direction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,[2] the record shows that toward the end of 2015, Brumbelow and Jenny Mathenia (who was separated from her husband at the time) engaged in a one-time sexual encounter, and she became pregnant. Approximately one month after Mathenia learned that she was pregnant, she informed Brumbelow of the pregnancy. At first, they discussed the possibility of raising the child together. But as Mathenia acknowledges, as soon as she learned of the pregnancy, she was “mean” to Brumbelow and “cussed him out” via text message because she “didn’t want a kid with him.” And throughout the pregnancy, Brumbelow repeatedly denied that he was the child’s father, despite Mathenia telling him “tons of times” that the baby was his child.[3] Although Mathenia informed him of the time period when she had been “romantically involved” with her husband, Brumbelow still doubted that he was E. M.’s father, in part, because of the marital relationship. For this reason, at some point early in the pregnancy, Brumbelow accompanied Mathenia to a doctor’s appointment to find out how many weeks she had been pregnant, so he could “do the math” and determine whether he was the child’s father. And while Brumbelow thought the timing was “off about a week or two[,]” he nevertheless offered to pay for Mathenia to have an abortion. She flatly declined. Then, sometime “ a little after” February 2016, Mathenia “cut off all contact” with Brumbelow because he continued to deny that he was E. M.’s father. As a result, during the entirety of Mathenia’s pregnancy, Brumbelow never asked about her well-being or if she needed anything. And although Brumbelow knew where Mathenia lived, he never visited her. Brumbelow also never offered Mathenia any financial support during the pregnancy (i.e., money for doctor’s appointments, maternity clothes, or the like). But in May 2016, approximately two months before E. M. was born, Mathenia communicated via text message with Brumbelow’s mother about him being the child’s father, and among other things, Mathenia told her about “cussing [Brumbelow] out” and not wanting to raise a child with him. E. M. was born on July 10, 2016, and the following day, Mathenia voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. That same day, E. M. went home from the hospital with Lance and Ashley Hall, who planned to adopt the child, and he has remained in their custody ever since. Although Mathenia knew that Brumbelow was E. M.’s biological father, she did not inform him of the child’s birth because she did not think it was “her job” to do so. Nevertheless, within a month of the baby being born, when Brumbelow and his mother learned E. M. had been placed with a family for adoption, Brumbelow contacted Mathenia and told her that he wanted to be a father to their child. And around the same time, Brumbelow’s mother also contacted Mathenia and offered to help her and Brumbelow raise the child. To this end, Brumbelow’s mother asked Mathenia to meet with Brumbelow at his attorney’s office so that she could “consent for [Brumbelow] to fight for custody,” and Mathenia agreed to do so. During the meeting at the attorney’s office, which was some time in August 2016, Mathenia expressed her “desire . . . to revoke [the] surrender of [her] parental rights” and to be E. M.’s mother. Mathenia explained that, despite initially agreeing to the adoption, she had been “on and off” about going through with it, and that she struggled with making the decision. And at least as of this meeting (which occurred approximately one month after E. M. was born), Mathenia wanted to revoke the surrender of her parental rights and co-parent E. M. with Brumbelow.[4] Shortly after the meeting, on August 23, 2016, Mathenia returned to the attorney’s office and acknowledged service of Brumbelow’s legitimation petition, which was filed the same day. After agreeing at the August 2016 meeting that they would raise E. M. together as his parents, Mathenia and Brumbelow had no further contact until the first hearing in this legitimation case, which was held in mid-September 2016. During that intervening time period, unbeknownst to Brumbelow, Mathenia changed her mind and decided to contest his efforts to legitimate E. M. and proceed with the adoption. For this reason, the Halls hired separate counsel for themselves and Mathenia to represent them in the legitimation proceeding. And in a separate action, the Halls filed a petition to adopt E. M., which was then consolidated with the legitimation proceeding for trial.[5] Ultimately, following a hearing, the trial court denied Brumbelow’s petition to legitimate E. M. Thereafter, Brumbelow filed a motion for a new trial, and a motion to stay the adoption proceedings. After the Halls and Mathenia filed a joint response to both motions, the trial court held a hearing on the matter.[6] The trial court summarily denied Brumbelow’s motion for a new trial, but granted his motion to stay the adoption proceedings. This Court then granted Brumbelow’s application for a discretionary appeal, which is now before us. We review a trial court’s ruling on a legitimation petition for an abuse of discretion,[7] and its factual findings for “clear error and will only sustain such findings if there is competent evidence to support them.”