Reese, Judge.A jury found Thomas Pierson guilty of two counts of sexual assault of a person in custody, four counts of violation of oath by a public officer, and one count each of false imprisonment and tampering with evidence.[1] He appeals from the judgment on his convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his sexual assault and violation of oath convictions. For the reasons set forth, infra, we affirm.Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,[2] the evidence showed the following facts. At approximately 12:15 p.m. on February 14, 2016, a woman, V. C., was driving southbound on Georgia Highway 85 on her way to have lunch with a friend, K. F. V. C. was unfamiliar with the area, so she was on the phone with K. F., who was giving her directions. The Appellant, a deputy with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, drove past V. C.’s car in the opposite direction and observed that she was speeding. The Appellant turned his patrol car around, activated the car’s blue lights, and stopped V. C.’s car (hereinafter, “Traffic Stop 1″).[3]After the Appellant obtained V. C.’s driver’s license, the two began “flirting” with one another; V. C. admitted at trial that she flirted with the Appellant because she hoped it would help her avoid a speeding ticket. After a few minutes, the Appellant wrote up a warning citation, but did not give it to V. C. at that time. When he told V. C. that he was going to give her a warning instead of a ticket, he said that he had not told her sooner because he wanted to make her “sweat a little bit[.]” As the Appellant and V. C. continued to flirt, V. C. realized that her seatbelt had pulled her shirt down so that the Appellant was able to see down her shirt, and she adjusted her seatbelt to correct the problem. The Appellant responded by telling her that he might have to change the warning citation to a speeding ticket. After flirting with V. C. a bit more, the Appellant suggested that V. C. drive a little way up the highway and turn right onto the first side road. The Appellant then ended Traffic Stop 1 by giving V. C. a warning citation for speeding and returning her driver’s license.As V. C. pulled her car back onto the highway to leave, she saw a “big box truck” coming toward her in her lane, and V. C. purposely rushed to pull in front of it so the truck would be between her car and the Appellant’s patrol car. As she was driving away, V. C. saw the side road the Appellant had told her to turn onto, but she intentionally drove past it and continued driving south on the highway. Less than five minutes later, the big box truck behind V. C. turned off the highway, and the Appellant’s patrol car “rushed up behind [her].” V. C. tried to ensure that she was driving below the speed limit while she again talked on the phone with K. F., getting directions and telling him about Traffic Stop 1. The Appellant pulled up “close behind” V. C.’s car, activated his blue lights, and pulled V. C. over a second time (“Traffic Stop 2″).As soon as he parked his patrol car behind V. C.’s car, the Appellant turned off his dash cam recorder.[4] At trial, the Appellant admitted that he knew that, if the dash cam recorder “continued to film [Traffic Stop 2, the recording] was going to be evidence of whatever took place on that event[.]” As the Appellant walked toward V. C.’s car, V. C. rolled down her window and asked him, “ [W]hy the hell did you pull me over this time[?]” The Appellant told her that he was sorry and that he “ just wanted to talk to [her].” There was a lot of traffic on the highway during Traffic Stop 2, and the Appellant told V. C. to pull her car forward and turn onto the next side road.[5] The Appellant’s patrol car’s blue lights were still activated, and V. C. complied because she “thought [she] had to.” V. C. turned and stopped her car on the side road, leaving enough room behind her for the Appellant’s patrol car to park. The Appellant, however, drove his patrol car alongside V. C.’s car, rolled down his window, and told her to follow him. Although uncertain about what she was supposed to do under these circumstances, V. C. believed she had to obey the Appellant’s directions, so she followed the Appellant as he drove down the side road and around a corner. The Appellant then turned and drove down a dirt road and parked, and V. C. became afraid and nervous about the situation. V. C. did not drive down the dirt road but, instead, stopped her car on the side road and stayed inside with her doors locked. The Appellant walked back to V. C.’s car and told her that he “just want[ed] to talk to [her],” so she rolled her window down. After talking to V. C. for a few minutes, the Appellant suddenly reached through her car window, grabbed her arm, unlocked the car door, pulled the door open, and tried to pull her out of the car. V. C. resisted and tried to stay in her car, but the Appellant told her that he just “wanted to see what [he was] looking at[ ]” and convinced her to walk with him to his patrol car so they could talk.While the Appellant and V. C. were talking in front of the patrol car, the Appellant suddenly grabbed V. C. and forced her to perform oral sex on him. During the assault, V. C. noticed that the Appellant was wearing blue plaid boxer shorts. And, at some point during the assault, the Appellant received a dispatch call on his police radio directing him to go to another location. The Appellant also “fiddl[ed]” with something on his