Miller, Presiding Judge.After Athens College of Ministry, Inc. (“ACM”) sought to build a college campus in Oconee County (the “County”), Kevin York and Icy Forest, LLC objected to the issuance of a special use permit for the proposed development. The trial court granted ACM’s and the County’s motions to dismiss for lack of standing, and York and Icy Forest now appeal. The appellants argue that the trial court (1) erroneously concluded that the decision to issue the permit was a legislative action, and not a quasi-judicial one; and (2) erred in ruling that ACM and the County could therefore challenge their standing for the first time in the trial court. We determine that the decision to issue the permit was quasi-judicial, and the appellees therefore waived their challenge to York’s and Icy Forest’s standing by not raising this issue before the Board. Thus, the trial court erred in granting ACM’s and the County’s motions to dismiss on the basis that the appellants lacked standing, and we reverse.This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss. Carter v. Cornwell, 338 Ga. App. 662 (791 SE2d 447) (2016). So viewed, the record shows that in late 2016, ACM sought by application a special use permit[1] to build a college campus on more than 100 acres of land (the “Property”) owned by Green Hills Farms, LLC (“Green Hills”).[2] The Property is located in an agricultural zoning district. York and Icy Forest, however, who are also property owners in the area, sent a letter to the Oconee County Board of Commissioners (the “Board”), objecting to the application. Before a special use permit may be granted, “due consideration” is given to ten “objective criteria,” as outlined in the Oconee County Development Code (the “ordinance”). The ordinance also mandates that the Board hold a public hearing. The County’s planning department issued a report analyzing the application based on the criteria in the ordinance, and the County recommended that the application be approved, subject to certain conditions. After a public hearing, the Board granted the special use permit, subject to specific conditions. ACM and the County do not claim that the appellants’ standing was challenged at the hearing or at any other time before the Board granted the permit. York and Icy Forest then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Oconee County Superior Court granted the writ. In separate motions, both ACM and the County moved to dismiss the appellants’ petition, arguing that they lacked the requisite standing to challenge the Board’s decision. ACM contended that the appellants did not show that they would be damaged in a way that was uncommon to similarly situated property owners, and the County likewise argued that the appellants were not aggrieved citizens. The County also argued that it could challenge the appellants’ standing before the trial court because the Board’s decision to issue the permit was legislative. York and Icy Forest responded that the Board’s decision was quasi-judicial, and the trial court’s review was therefore limited to the arguments raised before the Board. Thus, York and Icy Forest contended that because the appellees had not raised the issue of standing before the Board, it was waived.Following a hearing, the trial court granted both motions to dismiss for lack of standing. The trial court determined that the application essentially sought a special use permit, which is governed by OCGA § 36-66-3 (4) (E)[3]; that the Board had acted in a legislative capacity when it granted the permit; and that the trial court could therefore review the issue of standing in the first instance. The trial court then ruled that York and Icy Forest lacked standing to challenge the Board’s decision because they failed to show a special damage or injury. We granted the appellants’ application for discretionary appeal, and this appeal followed.In interrelated enumerations of error, York and Icy Forest contend that the decision to grant the permit was quasi-judicial and, as a result, the appellees had waived their challenge to standing by not raising this issue before the Board. Thus, the appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting ACM’s and the County’s motions to dismiss. We agree. “The writ of certiorari shall lie for the correction of errors committed by any inferior judicatory or any person exercising judicial powers . . . .” City of Cumming v. Flowers, 300 Ga. 820, 823 (3) (797 SE2d 846) (2017) (citing OCGA § 5-4-1 (a)).When a party seeks certiorari review in the trial court of a decision of an administrative body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, the trial court is bound by the facts and evidence presented to the administrative body, and the issue of standing is waived if it was not raised before the administrative body. Druid Hills Civic Assn. v. Buckler, 328 Ga. App. 485, 492-493 (3) (760 SE2d 194) (2014), disapproved in part on other grounds by Hourin v. State, 301 Ga. 835, 836 (1) (804 SE2d 388) (2017). Conversely, a petitioner seeking review of a local government’s legislative decision may introduce new evidence in the trial court, and the question of standing can also be raised and determined. See id.[4] Thus, the operative question in this case is whether the Board’s decision was quasi-judicial or legislative. “The test for determining whether official action is [quasi-judicial] or legislative focuses on the function performed by the decisionmaker.” (Citation omitted.) Diversified Holdings v. City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597, 601 (II) (807 SE2d 876) (2017).Generally, [a quasi-judicial] decision operates to address a specific dispute or determine rights and obligations of a particular party or parties. The resulting decision seeks to establish those rights and obligations or otherwise resolve the dispute, and is immediate in application. A legislative decision, on the other hand, is usually marked by a general inquiry, often not limited to the facts and circumstances of specific people or properties, which results in a rule of law or course of policy that will apply in the future.