[8] Bearing these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to Brumbelow’s specific claims of error. 1. In addition to the claims of error delineated supra, Brumbelow also argues, for the first time on appeal, that Georgia law regarding legitimation, in general, violates his constitutional equal protection[9] and due process rights.[10] Brumbelow further asserts that this Court must establish precedent regarding whether he was “deprived of his constitutionally afforded opportunity to form a bond with his child,” and that current Georgia law impermissibly favors the rights of prospective adoptive parents over the constitutional rights of a biological father. But regardless of whether these claims have merit, the Supreme Court of Georgia has exclusive jurisdiction over “. . . all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional provision has been drawn in question.”[11] Thus, we lack jurisdiction over Brumbelow’s constitutional challenges.Additionally, our Supreme Court hasinterpreted this jurisdictional provision to extend only to constitutional issues that were distinctly ruled on by the trial court and that do not involve the application of unquestioned and unambiguous constitutional provisions or challenges to laws previously held to be constitutional against the same attack.[12]Here, following the hearing on Brumbelow’s legitimation petition, both parties filed post-hearing briefs. And in his post-hearing brief, Brumbelow references, only once, his “due process” rights as an unwed father and that he is entitled to “equal treatment” under the law afforded to other parents. Moreover, his argument relies exclusively on Georgia statutes and prior cases applying our current precedent on legitimation. Finally, Brumbelow did not argue below, as he does now on appeal, that current Georgia law on legitimation is unconstitutional.Furthermore, the trial court’s order denying Brumbelow’s petition was based solely on Georgia caselaw regarding legitimation and the related public-policy concerns explicitly delineated in OCGA § 19-8-12 (a) (5), and the court made no mention of whether current Georgia law on legitimation violated Brumbelow’s state or federal constitutional rights. Given these particular circumstances, none of the constitutional arguments Brumbelow asserts on appeal were distinctly ruled upon or even considered by the trial court. Thus, we decline to transfer this case to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and we address only the non-constitutional claims of error over which this Court has jurisdiction.[13] 2. In Brumbelow’s two remaining claims of error (which are essentially the same), he argues that the trial court erred in finding that he abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a parent-child relationship with E. M. and that the court’s judgment was not supported by the evidence. We agree. When considering a legitimation petition, we must initially determine whether “the father has abandoned his opportunity interest to develop a relationship with the child.”[14] This is because the law affords an unwed, biological father an opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring, and if he “grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parentchild relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development.”[15] This opportunity interest “begins at conception and endures probably throughout the minority of the child[,]“[16] but it “is not indestructible[,] [and] [i]t may be lost.”[17] Indeed, as we have previously explained, the factors which may support a finding of abandonment include, without limitation, “a biological father’s inaction during pregnancy and at birth, a delay in filing a legitimation petition, and a lack of contact with the child.”[18] And in considering these factors, if the evidence supports a finding that a father abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his biological child, the court is then “authorized to end its inquiry and to deny the legitimation petition on that basis.”[19] Furthermore, our Supreme Court has acknowledged that “there exists a continuum of unwed fatherchild relationships with assigned degrees of protection afforded rights to custody.”[20] On one end are those relationships which have been “fully developed through present or past custody,”[21] and those unwed fathers “must be treated equally with other parents when their child is to be adopted.”[22] But there are also relationships between unwed fathers and children which, “while short of full custody, nonetheless establish substantial bonds.”[23] Unwed fathers in these circumstances may “generally visit their children and furnish some support and otherwise maintain contact with them.”[24] And then there are other unwed fathers who have “developed no relationship with their children[,] [and] [t]heir only connection is biological.”[25] Lastly, our Supreme Court has also explained that when an unwed biological father demonstrates “a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.”