belt, telling V. C. that he had to make sure that the “ recorder” was off. After the assault, as V. C. went back to her car, the Appellant told her not to tell anyone about what had happened.Despite the warning, V. C. immediately talked to her friend, K. F., on the phone and told him about the assault; she also called two other friends shortly thereafter. At trial, her friends described V. C.’s demeanor during those phone calls as “totally distraught” and “[h]ysterical[,]” and testified that she was crying and difficult to understand. Although her friends told V. C. to call 911 and report the assault, V. C. refused to do so, fearing that the Appellant or one of his friends would respond to the call.As V. C. was driving home after the assault, she left Harris County and entered Pike County, where she saw the office of the Pike County Sheriff’s Office. V. C. decided to stop there and report the assault, because the Appellant did not work for Pike County. She told the Pike County police officers what had happened and showed them the warning ticket the Appellant had given her during Traffic Stop 1. During the interview, V. C. described the boxer shorts the Appellant was wearing during the assault. The officers contacted the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, which sent an investigator to the Pike County office to interview V. C.[6] and the Pike County officers. According to the Harris County investigator, V. C. “appeared shaken [and] emotional” and “looked like she had been crying” when the investigator arrived to interview her. Following the interviews, the investigator called the Harris County Sheriff Mike Jolley and relayed the information she had obtained about the assault.In the meantime, Sheriff Jolley called Neil Adams, the Chief Deputy of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office (“Chief Adams”), who, in turn, advised other department supervisors about the situation and instructed them to meet him at the sheriff’s office. When the Appellant returned to the sheriff’s office at the end of his shift that day, Chief Adams and the other supervisors met with him and told him about V. C.’s allegations, and the Appellant “adamantly denied” that any sexual encounter had taken place between him and V. C. While speaking with the Appellant, Chief Adams received a phone call from the Harris County investigator who had interviewed V. C., and the investigator reported that V. C. had described the underwear the Appellant was wearing during the assault. When Chief Adams informed the Appellant, the Appellant agreed to show one of the supervisors his underwear, which matched V. C.’s description. At that point, the Appellant started to cry and said, “it was consensual.” Chief Adams ended the interview and placed the Appellant on administrative leave. The Appellant was also required to turn in his “gun belt,” and the Appellant admitted at trial that, throughout his encounters with V. C., he had a gun and a taser on his belt.[7] The supervisors also manually downloaded the recordings from the Appellant’s patrol car’s dash cam and watched the recordings of Traffic Stops 1 and 2.The next morning, the Appellant met with Sheriff Jolley and Chief Adams and apologized for embarrassing the sheriff’s office. The Appellant gave them a two-page, unsigned, unsworn, typed statement in which he admitted that V. C. had performed oral sex on him the previous day, but he claimed that it was consensual and was initiated by V. C.[8] Given that the sexual contact described by the Appellant constituted a “serious violation” of the policies of the sheriff’s office, Sheriff Jolley terminated the Appellant’s employment.As part of the office’s investigation, Sheriff Jolley had his staff audit all of the traffic stops the Appellant had conducted in the previous six months in order to find out if other people had been involved in similar incidents with the Appellant. The department sent letters to all of the people the Appellant had stopped during that time period. In response to the letter, a woman, L. F., contacted the department and reported that the Appellant had stopped her car on October 19, 2015, and then detained her for 45 minutes.[9] About 18 minutes after the stop began, the Appellant turned off the body microphone he was wearing, and, about 11 minutes after that, the Appellant turned off his patrol car’s dash cam recorder.[10] L. F. testified that, during the stop, the Appellant leaned into her car window while talking with her and, as she showed him some pictures on her phone, he grabbed the phone. The Appellant then showed L. F. a video on his own phone showing the Appellant having sex with a woman; the Appellant told L. F. that the woman was someone he “sleeps with” and was not his wife. Although L. F. had become frightened by this point in the traffic stop, she did not believe she was free to leave until the Appellant released her.The next afternoon, the Appellant went to L. F.’s home and knocked on her door; L. F. testified that she had not invited the Appellant to her home. L. F. peeked out the window, saw the Appellant, and did not answer the door because she was scared. The Appellant left L. F.’s home, but returned about an hour later and, when he again knocked on the door, L. F. did not answer it because she was “freaked out” by the fact that the Appellant had returned. Instead of leaving immediately when L. F. did not answer the door, the Appellant stood behind his patrol car, which was parked in her driveway, and waited a while before leaving.