Dillard, Presiding Judge. Angelia Countryman appeals her conviction for computer theft, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by denying her plea in bar because the statute of limitation barred her prosecution; (2) the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended to commit the crime; and (3) her counsel had a conflict of interest. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.[1] Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,[2] the record shows that from 2006 until 2013, Countryman worked in the National Guard’s education office. And during all relevant times, she was the tuition-assistance manager. The National Guard offers its soldiers $4,500 per year for school and pays that money directly to the school they attend. But to enroll in the next semester and qualify for further tuition assistance, the soldier must maintain a 2.0 grade point average, make a passing grade in each class, and attend their classes. And while employed as tuition-assistance manager, Countryman was in charge of tuition assistance and tasked with implementing a process called recoupment. Under the recoupment policy, the school retains any tuition assistance it has been paid, but a soldier who fails a class or fails to attend a class is required to repay those funds to the National Guard. Indeed, if recoupment is owed, the money is paid directly from the soldier to the National Guard, and the school has no further involvement. As part of her job, Countryman was authorized to enter student grades into a National Guard computer system called iMarc using a “CAC card” that was unique to her. Indeed, military rules and regulations precluded her from allowing anyone else to use this card. And in using iMarc, the National Guard had an “honor system” in place, meaning that it accepted a transcript from students or took their word for the grades they received. So, on occasion, education-office employees entered an arbitrary “placeholder grade” for students who needed a passing grade to start the next semester but had not yet received their grades. Under such circumstances, the student was responsible for updating his or her grades with the education office once they were received. That said, it is unclear from the record whether the National Guard had a written policy that a soldier working in the education office could not input his or her own grades into iMarc. Nevertheless, education-office employees apparently knew that they were not supposed to do so. According to Todd Brinkley (who worked with Countryman in the education office), there was probably a written policy against it. But at the very least, through training, Brinkley learned not to input his own grades into iMarc. And another employee, Shannon Byrd, testified it would look suspicious if you worked on your own account, and she never did so because she did not want to get in trouble.[3] On October 12, 2012, the National Guard began using a new computer program called GoArmyEd, and the tuition-assistance history in iMarc was transferred to that system. Unlike iMarc, GoArmyEd revealed the identities of employees who entered grades into iMarc, as well as the time and date those grades were entered. And one of the biggest differences between the two systems is that for GoArmyEd, the schools submitted student grades directly into the system, rather than having them manually entered by the National Guard’s education-office employees (as required by iMarc). During her time as tuition-assistance manager for the National Guard’s education office, Countryman was also a student receiving tuition assistance and was subject to recoupment. And in 2012, Countryman contacted Sheila Schofield—the central assistant tuition manager at St. Leo University—during the fall term, regarding a class she had taken at the school. Countryman previously requested tuition assistance for a math course at St. Leo, and she was ultimately registered for the class. But after the term, Schofield—who was responsible for maintaining grades between the GoArmyEd and St. Leo systems—attempted to find Countryman’s grade for the math class so she could input it into the GoArmyEd system. In doing so, Schofield discovered that the math class for which the tuition assistance was approved had been cancelled, and Countryman was directed to attend a fine-arts class instead. And due to the National Guard’s policy that the tuition assistance requested for the math class could not be used for a different class, Schofield “rejected the [tuition assistance] back to the GoArmyEd portal.” According to Schofield, a student must take certain actions if tuition assistance is approved for a class that is cancelled, including dropping the class. Indeed, there is a “drop/add” period in which a student can drop a class, and the National Guard’s rules require a student to request tuition assistance for any class five days prior to the start of each term. So, upon learning that Countryman’s math class had been cancelled, Schofield immediately contacted Peggy Quick—the National Guard education counselor—to find out if she could do anything to correct Countryman’s records to reflect that she attended and passed the fine-arts class. Specifically, Schofield, on behalf of Countryman, wanted to find out if the National Guard could make an exception to the general rule and allow the requested tuition assistance to be used for the fine-arts class. But Quick informed Schofield that tuition assistance must be requested for a specific class prior to the start of the semester. As a result, Countryman was required to pay recoupment to the National Guard for the math course. Schofield also attempted to secure a grant for Countryman from the school to pay for the course, but her request was denied. In 2015, Countryman contacted Schofield again regarding tuition assistance for the fine-arts course. This time, Schofield contacted the school’s new associate vice president about the situation, and he agreed to grant a scholarship to Countryman to pay for the course. As a result of the scholarship, Countryman was able to enroll in the next semester to finish her degree in human-resource administration. And to aid Countryman in receiving tuition assistance for the new semester, Schofield conducted an academic evaluation of her GoArmyEd records for her previous courses with St. Leo. In doing so, Schofield