[26] But the mere existence of a biological connection “does not merit equivalent constitutional protection[,] [and] [t]he actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds.”[27] Instead, the significance of the biological connection is that it “offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.”[28] Turning to the case at hand, Brumbelow argues the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in finding that he abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with E. M. by basing its decision on everything he did not do to pursue that interest, rather than all of the things he did to pursue a parent-child relationship with the child. We agree. Indeed, when considering whether a biological father abandoned his opportunity interest in a relationship with his child, “the appropriate inquiry is not whether the father could have done more, but rather whether the father has done so little as to constitute abandonment.”[29] And here, in its order, the trial court relied heavily on Brumbelow’s uninvolvement and failure to provide financial or emotional support during Mathenia’s pregnancy, despite his ability to do so, as well as his continued failure to provide financial assistance to either Mathenia or the Halls following E. M.’s birth. Ultimately, the court concluded that Brumbelow abandoned his opportunity interest in a relationship with E. M. because his “only action demonstrating any intent to develop a familial bond with [E. M.] was filing his petition for legitimation . . . .” In doing so, the trial court erred. As Brumbelow aptly notes, the trial court appears to have applied the wrong legal standard for considering legitimation petitions. But regardless, the trial court’s conclusion that the only action Brumbelow took to preserve his opportunity interest in a relationship with E. M. was filing the legitimation petition is not only unsupported by the evidence, it is also in direct conflict with the court’s own factual findings. First, the trial court failed to give any meaningful consideration to Brumbelow’s decision to file a legitimation petition shortly after E. M.’s birth. Our appellate courts routinely, if not always, place at least some significance on the length of time a biological father waits before filing a legitimation petition after learning of the possibility that he might be the child’s father (or, at the very least, indicate that any delay or lack thereof was taken into consideration).[30] In many of those cases, the unwed father was found to have abandoned his opportunity interest in a parent-child relationship, at least in part, by waiting years after the child’s birth to file a legitimation petition.[31] But here, the trial court essentially ignored the fact that Brumbelow filed his petition when E. M. was less than two months old and almost immediately after he learned of the planned adoption. In fact, Brumbelow filed the legitimation petition even before the Halls initiated the adoption proceeding[32] and months before DNA results confirmed that he, rather than Mathenia’s husband, was E. M.’s biological father.[33] While the expeditious manner in which Brumbelow initiated this action is only one of many factors to be considered and is certainly not dispositive, the trial court’s order makes no mention of the undisputed evidence that Brumbelow obtained counsel and initiated this action almost immediately after learning Mathenia placed E. M. with the Halls for adoption. Indeed, although the trial court’s order includes other dates relevant to this proceeding, it makes no reference to the date on which Brumbelow’s legitimation action was filed.[34] Suffice it to say, this omission is notable. Furthermore, the trial court also discounted other evidence—which was either undisputed by the parties or supported by Mathenia’s testimony—of actions that Brumbelow and his mother (on her son’s behalf) took to preserve his opportunity interest in a relationship with E. M. And while an unwed father’s “disregard of his opportunity interest during [the mother's] pregnancy is as significant as such a disregard after the child is born[,]“[35] Mathenia admitted to engaging in conduct that would have made it difficult for Brumbelow to contact or assist her during the pregnancy. Indeed, not only did Mathenia never ask Brumbelow for assistance (financial or otherwise) during the pregnancy, she testified to cutting off contact with him a few months into the pregnancy, being “mean” to him because she did not want to raise a child with him, and cussing him out via text message for the same reason. So, while we are required to defer to the trial court’s finding that Brumbelow made no attempts to contact Mathenia during the remainder of her pregnancy, it is undisputed that Mathenia had already decided not to have any contact with him. And when, as here, a biological mother admittedly shows hostility toward the biological father of her child, cuts off all contact with him, and unequivocally advises him that she does not want to raise a child with him, we cannot say—as the trial court’s order seems to suggest—that the biological father’s failure to contact or offer financial assistance to the biological mother during her pregnancy, standing alone, is enough to constitute an abandonment of his opportunity interest in a relationship with his child.