[11]After the media published a story about the Appellant’s assault of V. C., the GBI Agent who was investigating the incident contacted and interviewed a woman, C. T., who had posted an entry on Facebook describing a traffic stop conducted by a Harris County deputy.[12] At trial, C. T. testified that, on September 12, 2015, the Appellant stopped her car as she was driving through Harris County.[13] The traffic stop lasted about 26 minutes, during which the Appellant and C. T. talked and flirted with one another. Even though the Appellant handed C. T. a warning citation[14] about 22 minutes into the stop, the Appellant continued to talk to C. T., and she did not feel free to leave. The Appellant did not end the traffic stop and return to his patrol car until C. T. told the Appellant that she was in a hurry because she was going to see her grandmother, noting that her grandmother lived “off of Holland Road.”C. T. went home briefly, then, as she was driving to her grandmother’s home, she saw the Appellant’s patrol car coming toward her on Holland Road. After passing C. T., the Appellant turned his patrol car around and followed C. T.’s car until she pulled into her grandmother’s driveway. The Appellant parked at the end of the driveway and stayed there for about ten minutes. According to C. T., she felt “[e]xtremely uncomfortable[,]” “ flustered,” “upset[,]” and “ fearful” because the Appellant had used information he had obtained during a traffic stop to find her.Following the Appellant’s arrest and indictment for offenses committed against the three victims, the case proceeded to trial, where a jury found the Appellant guilty on two counts of sexual assault on a person in custody, based upon his improper sexual contact with V. C.; four counts of violation of oath by a public officer, based on his improper conduct during the traffic stops; one count of false imprisonment of V. C.; and one count of tampering with evidence, based upon his act of shutting off the dash cam recorder during Traffic Stop 2.[15] The trial court sentenced the Appellant to twelve years imprisonment, with eight to serve, plus a consecutive sentence of five years on probation for one of the violation of oath convictions. This appeal followed.On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and an appellant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. This Court determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia,[16] and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. Any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case, we must uphold the jury’s verdict.[17]“The standard of Jackson v. Virginia[[18]] is met if the evidence is sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged.”[19] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to the Appellant’s specific claims of error.1. The Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for sexual assault on a person in custody, arguing that the evidence showed that V. C. was not being “detained” by him or “in [his] custody” at the time of the sexual assault. We disagree.OCGA § 16-6-5.1 (b) (3) provides that[a] person who has supervisory or disciplinary authority over another individual commits sexual assault when that person[ is] an employee or agent of a law enforcement agency and engages in sexual contact with such other individual who the actor knew or should have known is being detained by or is in the custody of any law enforcement agency[.] As the trial court instructed the jury at the end of the trial, for the purpose of this statute, “[c]ustody means the state of being kept or guarded, and the state of being detained or held under guard, especially by the police. Custody presupposes actual imprisonment or detention by law enforcement such that the person is not free to go about his or her normal activities.”[20](a) As an initial matter, OCGA § 16-6-5.1 (e) specifically provides that “[c]onsent of the victim shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this Code section.” Thus, although the Appellant insisted before and during trial that V. C. had consented to the sexual conduct at issue,[21] he could not rely on her alleged consent as a defense to the charges at issue in this case, i.e., that he violated OCGA § 16-6-5.1 (b) (3) by sexually assaulting V. C. while she was detained by him or in his custody.[22](b) In arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under OCGA § 16-6-5.1 (b) (3), the Appellant contends that the State failed to prove that he “knew or should have known” that he was detaining V. C. or had her in his custody at the time of the sexual conduct. In his brief, the Appellant admits that Traffic Stop 2 began as a “detention” of V. C. because he had used his blue lights to pull her over, but he claims that, shortly after he conducted the stop, he told V. C. that he “just wanted to talk to her.”