Markle, Judge. After the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) filed ethics charges against superior court Judge Robert M. “Mack” Crawford, he filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto and for temporary and permanent injunctions against the JQC and its individual members, contending that the members of the JQC had not been properly appointed under OCGA § 15-1-21 (g) (1) because their names were not submitted to the Senate by the statutory deadline.[1] The trial court denied the petition, finding that (1) Crawford failed to obtain leave of court to file the petition for quo warranto and therefore it was procedurally deficient; (2) the petition failed on the merits because the record showed that the JQC members had been appointed properly; and (3) the request for injunctive relief was moot. Crawford now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) finding the petition procedurally deficient because he had obtained a rule nisi hearing, which was sufficient to obtain leave of court; and (2) denying the petition on the merits because the only evidence it could consider was the Senate Journal and no presumption of regularity applied to the confirmation process. Because we conclude that Crawford’s quo warranto petition could not be considered on its merits due to his failure to obtain leave of court prior to filing it, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case with instructions to dismiss it on this basis. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 732 (747 SE2d 892) (2013). The underlying facts of this case are largely undisputed. In 2016, Georgia voters amended the state constitution to alter the structure and power of the JQC. Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VI; OCGA § 15-1-21 (a) (2017). As is relevant to this appeal, under the new format, the JQC was divided into two panels: an investigations panel and a hearing panel. OCGA § 15-1-21 (e) (1). The governor, president of the senate, Supreme Court, and speaker of the house each appointed members to one of these two panels, OCGA § 15-1-21 (f) (3) (A), (4) (A), and these appointments required senate confirmation, OCGA § 15-1-21 (b). The statute further mandates that the appointments be submitted to the senate before the third Monday in January,[2] which the parties agree was January 15. OCGA § 15-1-21 (g) (1). Failure to meet this deadline results in the appointee being ineligible. Id. The senate was not in session on January 15, and when it returned to session on January 18, the secretary of the senate delivered a memo to all senators to notify them that the names for the JQC appointees had been submitted and would be referred to the Committee on Assignments consistent with Senate Rule 3-3.1. The Senate Journal for January 18, which is the official record of senate proceedings, contains the secretary’s memo and the letters of appointment.[3] Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. V, Par. 1. Ultimately, each appointee was confirmed by the senate. After Crawford was investigated and charged with ethics violations, he filed the instant petition for quo warranto challenging the appointment of the JQC members. Specifically, he alleged that the appointments were not submitted to the senate for confirmation before the January 15 deadline, as required by OCGA § 15-1-21 (g) (1), and therefore the appointments were void. The trial court issued a rule nisi, setting the hearing date the following month, and granting a temporary restraining order. That order, however, was rescinded prior to the hearing date because it granted a restraining order without a hearing. Nothing in the initial rule nisi gave Crawford leave to file the quo warranto. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition both for the failure to obtain leave of court prior to filing the petition and on the merits. This appeal followed. 1. Leave of Court Crawford argues that he obtained a rule nisi, which was sufficient to meet the procedural requirement that the petitioner obtain leave of court prior to filing a petition for quo warranto. Alternatively, he contends that we should remand for the trial court to dismiss the petition without prejudice if we were to conclude that the failure to obtain leave is dispositive. We conclude that obtaining leave of court is a threshold requirement, and, accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case. “Quo warranto is an extraordinary remedy which exists solely by virtue of statute.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Richardson v. Phillips, 285 Ga. 385, 385 (677 SE2d 117) (2009). OCGA § 9-6-60 provides, “[t]he writ of quo warranto may issue to inquire into the right of any person to any public office the duties of which he is in fact discharging. It may be granted only after the application by some person either claiming the office or interested therein.” As our Supreme Court has noted, the statute explicitly requires that “[a] petition for quo warranto may be filed only by leave of court.” (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Everetteze v. Clark, 286 Ga. 11, 12-13 (2) (685 SE2d 72) (2009); see also OCGA § 9-6-60.[4] “When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). We are not permitted to disregard statutory language.[5] Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner, 345 Ga. App. 434, 440 (1) (a) (812 SE2d 120) (2018). Indeed, “[w]here the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden.” Six Flags Over Georgia v. Kull, 276 Ga. 210, 211 (576 SE2d 880) (2003). Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, seeking leave of court is a threshold statutory requirement in an action for quo warranto. Everetteze, 286 Ga. at 12-13 (2). Indeed, our Supreme Court has recognized this requirement for decades.[6] Jones v. Boone, 297 Ga. 437, 439 (1) (774 SE2d 668) (2015) (party filed an application for leave to file a quo warranto, after which the trial court issued a rule nisi granting leave to file a petition for quo warranto); Richardson, 285 Ga. at 386 (noting that there was no evidence in the record that the petitioner obtained leave of court to file the petition for quo warranto). Where a plaintiff fails to seek leave to file prior to filing a petition for quo warranto, our Supreme Court has directed that the petition must be dismissed. Everetteze, 286 Ga. at 13 (2). Crawford relies on Walker v. Hamilton, 209 Ga. 735, 738 (76 SE2d 12) (1953), to support his argument that the trial court effectively granted leave when it issued the rule nisi. But Walker does not support his argument because, in that case, the petitioner did seek leave of the court to file the quo warranto petition.[7] Moreover, the holding in Walker expressly contemplated that the rule nisi would issue after the application for leave to file the petition, unlike the procedural posture here.[8] We therefore conclude that Crawford’s petition failed, not on the merits, but because he did not seek leave to file the petition, as required by the plain language of the quo warranto statute. OCGA § 9-6-60. Accordingly, as our Supreme Court precedent dictates, we must vacate the trial court’s order, and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice for failure to obtain leave. 2. In light of our conclusion in Division 1, we need not address Crawford’s remaining arguments on appeal regarding the merits of his petition. Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Barnes, P. J., and Reese, P. J., concur.