[36] Additionally, the trial court found that, despite his ability to do so, Brumbelow had not provided any emotional or financial assistance to Mathenia or the Halls since E. M. was born. But Mathenia never had custody of E. M., so she had no need for financial support following his birth other than for her pregnancy and birthing expenses. Furthermore, by filing this action, Brumbelow “agreed to assume all the responsbilities of the child’s legal father and submitted to a claim by [Mathenia] for recovery of [these] expenses.”[37] The trial court also appears to have ignored that, after E. M. was born, Brumbelow’s mother—who lived with Brumbelow in a four-bedroom home with enough space for E. M. to have his own room—contacted Mathenia and volunteered to provide a home for E. M. and to help her and Brumbelow raise their child.[38] Additionally, as to the Halls, they had sole custody of E. M. with the intent to adopt him. And while he did not assist the Halls financially or otherwise with regard to the care of E. M., Brumbelow testified that he believed having any direct contact with them would constitute harassment. For their part, the Halls claimed that they would have accepted financial support from Brumbelow if he offered it, but neither of them “felt the need” to contact him because they wanted to “assume the parental responsibility of [the] child.” Moreover, although Brumbelow did not offer financial assistance to the Halls, he did make at least one request for visitation through his attorney during the pendency of this litigation, but he received no response.[39] As to the trial court’s application of the law in denying Brumbelow’s petition, the court relied almost exclusively on our Supreme Court’s discussion, set forth supra, of the continuum that exists between unwed fathers who have a fully developed relationship with their child and those who have no relationship with their child, such that their only relationship is biological.[40] In applying this analysis, the court found that by his sole action of filing the legitimation petition, Brumbelow had “only slightly moved on the spectrum from a father who has developed absolutely no relationship, with the only connection being biological.” But while a consideration of this continuum may be applicable or helpful in many cases, neither the trial court nor Mathenia has identified any precedent suggesting that the application of this continuum is dispositive in every case regardless of the particular circumstances. And here, it is unclear how Brumbelow’s action of filing a legal document would move him along the relationship continuum, slightly or otherwise—beyond expressing a desire for a future relationship with the child. Indeed, prior to filing the legitimation petition, Brumbelow had no opportunity to develop a relationship or bond with his one month old newborn son, who has been in the Halls’ custody since birth. It was erroneous, then, for the trial court to limit its consideration to how developed the relationship was between Brumbelow and E. M. without tailoring its analysis to the facts and circumstances of this particular case.[41] As our Supreme Court has rightly acknowledged, “the possible circumstances of relationships between unwed fathers and their children are of great variety. . . .”[42] Furthermore, applying the trial court’s reasoning, a biological father’s decision to file a legitimation petition when the child is a newborn (which we have previously advised unwed fathers to do)[43] is virtually meaningless, and his only “hope” is for the prospective adoptive parents to give him access to the child in order to develop the type of relationship that may ultimately defeat their petition for adoption. This is not the law. To the contrary, in Bowers v. Pearson,[44] we held that the biological father did not abandon his opportunity interest in a relationship with his child, who the mother unilaterally (and unbeknownst to the father) placed with an adoptive family within days of her birth.[45] Similarly to this case, the trial court in Bowers denied the biological father’s legitimation petition—which was filed even before the child was born—based on its finding that he abandoned his opportunity interest in a relationship with his child “by failing to provide financial or other assistance to [the mother] during her pregnancy and delivery.”[46] In Bowers, the mother admitted that she never asked the father for assistance because she (and her parents) did not want him to be involved, and the maternal grandfather indicated that he never asked the father for assistance because he believed it would be “counterproductive in the adoption.”[47] And while the biological father filed the legitimation petition a month before the child was born, the mother and her parents believed adoption was in the child’s best interest, placing the child with prospective adoptive parents shortly after she was born.[48] After detailing the relevant precedent from the Supreme Court of Georgia and this Court, we held that the evidence did not support a finding that the father abandoned his opportunity interest in a natural parent-child relationship.