[23] The Appellant argues that, because he stopped V. C. for his own “personal reasons[,]” and not because she had violated the law, he “ was aware that [V. C.] was not being officially detained and was free to leave.” He also contends that the evidence established that he turned off his blue lights when he turned onto the side road, that V. C. “willingly” followed him down the road, and that he did not park his patrol car in a manner that prevented her from driving away. The Appellant argues that, as a result, the evidence was “clear” that V. C. was not being detained by him or in his custody at the time of the sexual conduct, as required by the statute, so his convictions must be reversed. These arguments lack merit.The undisputed evidence at trial showed that, on the day of the assault, the Appellant was driving a Harris County Sheriff’s Office patrol car; was on duty during his assigned shift; was wearing his official uniform, which was equipped with a microphone; and had a pistol, taser, and police radio attached to his belt. After the Appellant parked his patrol car on the dirt road, he walked back to V. C.’s car and convinced her to walk with him to the front of his patrol car. In addition, it is undisputed that, while the Appellant and V. C. were engaged in sexual conduct, he received a dispatch call on his police radio, which supported a finding that he was on official duty at the time of the assault.The Appellant also admitted at trial that, when he turned on his blue lights to conduct Traffic Stop 2, V. C. was obligated to pull over and stop her car.[24] The Appellant testified that, at the time, he knew the stop was an “unlawful detention” of V. C., because he had no legal reason to stop her, and that conducting the unauthorized stop violated his oath of office.Further, V. C. testified that, under the circumstances, she did not think she was allowed to leave after the Appellant stopped her the second time or that she could refuse to do what the Appellant instructed her to do, and she believed that she was required to follow his patrol car down the side road, because he had activated his blue lights and had told her to follow him.[25] In fact, V. C. testified that the Appellant’s conduct toward her was the only reason she followed his patrol car down the side road. She also testified that, after the Appellant parked on the dirt road, she did not want to get out of her car because she was afraid and nervous. According to V. C., however, the Appellant walked up to her car, grabbed her arm, and tried to pull her out of her car, then held onto her wrist as he walked her to the front of his patrol car.Based on this evidence, we conclude that the jury was authorized to find that V. C. was being detained by the Appellant or kept in his custody to the extent that she was not free to go about her normal activities.[26]Moreover, during trial, the Appellant made the same arguments to the jury that he now makes on appeal, i.e., that V. C. was not credible, her version of her encounter with the Appellant was a complete lie, and the evidence demanded a finding that he was not detaining V. C. and did not have her in custody at the time of the sexual conduct.[27] The issue of the Appellant’s intent during the crime, however, was solely for the jurors to decide after considering the credibility of the witnesses and resolving the conflicts in the evidence.[28] Based upon the jury’s guilty verdicts, the jurors obviously found that the Appellant was not credible and rejected his version of the events, as the jurors were authorized to do.[29]Thus, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,[30] we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Appellant was guilty of sexually assaulting a person in custody.[31] Those convictions are affirmed.2. The Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for violation of oath by a public officer, arguing that the evidence failed to show that he had taken an oath “as prescribed by law,” as required by OCGA § 16-10-1. We disagree.OCGA § 16-10-1 provides that “[a]ny public officer who willfully and intentionally violates the terms of his oath as prescribed by law shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.”[32] “[T]o prove a violation of this Code section, the State must present evidence that the defendant violated the terms of the oath actually administered and that those terms were from an oath ‘prescribed by law,’ that is, one that the legislature required of a public officer before entering the duties of his or her office.”[33](a) OCGA § 45-3-7, entitled “Oaths of deputies,” provides as follows:Before proceeding to act, all deputies shall take the same oaths as their principals take and the oaths shall be filed and entered on the minutes of the same office with the same endorsement thereon; but this Code section shall not apply to any deputy who may be employed in particular cases only. A deputy sheriff may take his oaths before the sheriff and the oaths may be filed in and entered in the records of the sheriff’s office.[34]At trial, Sheriff Jolley testified that, before the Appellant or any other deputy sheriff in the Harris County Sheriff’s Office was allowed to take any actions in his or her official capacity, he or she was administered the “Official Oath of a Deputy Sheriff” (“the oath”).[35] The State introduced into evidence a copy of the oath the Appellant had taken, and Sheriff Jolley read the oath to the jury, as follows:I, Thomas Pierson,[[36]] do swear that I will faithfully execute all writs, warrants, precepts, and processes directed to me as deputy sheriff of this county, or which are directed to all sheriffs of this State, or to any other sheriff specially, I can lawfully execute, and true returns make, and in all things well and truly, without malice or partiality, perform the duties of the Office of Deputy Sheriff of Harris County, during my continuance therein.I do further solemnly swear or affirm that I am not the holder of any public money due this State unaccounted for, that I am not the holder of any office of trust under the Government of the United States (except postmaster), nor of either of the several states, nor of any foreign state, and that I am other wise qualified to hold said office, according to the Constitution of the United States and laws of Georgia, and that I will support the Constitutions of the United States and of this State.SO HELP ME GOD!The first paragraph of the oath is almost identical to the oath that sheriffs are required to take, pursuant to OCGA § 15-16-4.