(Citation omitted.) Id. at 601-602 (II).Also, “adjudication is [generally] the decisionmaking process for applying preexisting standards to individual circumstances.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Intl. Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 299 Ga. 392, 401 (4) (a) (788 SE2d 455) (2016). It follows, then, that “[w]here . . . a special permit is sought under terms set out in the local ordinance, the local governing body acts in a quasi-judicial capacity to determine the facts and apply the law.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bulloch County Bd. of Commrs. v. Williams, 332 Ga. App. 815, 817 (773 SE2d 37) (2015). See also Moon v. Cobb County, 256 Ga. 539 (350 SE2d 461) (1986). In this case, the ordinance directed that due consideration be given to ten objective “standards for special use consideration” before the grant of the permit. Correspondingly, the application for the permit contained a “zoning impact analysis,” addressing each of these criteria in relation to ACM’s proposed special use of the Property. Pursuant to the ordinance, in order for the Board to decide on the application, the County’s planning department had to review the application and make a recommendation to the Board. Thus, the planning department analyzed the application against the ten criteria in the ordinance, and the Board then held a hearing before granting the permit. Therefore, the process used for the Board’s decision involved “determin[ing] the facts and apply[ing] the ordinance’s legal standards to them, which is a decisionmaking process akin to a judicial act.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Flowers, supra, 300 Ga. at 824 (3).[5] Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 349 (1) n.4 (249 SE2d 38) (1978) (same); Rogers v. Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 121-122 (4) (137 SE2d 668) (1964) (“A governmental agency entrusted with the licensing power functions as a legislature when it prescribes these standards, but the same agency acts as a judicial body when it makes a determination that a specific applicant has or has not satisfied them.”). The Board’s decision was also “immediate in application, specific in application, and involved an assessment of facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Flowers, supra, 300 Ga. at 824 (3). Thus, the determination to grant the special use permit was quasi-judicial.The trial court, in deciding that the Board’s decision was legislative, found that OCGA § 36-66-3 (4) governs this dispute. This statute provides,“Zoning decision” means final legislative action by a local government which results in: (A) The adoption of a zoning ordinance; (B) The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance which changes the text of the zoning ordinance; (C) The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance which rezones property from one zoning classification to another; (D) The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance by a municipal local government which zones property to be annexed into the municipality; or (E) The grant of a permit relating to a special use of property. (Emphases supplied.) OCGA § 36-66-3 (4). Thus, the trial court appears to have concluded that because the local government’s action in this case resulted in the “grant of a permit relating to a special use of property” it was necessarily a “legislative action.” But we do not interpret the statute in that manner. OCGA § 36-66-3 (4) defines a “zoning decision,”[6] not a “special use permit” or “special use approval” decision. In other words, the statute does not, on its face, make a local government’s issuance of any and all “permit[s] relating to a special use of property” “legislative action[s],” regardless of the process that was used to make any such decision.[7] See Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (“When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Again, in determining whether the decision was quasi-judicial or legislative, “the [C]ourt examines how the ordinance defines the parameters and requirements of the decision and the process the local entity uses to reach it.” (Emphasis supplied.) Flowers, supra, 300 Ga. at 831 (5) (d). Here, the ordinance states, “[a] Special Use otherwise permitted within a zoning district shall be considered to be compatible with other uses permitted in the district, provided that” the Board gives due consideration to the criteria explicated in the ordinance and conducts a public hearing in accordance with ordinance provisions. And the County’s staff report specifically states that “ [t]he analysis of [ACM's] application [was] made upon the standards for special use consideration.” See, e.g., Flowers, supra, 300 Ga. at 824 (3) (board’s decision was quasi-judicial partly because it was “tightly controlled by the ordinance.”). Although the grant of the permit ultimately authorized a change in use of land, it remains that the “permit [was] sought under terms set out in the ordinance,” and the Board therefore acted in a “quasijudicial capacity to determine the facts and apply the law” as relevant to ACM’s application for building its college. Fulton County. v. Bartenfeld, 257 Ga. 766, 770 (2) (c) (363 SE2d 555) (1988). Compare Keystone Knights, supra, 299 Ga. at 401 (4) (a) (administrative determinations “of a legislative nature” “are often marked by a general factual inquiry that is not specific to the unique character, activities or circumstances of any particular person.”). When viewed in light of our decades-long case law explicitly addressing the difference between quasi-judicial and legislative decisions,[8] the decision which the appellants are specifically challenging here is a quasi-judicial or adjudicative “action by a local government which results in . . . the grant of a permit relating to a special use of property.” OCGA § 36-66-3 (4) (E). The character of the local government’s action in this case, and the decision-making process involved, dictate that the grant of the special use permit does not fall under the statutory definition of “zoning decision.” Thus, OCGA § 36-66-3 (4) (E) does not apply or compel the conclusion that the Board’s decision was legislative.[9] For the preceding reasons, we conclude that the decision to grant the special use permit in this case was quasi-judicial, and the appellees therefore waived their challenge to York’s and Icy Forest’s standing by failing to raise this issue before the Board. RCG Properties, LLC v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 260 Ga. App. 355, 362 (1) (579 SE2d 782) (2003) (Board’s decision was quasi-judicial, and issue of standing was waived because it was not raised before the Board). Thus, the trial court erred in granting ACM’s and the County’s motions to dismiss for lack of standing.Judgment reversed. Brown J., concurs. Goss, J., dissents.* THIS OPINION IS PHYSICAL PRECEDENT ONLY. COURT OF APPEALS RULE 33.2 (a).