[49] In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the mother never asked the father for assistance, the mother and her family did not want him to have any involvement, and by initiating the legitimation action, the father “agreed to assume all the responsibilities of the child’s legal father and submitted to a claim by the mother for reimbursement of birthing expenses.”[50] In this case, there was conflicting testimony as to whether, after Brumbelow attended a doctor’s appointment with Mathenia, he made any efforts to contact her during the remainder of her pregnancy, and we defer, as we must, to the trial court’s finding that Brumbelow made no such attempts.[51] But similarly to the mother in Bowers, Mathenia admitted that, a few months into her pregnancy, she cut off all contact with Brumbelow, she did not want to raise a child with him, and she never asked him for assistance of any kind during the pregnancy. Additionally, while Brumbelow did not file the legitimation petition before the child was born like the father in Bowers, he did file it as soon as he learned that Mathenia surrendered her parental rights and the child was in the Halls’ custody, which was less than two months after E. M. was born. Significantly, by initiating this action so soon after the child’s birth, even before the adoption petition was filed, Brumbelow “agreed to assume all the responsibilities of the child’s legal father and submitted to a [potential] claim by [Mathenia] for recovery of birthing expenses.”[52] Nevertheless, Mathenia argues that reversing the trial court’s ruling “would run entirely counter to” our decisions in In Interest of D. S. P.[53] and Turner v. Wright.[54] But we distinguished those cases in Bowers as follows:In [denying the father's legitimation petition], the trial court relied on In the Interest of D. S. P. and Turner v. Wright, two cases in which it was determined that the biological fathers had abandoned their opportunity interests to develop relationships with their children. The court’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. In D. S. P., the father knew the mother intended to put the child up for adoption; but he did nothing until almost two months after the child’s birth and offered no financial or emotional support to the mother, even though she needed such support from him. In Turner, the father committed criminal acts after he became aware he was to be a father, resulting in his incarceration during the mother’s pregnancy and when he filed the petition for legitimation within one month after the child’s birth.[55]We find these distinctions applicable here as well. Indeed, unlike in D. S. P., Brumbelow was not aware of the planned adoption in advance, and immediately after he became aware of it, he obtained legal counsel, met with Mathenia to express his desire to be a father to E. M., and filed a legitimation petition (while under the impression Mathenia would support it). Turner is similarly inapplicable because it is undisputed that Brumbelow did not engage in any criminal conduct, and his failure to develop a relationship with E. M. is not due to any voluntary choice he made. Instead, here, Mathenia’s unilateral decision to proceed with the adoption was the cause of his inability to develop a relationship with his child.[56]In sum, we are mindful that, as to any conflict in the evidence, the trial court determines “the credibility of witnesses and may accept or reject any part of a witness’s testimony, even in the absence of contradictory testimony.”[57] But here, even crediting Mathenia’s testimony and resolving all conflicts in favor of the ruling below, the trial court’s conclusion that Brumbelow’s “only action demonstrating any intent to develop a familial bond with [E. M.] was filing his petition for legitimation”[58] is wholly unsupported by the evidence. Indeed, even the trial court’s order acknowledged additional actions Brumbelow took to pursue his opportunity interest in fathering E. M., such as attending at least one prenatal doctor’s appointment and requesting visitation with E. M. at least once after the petition for legitimation was filed. Although the trial court may have found those actions to be insignificant, they certainly constitute relevant actions other than filing a timely legitimation petition. Moreover, the trial court failed to acknowledge other actions taken by Brumbelow less than two months after the child’s birth, such as obtaining legal counsel, initiating a meeting with Mathenia at his attorney’s office to express his desire to parent E. M., and filing the instant action without delay. Additionally, the offer of financial and emotional assistance to Mathenia by Brumbelow’s mother should also have been considered by the trial court in its analysis. While Brumbelow certainly could have done more, assuming that Mathenia or the Halls would have been receptive to such efforts, that is not—as we have already explained—the relevant legal standard, and given the particular circumstances of this case, we simply cannot say that Brumbelow “has done so little as to constitute abandonment.”