Benham, Justice.Appellant Charles Richardson was convicted of murder and associated offenses arising out of the shooting death of Kyle Jennings.[1] Appellant now challenges his convictions on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; finding no error, we affirm.Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence adduced at trial established as follows. In a prior drug transaction, Jennings paid Appellant with a counterfeit $100 bill and received $95 in change; Appellant sought out Jennings and spoke with him about the counterfeit money. Later, Appellant shot Jennings outside a convenience store where Jennings and his friends, Terrell McBride and Cyruss Hearst, had gone to make purchases. Hearst testified that he had exited the store with the victim, saw Appellant approach the victim, heard Appellant repeatedly say, “Let me get that,” and watched as Appellant shot Jennings. According to Hearst, Appellant retreated across the street to his car after the shooting. McBride testified that he was inside the store when he heard gunshots, ran outside, made eye contact with a person he knew as “Chuck,” and saw him run across the street to a car he recognized as belonging to Chuck; McBride identified Appellant as the person he saw and testified that Appellant had a gun. Appellant was apprehended months later in Chicago.1. Though not raised by Appellant as error, in accordance with thisCourt’s standard practice in appeals of murder cases, we have reviewed therecord and find that the evidence, as stated above, was sufficient to enable arational trier of fact to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).2. In his enumerations of error, Appellant asserts that he receivedineffective assistance of counsel in three different ways. To succeed on hisclaims, Appellant bears the heavy burden of showing “both that his counselperformed deficiently and that, but for the deficiency, there is a reasonableprobability that the outcome of his trial would have been more favorable.”Slaton v. State, 303 Ga. 651, 652 (814 SE2d 344) (2018). See also Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).To prove deficient performance, one must show that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms. Courts reviewing ineffectiveness claims must apply a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional performance. Thus, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course. If the defendant fails to satisfy either the “deficient performance” or the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test, this Court is not required to examine the other.(Citation omitted.) Slaton, 303 Ga. at 652-653. We address each ofAppellant’s claims in turn.(a) Prior to trial, Appellant’s mother provided trial counsel with the name and contact information of Renaldo Hollingsworth, whom she identified as a potential exculpatory witness. Likewise, in pre-trial discovery, the State mentioned Hollingsworth as a person who was present at the scene of the crimes. Trial counsel did not call Hollingsworth as a witness, and Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel as a result.At the hearing on Appellant’s motion for new trial, Hollingsworth – aclose friend of Appellant – testified that he was across the street from wherethe shooting occurred. After hearing gunshots, he ducked, and when heimmediately looked up again, the person he saw running away from the scenedid not fit Appellant’s physical description. According to Hollingsworth, hewas available to testify at trial, had given Appellant’s mother his contactinformation for the purpose of passing it on to trial counsel, but he never heardfrom counsel; he acknowledged, however, that despite his apparent enthusiasmto testify and his close relationship with Appellant, he never sought out trialcounsel directly. Indeed, trial testimony reflects that Hollingsworth wasactively avoiding any involvement in the case and fled from law enforcementwho were seeking a witness statement. Trial counsel testified that he recalledlearning about Hollingsworth and that, though he had no specific recollectionas to whether he spoke with Hollingsworth, he was certain he would have attempted to reach Hollingsworth as part of his standard pre-trial investigation.“The motion for new trial court was entitled to believe counsel’s testimony on this issue, see Warren v. State, 283 Ga. 42, 44 (6) (656 SE2d 803) (2008), and likely did as the court denied [Appellant's] amended motion [for new trial]” with respect to this claim. Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433, 439 (796 SE2d 242) (2017). At most, Appellant demonstrated that Hollingsworth never actually spoke with trial counsel; however, trial counsel testified that he would have attempted to reach out to Hollingsworth, and it does not follow that trial counsel did not pursue Hollingsworth as a witness simply because Hollingsworth and trial counsel never connected. Cf. Hudson v. State, 284 Ga. 595, 589 (669 SE2d 94) (2008) (no deficient performance where trial counsel made good-faith effort to locate witness but was unsuccessful). Accordingly, Appellant has failed to demonstrate deficient performance.Moreover, Appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice. While Appellantcontends that Hollingsworth’s testimony would have been helpful to hisdefense, trial counsel used Hollingsworth’s absence at trial to great advantage,eliciting testimony that Hollingsworth was a person of interest in the shootingand was actively evading law enforcement. Trial counsel also usedHollingsworth’s absence to question the quality of the State’s investigation – police were unable to locate or question him – and to suggest that Hollingsworth was the actual shooter. