Doyle, Presiding Judge. In this interlocutory appeal, Star Residential, LLC, and Terraces at Brookhaven, LLC, (the “Defendants”) appeal a trial court order denying their motion to dismiss certain claims brought against them by Manuel Hernandez seeking damages for injuries he received in a shooting at his apartment complex. The Defendants contend that the trial court erred by ruling that (1) Hernandez has alleged a viable personal injury claim under the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (“GSGTPA”),[1] and (2) Hernandez has alleged a viable negligence per se claim based on city and county nuisance ordinances. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The relevant factual background is not in dispute. Hernandez’s complaint alleges that he was a tenant in an apartment complex owned by Terraces at Brookhaven, LLC, and operated by Star Residential, LLC. In 2017, when Hernandez approached the doorway to his apartment, he was shot from behind in an unprovoked attack and robbery involving two shooters and a getaway driver. Hernandez survived the attack but was paralyzed from the waist down. Based on his injuries, Hernandez sued the Defendants, alleging claims of negligent security/premises liability and nuisance, later amending his complaint to refine the nuisance claim under the GSGTPA and add claims for negligence per se based on alleged violations of DeKalb County and City of Brookhaven public nuisance ordinances. The Defendants answered and moved to dismiss the claims based on the GSGTPA and local nuisance ordinances. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and this Court granted the Defendants’ application for interlocutory review.[2] 1. The Defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss Hernandez’s claim (Count 2) predicated on the GSGTPA. Specifically, the Defendants argue that the language of the GSGTPA does not apply to the claim against them in this case because they merely own and operate the property, and Hernandez does not allege that the Defendants were involved in the shooting. Based on the breadth of the language of the GSGTPA and its clear instruction that the finder of fact determine whether a claim falls within the Act’s legislative intent,[3] we discern no reversible error. As a threshold matter, we note that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of the relief sought by the claimant, the complaint is sufficient and a motion to dismiss should be denied. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party’s favor. On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted is reviewed de novo.[4] Our substantive analysis begins with the familiar rules of statutory construction. A statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text. Under our wellestablished rules of statutory construction, we presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its “plain and ordinary meaning,” we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. Though we may review the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.[5] Here, Hernandez’s nuisance count relies on OCGA § 16-15-7, which provides: (a)_ Any real property which is erected, established, maintained, owned, leased, or used by any criminal street gang for the purpose of conducting criminal gang activity shall constitute a public nuisance and may be abated as provided by Title 41, relating to nuisances.[6] (b)_ An action to abate a nuisance pursuant to this Code section may be brought by the district attorney, solicitorgeneral, prosecuting attorney of a municipal court or city, or county attorney in any superior, state, or municipal court. (c)_ Any person who is injured by reason of criminal gang activity shall have a cause of action for three times the actual damages sustained and, where appropriate, punitive damages; provided, however, that no cause of action shall arise under this subsection as a result of an otherwise legitimate commercial transaction between parties to a contract or agreement for the sale of lawful goods or property or the sale of securities regulated by Chapter 5 of Title 10 or by the federal Securities and Exchange Commission. Such person shall also recover attorney’s fees in the trial and appellate court and costs of investigation and litigation reasonably incurred. All averments of a cause of action under this subsection shall be stated with particularity. No judgment shall be awarded unless the finder of fact determines that the action is consistent with the intent of the General Assembly as set forth in Code Section 16152. (d)_ The state, any political subdivision thereof, or any person aggrieved by a criminal street gang or criminal gang activity may bring an action to enjoin violations of this chapter in the same manner as provided in Code Section 16146.[7] The plain language of subsection (c) is clear that “[a]ny person who is injured by reason of criminal gang activity shall have a cause of action” for treble damages. The subsection is also explicit that a judgment on the cause of action is not available “unless the finder of fact determines that the action is consistent with the intent of the General Assembly as set forth in Code Section 16152.” That Code section provides: (a)_ The General Assembly finds and declares that it is the right of every person to be secure and protected from fear, intimidation, and physical harm caused by the activities of violent groups and individuals. It is not the intent of this chapter to interfere with the exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of freedom of expression and association. The General Assembly recognizes the constitutional right of every citizen to harbor and express beliefs on any lawful subject whatsoever, to associate lawfully with others who share similar beliefs, to petition lawfully constituted authority for a redress of perceived grievances, and to participate in the electoral process. (b)_ The General Assembly, however, further finds that the State of Georgia is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent criminal street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods. These activities, both individually and collectively, present a clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected. (c)_ The General Assembly finds that there are criminal street gangs operating in Georgia and that the number of gang related murders is increasing. It is the intent of the General Assembly in enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of criminal activity by criminal street gangs by focusing upon criminal gang activity and upon the organized nature of criminal street gangs which together are the chief source of terror created by criminal street gangs. (d)_ The General Assembly further finds that an effective means of punishing and deterring the criminal activities of criminal street gangs is through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or used by criminal street gangs. Thus, OCGA § 16-15-7 provides for a cause of action for treble damages to persons injured by reason of criminal gang activity if the factfinder determines that the action is consistent with the above codified legislative intent.