[59] 3. While a finding of abandonment is sufficient to deny a legitimation petition,[60] the trial court also made a summary finding that denying Brumbelow’s legitimation petition was in E. M.’s best interests. In this regard, we have explained that when a court determines the unwed father has not abandoned his opportunity interest in a parent-child relationship, as we have in Division 2 supra, “depending on the nature of the putative father’s relationship with the child and other surrounding circumstances, the standard for evaluating whether legitimation is appropriate is either a test of his fitness as a parent or the best interest of the child.”[61] In In the Interest of Baby Girl Eason,[62] our Supreme Court acknowledged that there are “circumstances in which the best interests of the child standard is adequate.”[63] For example, when there is a divorce “each party has equal rights and a fitness test cannot be used, . . . a best interests test is sufficient.”[64] And the best-interests-of-the-child standard is likewise adequate when “an unwed father who faces a mother who has custody and a stepfather who seeks to adopt.”[65] But these were not the circumstances in Eason and they are not the circumstances before us now. Instead, Eason concerned “an unwed father, an infant some nine months old, adopting parents who ha[d] been in custody of the child virtually all its short life, and a mother who ha[d] surrendered her rights in the child in favor of the adoption.”[66] And under these circumstances, the Eason Court concluded that “[t]he adoption laws were being pursued through the courts and this account[ed] for the placement of the child with the adopting parents[,] [and] . . .[t]he unwed father ha[d] a constitutionally protected interest which [could not] be denied him through state action.”[67]As in Eason, the relationship E. M. has developed with his prospective adoptive parents did not take place in the absence of state action. Here, Mathenia,vested by state law with exclusive control over the notyetlegitimated child,[[68]] made a unilateral decision to place the child for adoption; and, if not abandoned by him, [Brumbelow's] opportunity to develop a relationship with the child will be lost through the action of the court in denying his petition to legitimate.”[69]And when an opportunity to develop a relationship with his biological child is lost due to state action, “a fit biological father who pursues his interest in order to obtain full custody of his child must be allowed to prevail over strangers to the child who seek to adopt.”[70] This is because Brumbelow has a “constitutionally protected interest which cannot be denied him through state action.”[71] In sum, because Brumbelow has “not abandoned his opportunity interest, the standard which must be used [upon remand] to determine his right to legitimate the child is his fitness as a parent to have custody of the child.”[72] And if he is fit, “he must prevail.”[73] Lastly, we acknowledge that OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1), the current version of which was enacted after Eason, provides that a court must consider the best interests of the child “in any action involving the custody of a child between the parents or either parent and a third party limited to grandparent, greatgrandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent . . . .”[74] But as recently as 2015, this Court held that Eason ”remains binding precedent despite the adoption in 1996 of OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1), which concerns custody disputes between legal parents and certain third parties, including prospective adoptive parents.”[75] Moreover, in 2001, the Supreme Court of Georgia clarified that “Eason does not stand for the proposition that the fitness test is the substantive standard applicable to every legitimation petition but recognized a continuum of rights, specific to the facts of each case, to which varying standards could be applied.”[76] Instead, Eason held thatthe parental fitness standard must be used to determine the father’s right to legitimate the child because it was the State’s action which interfered with the father’s rights with respect to the child and which allowed for the development of the parent/child relationship between the child and the adopting parents.[77]And the Eason Court made clear that, “absent the State’s involvement and under other circumstances, the best interests of the child standard would be adequate.”[78] Here, as in Eason, we have a biological father who pursued his opportunity interest in parenting his biological child, who has been in the custody of prospective adoptive parents since birth, and if the trial court determines on remand that he is a fit parent, his petition must be granted.[79] For all these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s finding that Brumbelow abandoned his opportunity interest in a relationship with E. M., but remand the case for the trial court to determine whether Brumbelow is a fit parent, rather than whether denying his legitimation petition is in E. M.’s best interests. As previously noted, if the trial court concludes that Brumbelow is a fit parent, his legitimation petition must be granted.Judgment reversed and case remanded. Doyle, P. J., and Mercier, J., concur.
