Dillard, Presiding Judge. John Doe appeals from the denial of his motion to seal arrest records of the Clerk of the Superior Court of DeKalb County. Specifically, Doe contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion when (1) the undisputed evidence shows that the harm to him clearly outweighed public interest in access to his records of acquittal, (2) it failed to properly apply the statutory balancing test under OCGA § 35-3-37 (m), and (3) policy considerations further support the evidence presented to the trial court. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm. The record shows that, following a trial by jury in 2002, Doe was acquitted of aggravated assault with intent to rape and three counts of child molestation. Thereafter, in 2018, Doe filed a motion to seal the records of the clerk of court under OCGA § 35-3-37 (m). In doing so, he asserted that the DeKalb County District Attorney previously approved his record restriction application and, thus, the Georgia Crime Information Center (GCIC) restricted the record of his arrest for the offenses at issue. Nevertheless, records for the arrest were still publicly available at the DeKalb County Superior Court Clerk’s Office and online. As a result, Doe claimed that because his “potential employers are likely to conduct a criminal background check,” there was a reduced likelihood that “a potential employer will offer [him] meaningful employment in the future.” Doe further explained that he had “already been denied employment based on his criminal history” and “not been able to find work in his field” due to the records at issue, and he attached an affidavit swearing to same. More specifically, Doe noted that even though he was a trained auto mechanic, he had not been able to secure employment in that field due to these records. Instead, Doe claimed that he was relegated to working as a landscaper, which was unstable employment that left him and his family living paycheck to paycheck. He also expressed a desire to return to school and acquire the appropriate license to become a truck driver. But before doing so, and making such an investment, he wanted to clean up his record to ensure that he would have employment opportunities. Accordingly, he requested that the criminal history information related to the charges for which he was acquitted be sealed. Following two hearings on the matter, the trial court denied Doe’s motion, concluding that he had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the public availability of his records resulted in harm to his privacy that clearly outweighed the public’s interest in the criminal history record information being available. This appeal follows. 1. Doe argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion when undisputed evidence shows that the harm to his privacy clearly outweighed the public’s interest in access to the records of his arrest. We disagree. At the conclusion of the first hearing, the trial court withheld ruling upon Doe’s motion and continued the proceedings by scheduling a future hearing, at which it invited Doe to provide documentation to support his contention that he had been denied employment due to a felony arrest appearing on his record. During the first hearing, Doe’s counsel asserted that his client was available to testify that he had been denied employment for that reason, though he did not say that Doe would testify in greater detail or specificity than the statements contained in his affidavit. As a result, the trial court appears to have dismissed the proffer of Doe’s testimony because it was “sure he will tell me exactly what [counsel] just said.” Instead, the court indicated that it wished to see documentary evidence substantiating Doe’s claims. Then, at the second hearing, Doe’s counsel informed the trial court that his client still did not have any supporting documentation and proceeded on the record as it then existed. Thereafter, the court issued its order denying the motion. In considering Doe’s claim, we begin with the text of the relevant statute, OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) (1), which provides: For criminal history record information maintained by the clerk of court, an individual who has a record restricted pursuant to this Code section may petition the court with original jurisdiction over the charges in the county where the clerk of court is located for an order to seal all criminal history record information maintained by the clerk of court for such individual’s charge. Notice of such petition shall be sent to the clerk of court and the prosecuting attorney. A notice sent by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery shall be sufficient notice. It is undisputed that Doe complied with these procedures, but the parties disagree as to whether Doe met his burden of showing that his criminal history record information should be restricted under the balancing test delineated by OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) (2): The court shall order all criminal history record information in the custody of the clerk of court, including within any index, to be restricted and unavailable to the public if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: (A) The criminal history record information has been restricted pursuant to this Code section; and (B) The harm otherwise resulting to the privacy of the individual clearly outweighs the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available.[1] Although it undisputed that Doe met the requirements of OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) (2) (A), because the GCIC had already restricted the record of his arrest for the offenses at issue, he still needed to show by a preponderance of the evidence—under (m) (2) (B)—that the harm resulting to his privacy clearly outweighed the public’s interest in the availability of the records in order for the trial court to order their restriction.[2] And to satisfy the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, Doe was required to demonstrate that the “superior weight of evidence upon the issues involved, which, while not enough to free the mind wholly from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than to the other.”[3] Here, the record shows that Doe provided no detailed or specific information as to the impact his arrest record had on his ability to acquire employment as an auto mechanic—e.g., no dates of his search for employment and no names and addresses of companies to which he had applied. Instead, Doe broadly and vaguely asserted by way of an affidavit that he was “denied many [auto-mechanic] jobs due to [his] record” and that he was hindered in supporting his family “by [his] record” because “the only work [he is] able to get is lawn maintenance and landscaping.” And while it is true that Doe did not testify, the blame for this cannot lie solely with the trial court, which obviously dismissed the proffer of testimony because Doe’s counsel never indicated that his client would testify in greater detail than the vague statements already contained in the affidavit.[4] Nor did counsel ask that Doe be permitted to testify at the second hearing or proffer any additional details.[5] Finally, Doe did not submit a new or amended affidavit prior to the second hearing so as to provide specific details about his alleged efforts to acquire employment as an auto mechanic.[6] Here, setting aside any lack of supporting documentation from potential employers,[7] which the trial court apparently required, Doe’s vague and conclusory affidavit was the only evidence he submitted, and it lacked sufficient detail and specificity to meet the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that his privacy interests clearly outweighed the public’s interest in the records.[8] Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Doe’s motion.[9] 2. Next, Doe argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the statutory balancing test under OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) and, thus, asks that we remand this case back to the trial court. More specifically, Doe maintains that the trial court erred by (1) refusing to allow him to testify, (2) refusing to consider anything other than documentary evidence, (3) failing to conclude that the public interest in an acquittal was outweighed by Doe’s “direct evidence of harm,” and (4) employing a double standard by ruling in the State’s favor when it did not present evidence. But for the reasons already set forth in Division 1, supra, these arguments lack merit. 3. Finally, Doe argues that “policy considerations further support Doe’s evidence that his unsealed record of acquittal has harmed his privacy interests.” Once again, as to the sufficiency of the evidence, this is a court for the correction of errors, and “ordinarily it is within this Court’s purview to review such a determination for legal error once made by the trial court, not to make the determination in the first place.”[10] And having considered the arguments and evidence that were before the trial court, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Doe’s motion. Accordingly, for all these reasons, we affirm. Judgment affirmed. Gobeil, J., concurs. Hodges, J., concurs fully and specially. A19A2378. DOE v. THE STATE.