[37] Thus, the oath fulfilled the requirement, under OCGA § 45-3-7, that the Appellant “take the same oath[ ] as [his] principal[,]” i.e., the sheriff.[38] Further, Sheriff Jolley testified that he personally administered the oath to the Appellant, that the Appellant swore the oath, and that a copy of the oath, with the Appellant’s name hand-written at the top, was filed in the sheriff’s department, as required by OCGA § 45-3-7.Under these circumstances, we find that there was sufficient evidence to show that the terms of the oath taken by the Appellant were “prescribed by law,” as required by OCGA § 16-10-1.[39](b) The Appellant argues, however, that, even if the sheriff had administered the oath to him at some point prior to the improper conduct at issue, the oath was invalid because it was not “subscribed” by him, as required by OCGA § 45-3-3, which provides that,[w]hen not otherwise provided by law . . . , the oaths of office may be taken before any officer authorized by law to administer an oath. Such oaths shall be written and subscribed by the persons taking them and accompanied by the certificate of such officer, which shall specify the day and year taken.[40]The Appellant argues that, absent a showing that he “subscribed” to the oath, the State failed to show that he took the oath “as prescribed by law[,]” as required to constitute a violation of his oath of office under OCGA § 16-10-1. This argument lacks merit.Pretermitting whether OCGA § 45-3-3 applies in this case, given that its requirements only apply when there is no other law with conflicting requirements, the statute dictates the manner in which an oath may be taken and how the administration of the oath is to be officially recorded, not the terms of the oath itself.In contrast, a plain reading of OCGA § 16-10-1 shows that the phrase “the terms of [the] oath as prescribed by law” refers specifically to the terms of the oath itself, not the manner in which the oath had to be administered or memorialized.[41] And, as we found in subdivision (a), supra, the State proved that the terms of the oath taken by the Appellant were “the terms of [the] oath as prescribed by law,” i.e., the terms required and codified by the Georgia Legislature for deputy sheriffs in OCGA §§ 15-16-4 and 45-3-7.[42]It follows that this argument presents no reversible error.(c) Finally, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that the Appellant’s improper conduct violated the terms of his oath.[43]In four separate counts, the indictment charged the Appellant with violating OCGA § 16-10-1, alleging that he, “being a public officer with Harris County Sheriff’s Office, did willfully and intentionally violate the terms of his oath as prescribed by law in that he did swear to ‘in all things well and truly, without malice or partiality, perform the duties of the Office of Deputy Sheriff of Harris County[.]‘” Each count then specifically described the Appellant’s improper conduct that violated his oath of office.[44]As shown in subdivision (a), supra, the oath required that the Appellant “well and truly, without malice or partiality, perform the duties of the Office of Deputy Sheriff of Harris County[.]” At trial, the State presented the sheriff’s office’s policy manuals that outlined the required conduct and duties of the office’s employees, including deputies, as well as evidence showing that the Appellant was “ familiar with [the] policies and procedures and was given a copy of the policy,” and that sections of the policy had been reviewed daily during the Appellant’s eight-week training period.According to Sheriff Jolley, the Appellant violated the office’s policies, and, thus, his oath, when the Appellant had sexual contact with V. C. during Traffic Stop 2, and when the Appellant engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct with L. F. and C. T. during their traffic stops. Further, the Appellant admitted during his testimony that he failed to “well and truly perform[ his] duties as a deputy sheriff[,]” as required by his oath, when he used sexually inappropriate language and propositioned V. C. during Traffic Stop 1; when he conducted Traffic Stop 2 with no legal reason to stop or detain V. C.; when he engaged in sexual conduct with V. C.; when he engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior with L. F. and C. T.; and when he turned off his body microphone and dash cam recorder during the traffic stops.[45] In fact, during closing arguments, the Appellant’s defense counsel challenged only the validity of the oath taken by the Appellant, while admitting that the Appellant “clearly . . . violate[d] the terms of his oath, . . . no one’s disputing that one bit.”This evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the Appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating OCGA § 16-10-1, as charged in the indictment.[46]Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur.
