Peterson, Justice. Gary Arlen Holland was charged under OCGA § 40-6-393 (b) with first-degree vehicular homicide predicated on the offense of hit- and-run.[1] Holland moved to bar his prosecution for that offense. The trial court granted his motion, declaring OCGA § 40-6-393 (b) unconstitutional under the equal protection and due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The State appeals the trial court’s order. The trial court erred in finding the statute unconstitutional, and we reverse. On June 29, 2017, a Glynn County grand jury returned an indictment charging Holland with first-degree vehicular homicide, hit and run, failure to report an accident, two counts of second- degree vehicular homicide, failure to yield to a bicyclist, and failure to maintain lane. The indictment alleged that, on September 4, 2016, Holland fatally struck Susan Kilner with his truck as she was cycling in the bicycle lane. The first-degree vehicular homicide charge was predicated on the allegation that Holland left the scene of the accident.[2] Holland moved to bar his prosecution for first-degree vehicular homicide on the grounds that OCGA § 40-6-393 (b) violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. The trial court granted Holland’s motion in part, striking down the statute as unconstitutional on equal protection and due process grounds.[3] The State appeals. 1. We turn first to Holland’s substantive due process claim, and conclude that the trial court erred in declaring that the statute violates due process. The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, so we review de novo the trial court’s conclusion regarding the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-6-393 (b). See Rhodes v. State, 283 Ga. 361, 362 (659 SE2d 370) (2008) (footnotes omitted). “Where a criminal statute does not discriminate on racial grounds or against a suspect class, equal protection and due process concerns are satisfied if the statute bears a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.” Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 400 (3) (b) (807 SE2d 425) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the criminal statute in question does not discriminate on racial grounds or against a suspect class. We therefore apply this rational basis test, the most lenient level of judicial review. See id.[4] Under this test, the statute is presumptively valid, such that the claimant bears the burden of proof. See id. Maintaining public safety and welfare, including protecting the public while traveling on Georgia’s roads and highways, is plainly a legitimate legislative purpose. See, e.g., Castillo-Solis v. State, 292 Ga. 755, 762 (3) (740 SE2d 583) (2013). And so this case turns on whether the statute bears a reasonable relationship to that purpose. It does. Before 2008, the crime of first-degree vehicular homicide predicated on hit-and-run included as an element that the defendant’s actions in leaving the scene were a contributing cause of the victim’s death. See OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) (1999); see also Klaub v. Battle, 286 Ga. 156, 158 (686 SE2d 117) (2009) (reversing denial of habeas relief to defendant convicted of first-degree vehicular homicide under prior version of statute, because the State did not prove that defendant’s act of leaving the scene caused the victim’s death). In 2008, the General Assembly deleted that element. See Ga. L. 2008, p. 1164, § 2. Holland’s constitutional challenge asserts that the absence of that element renders the statute irrational, when other versions of first-degree vehicular homicide still include an element of causation as a result of the traffic violation. Compare OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) with OCGA § 40-6-393 (b).[5] The State has argued that requiring drivers who cause serious traffic accidents to remain at or immediately return to the scene and provide or summon aid, and encouraging this conduct by threatening serious punishment, can decrease the severity of victims’ injuries or even save victims’ lives. The requirement that drivers stay on the scene and provide identification can also simplify resolution of any related civil claims and conserves law enforcement resources, the State posits. This is a reasonable, and not arbitrary or discriminatory, explanation for subjecting hit-and-run drivers who cause a fatal accident to prosecution for first-degree vehicular homicide, even if the State cannot prove that the failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 40-6-270 (a) was a contributing cause of the victim’s death.[6] Therefore, Holland has not shown that the General Assembly’s determination was irrational.[7] The trial court erred in concluding that OCGA § 40-6-393 (b) is unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds. 2. The trial court also found the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. This, too, was error. Similar to the standard governing Holland’s substantive due process challenge, an equal protection challenge to a criminal statute is examined under the rational basis test unless the statute discriminates on racial grounds or against a suspect class. See Pierce, 302 Ga. at 400 (3) (b). An equal protection claimant “must establish that he is similarly situated to members of the class who are treated differently from him. Next, the claimant must establish that there is no rational basis for such different treatment.” Id. (citation omitted). “In general, for equal protection purposes, criminal defendants are similarly situated if they are charged with the same crime” Jones v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (a) (837 SE2d 288) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). The trial court found OCGA § 40-6-393 (b) unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because it treats those charged with first- degree vehicular homicide based on a hit-and-run differently from those charged with first-degree vehicular homicide based on any other singular traffic violation. In particular, although a conviction for first-degree vehicular homicide under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) requires the State to prove that the defendant caused another’s death through the underlying traffic violation, the State does not need to prove that the defendant’s act of leaving the scene without fulfilling his obligations under OCGA § 40-6-270 (a) was a contributing cause of the victim’s death in order to secure a conviction for first-degree vehicular homicide under OCGA § 40-6393 (b). The trial court’s (at least implicit) conclusion that those charged with first-degree vehicular homicide based on a hit-and-run are similarly situated to those charged with first-degree vehicular homicide based on another singular traffic violation was probably wrong; the different bases for vehicular homicide criminalize different conduct. See State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 408 (1) (761 SE2d 1) (2014) (questioning whether defendants who are convicted for trafficking methamphetamine and provide substantial assistance to the State should be considered similarly situated to those defendants who are convicted of trafficking methamphetamine but are unable to provide substantial assistance). But the State does not challenge that conclusion, and, in any event, Holland’s equal protection claim fails for essentially the same reason his substantive due process claim fails — he has not shown that that the different approach taken in OCGA § 40-6393 (b) lacks a rational basis when compared to the approaches taken to the other types of vehicular homicide. The same reasons that make the statute rationally related to a legitimate public interest also make the different statutory approach the General Assembly adopted in 2008 reasonable. The trial court erred by concluding that OCGA § 40-6-393 (b) is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Judgment reversed. Melton, C.J., Nahmias, P.J., and Blackwell, Boggs, Warren, Bethel and Ellington, JJ., concur.
