Dillard, Presiding Judge. We granted Gwinnett County’s application for an interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss Twynette Ashby’s action to recover for personal injuries on the ground that her suit was barred by sovereign immunity. Because we agree with the County, we reverse. Ashby filed suit against the County, its Board of Commissioners, the Lawrenceville Youth Athletic Association, John Does 1-3, and XYZ Corporations 1-3 on April 23, 2019. Ashby alleged that on July 26, 2017, she attended her son’s football practice at a baseball field in Rhodes Jordan Park in Lawrenceville, which is located in Gwinnett County. Ashby was walking near the bleachers when her foot slipped into an uncovered drain, which caused her to fall and sustain “severe personal injuries.” She claimed that the fall resulted from the defendants negligently maintaining or repairing the drain and failing to warn of the dangerous condition. As a result, she asserted that the County was vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its agents or employees (i.e., John Does 1-3 and XYZ Corporations 1-3). The County answered and contended, inter alia, that Ashby’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity, and subsequently moved to dismiss her suit on this ground. In response, Ashby argued that OCGA § 50-21-23 waived the County’s immunity from suit and, additionally, that such immunity was waived under the Recreational Property Act.[1] More specifically, Ashby alleged—in response to the motion to dismiss—that the County charged her a fee for using the park for recreational purposes because she paid for her son to participate on the football team and use the park for practice.[2] Without any explanation, the trial court denied the County’s motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity.[3] But the court did issue a certificate of immediate review, and we granted the County’s application for interlocutory appeal. This appeal follows. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity de novo because it is a matter of law.[4] Of course, the trial court’s factual findings will be sustained if there is evidence to support them, and the party seeking the waiver of immunity has the burden of proof.[5] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to the County’s claim of error. Sovereign immunity protects all levels of governments from “legal action unless they have waived their immunity from suit.”[6] Any suit against the State that is barred by sovereign immunity is subject to dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.[7] And like the State, counties too enjoy sovereign immunity.[8] Sovereign immunity is only waived by an act of the General Assembly specifically providing for waiver and delineating the extent of that waiver.[9] Likewise, OCGA § 36-1-4 provides that “[a] county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute.”[10] Accordingly, a county’s immunity is “complete unless waived by statute, and includes protection from suits involving claims of negligence.”[11] To that end, Ashby’s assertion that the County’s immunity was waived by OCGA § 50-21-23 is unavailing. That code section provides, in relevant part: The state waives its sovereign immunity for the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment and shall be liable for such torts in the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances; provided, however, that the state’s sovereign immunity is waived subject to all exceptions and limitations set forth in this article. The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.[12] But OCGA § 50-21-22 (5) specifically excludes counties from the definition of “state” for purposes of the Georgia Tort Claims Act.[13] So, even though Ashby suggests that her suit against the John Doe and XYZ Corporation defendants as county employees somehow waives sovereign immunity, it is well established that “county officers sued in their official capacities—since a suit against a county officer in her official capacity is a suit against the county itself—enjoy the same sovereign immunity.”[14] Likewise, Ashby’s assertion that the County waived sovereign immunity to the extent of its liability coverage is without merit because there is no assertion that a County motor vehicle was involved.[15] Finally, we also disagree with Ashby’s contention that the County waived sovereign immunity under the Recreational Property Act when it charged a fee for her son’s participation in football. The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act is “to encourage both public and private landowners to make their property available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting the owners’ liability.”[16] And to this end, it provides, inter alia, that [e]xcept as specifically recognized by or provided in Code Section 51325, an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes does not thereby . . . [a]ssume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.[17] But as we have previously explained, the Recreational Property Act does not create a statutory waiver of a county’s sovereign immunity.[18] Accordingly, because Ashby did not establish that the County waived its sovereign immunity, the trial court erred in denying the County’s motion to dismiss on this ground, and we reverse its ruling. Judgment reversed. Rickman and Brown, JJ., concur.
