Mercier, Judge.A jury found Christopher Vass guilty of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions and the admission of other crimes evidence and expert testimony regarding domestic violence. Finding no basis for reversal, we affirm.1. Vass’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit. When a criminal conviction is appealed, the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. And the relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, and the jury’s verdict will be upheld so long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.
Belcher v. State, 344 Ga. App. 729, 731 (812 SE2d 51) (2018) (punctuation, footnotes and emphasis omitted).Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence at trial included the following. S. G. testified that she started dating Vass in 2012 and was in a relationship with him for several years. When Vass and S. G. had disagreements, “sometimes it would get physical,” and Vass would strike S. G. with his hands. Vass hit S. G. on several occasions. Asked on direct examination why she stayed in the relationship, S. G. responded that she loved Vass. S. G. testified that on May 8, 2015, she and Vass were traveling in S. G.’s vehicle when they began arguing. They arrived at an apartment complex where Vass’s friend D. Y. lived, and Vass parked the vehicle. Vass retrieved a handgun from a compartment in the rear of the vehicle; S. G. had not known there had been a gun in the compartment. Vass then walked toward D. Y.’s apartment. S. G. followed Vass up a staircase, telling him that their relationship “[was] not working,” that she wanted him to return her belongings, and that she would leave him alone. Vass turned to face S. G., told her she was not getting anything back, pulled a gun from behind his back, and pointed it at her. S. G. heard a sound, felt “heat,” and asked Vass if he shot her. Vass replied, “Yes,” turned around, and entered D. Y.’s apartment. S. G., who was shot in the chest, walked to the van and started to drive around the apartment building. Vass ran to the van, moved S. G. to a passenger seat, and drove to DeKalb Medical Center. While en route, Vass phoned D. Y. and told him to “get rid of the gun, [and that] it was under the mattress.” Vass told S. G. to “make something up” about how she got shot. When they arrived at the hospital, Vass carried S. G. into the emergency room, announced that she had been shot, and left her there. Because the gunshot wound was so severe, S. G. was rushed by ambulance from that hospital to a trauma unit at Grady Memorial Hospital (“Grady Memorial”).A trauma surgeon who examined S. G. in Grady Memorial’s emergency room on May 8, 2015 testified that S. G. sustained a gunshot wound to her chest and a lacerated liver. The surgeon classified S. G.’s wound as a “level one,” which is the “highest level of acuity,” meaning that the injury “may result in either serious harm or even death.” S. G. was treated and monitored in the hospital, then discharged several days later. When police officers questioned S. G. during her hospitalization about the gunshot wound, she did not tell them that Vass shot her. Instead, she stated that she had been struck by a stray bullet while standing outside her vehicle. Weeks later, on May 26, 2015, S. G. told police that Vass had shot her. Then, after Vass was arrested for the shooting, S. G. went to the district attorney’s office and asked that the charges be dropped, because S. G. “just wanted [Vass] to come home.” At trial, S. G. testified that Vass had shot her during the argument (as set out above). When asked at trial why she did not report that initially and why she requested that the charges be dropped, S. G. replied, “because [she] loved him” and hoped that they would get back together. At trial, as other acts evidence, C. T. testified that she had been in a romantic relationship with Vass, and that the relationship ended in 2006, soon after their child was born. In 2007, C. T. and her mother went to Vass’s grandmother’s home to pick up the child. An argument ensued between Vass and C. T., and Vass “pulled out something” that “look[ed] like a . . . handgun.” Vass then fled on foot. C. T.’s mother phoned police. When the prosecutor asked C. T. if she remembered telling the police and the prosecutor that Vass actually pointed a handgun at her, C. T. replied that she did not remember saying that. C. T. and her mother reported the incident to the police that day. C. T. did not later speak to police officers or contact anyone else about the incident; she “just moved on.” (In the hearing on the motion, defense counsel informed the trial court that the charges filed in that case, aggravated assault and pointing a pistol at another, were dismissed.)At trial, the State called a mental health clinician to testify as an expert regarding domestic violence. The mental health clinician testified that she had a master’s degree in clinical community counseling, was employed at a local non-profit domestic violence organization, and worked with victims of trauma and “extreme abuse.” She assisted in the treatment of family violence victims and, at the time of trial, had been working in that capacity for 16 years, conducted and underwent training in the areas of abuse and domestic violence, and helped build a “victim-centered” temporary protective order program that “is considered a model for the nation.” The trial court qualified the mental health clinician as an expert in the area of domestic violence. When asked to explain the term “domestic violence,” the mental health clinician replied that “domestic violence,” a term “that’s used interchangabl[y]” with “ intimate partner violence,” refers to people who are involved in a domestic relationship or are dating, and not necessarily living together, in which one party is perpetuating violence against another. She explained that such relationships sometimes include a “cycle of violence,” in which a violent incident is followed by a “honeymoon phase” that may include apologies and forgiveness, then an improvement, a rebuilding of tension, and another incident of violence. The mental health clinician testified that it is common for a victim to try to protect the abuser, to not report the abuse to law enforcement, and to change his or her story or recant a report of abuse. She added that a victim may engage in such conduct as a survival tactic or a coping mechanism, or as a means of staying in a relationship he or she does not want to end.The indictment pertinently alleged that Vass committed the offense of aggravated assault by assaulting S. G. with a deadly weapon and that he possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony (aggravated assault). See OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (a) (2), 16-11-106 (b) (1). “[T]he testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.” Belcher, supra at 731 (1) (punctuation and footnote omitted). The credibility of a witness is a matter for the trier of fact. OCGA § 24-6-620. The evidence at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Vass guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses for which the jury returned verdicts of guilt. See generally Barnes v. State, 296 Ga. App. 493, 495 (675 SE2d 233) (2009); Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 93 (1) (805 SE2d 80) (2017). 2. Vass contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce, pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404, evidence that he previously pointed a gun at C. T. (his former girlfriend and the mother of his child) during an argument. He asserts that the probative value of that evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.[1] The trial court did not abuse its discretion.Rule 404 (b) of Georgia’s new Evidence Code provides:Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