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied relief on this claim.(b) During closing argument, the State asserted that the testimony of certain witnesses was “the truth.” The prosecutor then argued in his final closing that, “My job that I took an oath to do is to seek the truth. That’s what the State is doing in this case.” According to Appellant, the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of witnesses, attacked the credibility of trial counsel, and attempted to bolster the prosecution’s standing with the jury, and, as such, he says that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object.“Closing arguments are judged in the context in which they are made.”Adams v. State, 283 Ga. 298, 302 (3) (e) (658 SE2d 627) (2008). With respectto the prosecutor’s first remarks, we conclude that the prosecutor permissiblyurged the jurors to conclude the prosecution’s witnesses offered credibletestimony based on the evidence presented. See Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505,515 (4) (a) (iii) (801 SE2d 782) (2017). Here, the prosecutor’s references tothe truth were made in the context of asking the jury to apply their common sense when, for example, judging the credibility of witnesses. Where a prosecutor’s argument was not improper, trial counsel’s decision not to object does not amount to deficient performance. See Lamar v. State, 297 Ga. 89, 93 (3) (772 SE2d 636) (2015).With respect to the prosecutor’s second argument – that it was his job to“seek[] the truth” – even assuming that trial counsel was deficient for failingto object, Appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. The statement, whiletroubling, was made in response to the argument from defense counsel that,with respect to his intense cross-examination of witnesses, he “had a job to do”and that he was there “to stand up for [Appellant] and help him.” Viewed inthe context of dueling attorneys exchanging arguments concerning their role inthe judicial process, “the improper remarks of the prosecuting attorney did notundermine the fundamental fairness of the trial,” Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743,749 (733 SE2d 294) (2012), and the jury – which was instructed that thearguments of counsel were not to be considered evidence – would haveunderstood these remarks to be little more than an exchange of emotionally-charged argument from the respective attorneys, see id.(c) On direct examination, Hearst and McBride testified as to the eventsin question and identified Appellant as the shooter. Later in the trial, the State elicited testimony from a detective regarding statements Hearst and McBride made on the night in question which were consistent with their trial testimony. Appellant asserts trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to what Appellant claims was inadmissible bolstering evidence concerning the two eyewitnesses, which prejudiced his defense.This case was tried in 2010, before the date Georgia’s new EvidenceCode went into effect. Under the old Evidence Code, a witness’s priorconsistent statement was admissible if the veracity of the witness’s trialtestimony was placed in issue at trial, the witness was present at trial, and thewitness was available for cross-examination. See Williams v. State, 292 Ga.844, 849 (3) (c) (742 SE2d 445) (2013). “A witness’s veracity is placed inissue if affirmative charges of recent fabrication, improper influence, orimproper motive are raised during cross-examination. For the prior consistentstatement to be admissible, it must also predate the alleged fabrication,improper influence, or improper motive.” Kidd v. State, 292 Ga. 259, 260 (2)(736 SE2d 377) (2013). Appellant asserts that trial counsel did not challengethe veracity of the witnesses with specific allegations of recent fabrication,improper motive, or improper influence, and therefore the rules permitting theintroduction of prior consistent statements were not triggered. The trialtranscript shows, however, that defense counsel cross-examined Hearst byraising inconsistencies between Hearst’s trial testimony and his previousstatements to police, including whether he told police Appellant’s name at thescene of the crime and whether he knew who Appellant was when the victimbought drugs from Appellant with counterfeit money. Similarly, defensecounsel cross-examined McBride about inconsistencies between his trialtestimony and his previous statements to police, including why he did not tellpolice that he knew Appellant was upset that the victim had paid him for drugswith counterfeit money. Even though defense counsel did not directly accusethe two witnesses of lying, it is obvious from counsel’s cross-examination ofthe witnesses that he affirmatively attacked their veracity by pointing outinconsistencies between their previous statements and their trial testimony, andby pointing to material facts that were provided at trial but not disclosed intheir prior statements to the police. The cross-examination of these witnessesclearly implied that their direct testimony constituted a recent fabrication, andthe witnesses’ statements to police predated the allegedly fabricated trialtestimony. Consequently, the detective’s testimony regarding the priorconsistent statements these witnesses made to him was admissible. SeeWilliams, supra, 292 Ga. at 850 (3) (c); Kidd, supra, 292 Ga. at 260. Trialcounsel did not perform deficiently by failing to make a meritless objection to the admission of this evidence. See Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355 (3) (a) (689 SE2d 280) (2010).Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