[8] Notably, the statute is silent as to the nature of the cause of action or the intended defendant of such an action. The GSGTPA does define “criminal gang activity” to include “the commission . . . of . . . [a]ny criminal offense in the State of Georgia . . . that involves violence, possession of a weapon, or use of a weapon . . . ,”[9] and it appears plain that the violent injury Hernandez alleges he received falls within this type of conduct.[10] The statute is also explicit that it is for the factfinder to determine whether the action is consistent with the legislative intent expressed in OCGA § 16-15-2.[11] Thus, whether the present action is consistent with the intent set forth in OCGA § 16-15-2 is not a threshold issue for courts to resolve,[12] particularly at the motion to dismiss stage, and we must give effect to that policy choice. The facts alleged in Hernandez’s complaint, which we must construe in his favor at this stage of the litigation, state that: criminal activity and numerous shootings were the result of gang activity at his apartment complex ; his apartment complex was used by criminal street gangs for the purpose of conducting gang activity ; lack of adequate security provided by the Defendants “enabled criminal street gangs to overtake the property to the point that residents were exposed to living in an environment that was equivalent to a ‘war zone’” ; and as a proximate result of the dangerous conditions maintained by the Defendants at his apartment complex, Hernandez was injured by criminal street gang activity. We cannot say as a matter of law that Hernandez “could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief”[13] he seeks. Accordingly, based on the broad definition of criminal gang activity, the role of the factfinder in determining whether an action is consistent with the intent of the GSGTPA, and the standard applicable to motions to dismiss, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hernandez’s claim under the GSGTPA. 2. The Defendants also contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss Hernandez’s negligence per se claims predicated on alleged violations of DeKalb County and City of Brookhaven nuisance codes, arguing that no duty to Hernandez is created by the respective nuisance code language. Based on the language of the ordinances and Hernandez’s complaint, we disagree. “[N]egligence per se arises when a statute [or ordinance] is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the [ordinance] was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the [ordinance] was intended to guard against.”[14] The ordinances at issue here contain mirroring language, as provided, for example, in the Brookhaven nuisance ordinance: The governing authority of the [city/county] finds that nuisances are such activities and conditions that cause a demonstrable adverse impact on the community. These activities and conditions may be associated with illegal criminal activity that has also been proven to have a demonstrable adverse impact on community residences and results in neighborhood blight. The [city/county] finds that there is a substantial need directly related to the public health, safety[,] and general welfare of its citizens to comprehensively address these concerns through the adoption of the following regulations. The purpose and intent of the governing authority . . . in enacting the ordinance . . . are as follows: (1) To state that it is the duty of the owner of every . . . property . . . to maintain . . . such . . . property in conformance with applicable codes . . . which regulate and prohibit activities on property and which declare it to be a public nuisance to . . . maintain any . . . property in violation of such codes or ordinances; . . . (5) To protect the health, welfare and safety of the citizens . . . by the removal of both criminal perpetrators and housing blight on the community; . . . (7) To promote the safety of its citizens. . . . In its order, the trial court relied on additional language declaring buildings used for “prostitution, illegal gambling, or in connection with the commission of drug crimes . . . to be a public nuisance.”[15] The Defendants argue that Hernandez has not identified an ordinance establishing a duty owed to him that they violated. But as pointed out by the trial court, the ordinances at issue create a duty on the part of owners to maintain property in conformance with applicable ordinances, and the stated purpose of the ordinances is to protect the safety of citizens by reducing nuisances associated with criminal activity. As noted in Division 1 of this opinion, Hernandez alleged that the Defendants maintained the property in such a way as to create a “war zone” of violence and criminal activity at the apartment complex. The complaint’s allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss the claims based on alleged violations of the DeKalb County and Brookhaven ordinances. [A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof. Put another way, if, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.[16] The ordinances at issue expressly contemplate that residents such as Hernandez could be exposed to the criminal activity that the ordinances are designed to reduce. And Hernandez’s complaint alleges that his injury was due to an environment allegedly maintained by the Defendants in violation of the local ordinances at issue. Accordingly, based on the record before us, the trial court did not err by denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hernandez’s negligence per se claims. Judgment affirmed. Coomer, J., concurs; Markle, J., concurs fully and specially. A19A2267. STAR RESIDENTIAL, LLC et al. v. HERNANDEZ