first noticed that some of the courses listed in Countryman’s GoArmyEd records had invalid course numbers or titles. Schofield researched further and discovered that there were also grade discrepancies between Countryman’s GoArmyEd records and her official St. Leo transcript. Then, on January 13, 2015, Schofield submitted a GoArmyEd “help desk ticket,” explaining the issue because these discrepancies had to be corrected before Countryman could move forward with her degree. Schofield also provided the National Guard with an unofficial copy of Countryman’s transcript. Thomas Bolin—the National Guard’s education service officer at the time— received Schofield’s help desk ticket, began researching the situation, and noticed the discrepancies between Countryman’s St. Leo transcript and the grades listed in the GoArmyEd system. Specifically, in auditing Countryman’s records, Bolin discovered that some of Countryman’s grades were incorrect in the GoArmyEd system. For example, in some instances, Countryman’s transcript indicated that she made an F in a class, while her GoArmyEd records indicated that she made an A; and several classes in the GoArmyEd system did not appear on her transcript at all. Upon further investigation, Bolin learned that Countryman worked in the education office previously and that she entered her own grades into iMarc using her CAC card.[4] And in Bolin’s view, Countryman must have had full access to the iMarc system to do this. Ultimately, based on the failing grades found on Countryman’s transcript (but not in the GoArmyEd system), Countryman owed recoupment to the National Guard for 10 courses, totaling $5,700. And according to Charles Haycraft, who was responsible for training Countryman when she worked at the National Guard’s education office, there was no way to reconcile the discrepancies in Countryman’s records other than to conclude that she entered incorrect grades to “just plain avoid recoupment.” Thereafter, on July 20, 2017, Countryman was charged, via indictment, with one count of computer theft based on the alleged act of altering her grades in the National Guard’s computer network, so as to avoid repaying tuition assistance. On April 26, 2018, Countryman was reindicted for the same offense, and the new indictment contained a tolling provision that stated: “Pursuant to [OCGA §] 17-3-2 (2),[[5]] the Grand Jurors aforesaid also find that the aforementioned crime was unknown until on or about January 13, 2015.” According to the new indictment, Countryman’s offense was committed “on, about and between the 28th day of July 2007 and the 1st day of October, 2011.” Prior to trial, Countryman filed a plea in bar and motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the four-year statute of limitation that applied to her offense expired before the initial 2017 indictment was filed.[6] Specifically, Countryman disputed the indictment’s allegation that the crime was unknown until 2015, contending that actual knowledge of the alleged offense can be imputed to the State on July 11, 2013, at the latest, because the victim, the National Guard, was aware of the offense by that date. But following a hearing on the matter, the trial court rejected Countryman’s arguments and denied the plea in bar. In its order, the court noted there was no dispute that the indictment was not filed within four years of the crime. But the court found that the National Guard, and thus the State, did not have actual knowledge of the acts forming the basis of the indictment until January 13, 2015, when Schofield informed the National Guard about the discrepancies between the grades listed in Countryman’s transcript and those contained in the GoArmyEd system. Countryman proceeded to trial, and after the State’s case, she moved for a directed verdict; but the trial court denied the motion. Following the close of evidence, Countryman renewed her motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. She also moved to quash the indictment, again arguing that it was barred by the statute of limitation. The trial court denied these motions, and ultimately, Countryman was convicted of the charged offense. Countryman then obtained new counsel and filed a motion for a new trial, raising, inter alia, the same arguments that she does on appeal. But following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. This appeal follows. 1. Countryman first argues that the trial court erred in denying her plea in bar because the National Guard had actual knowledge of her alleged computer theft by 2012 at the latest, and therefore, her prosecution was barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitation. We disagree. The appellate standard of review for a plea in bar asserting a statute-of-limitation defense is a “de novo review of the issue of laws.”[7] And because this ruling involves a mixed question of law and fact, we “accept the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and witness credibility unless they are clearly erroneous,[[8]] but independently apply the law to the facts.”[9] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Countryman’s specific argument that the applicable statute of limitation barred her prosecution. In criminal cases, the statute of limitation “runs from the time of the criminal act to the time of indictment.”[10] And the purpose of a statute of limitation is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the fardistant past.[11] Thus, criminal limitation statutes are to be forgivingly interpreted “in favor of repose.”[12] That said, statutory provisions providing for the tolling of a statute of limitation are “designed to expand the exposure to criminal prosecution beyond the specified fixed period.”[13] Suffice it to say, the burden is unquestionably on the State to “prove that a crime occurred within the statute of limitation, or, if an exception to the statute is alleged, to prove that the case properly falls within the exception.”[14] Notably, whether the State has met this burden is “for the finder of fact.”[15] Relevant here, OCGA § 17-3-1 (c) provides that a four-year statute of limitation applies to the offense of computer theft.[16] But under OCGA § 17-3-2 (2), “[t]he period within which a prosecution must be commenced under Code Section 1731 or other applicable statute does not include any period in which . . . [t]he person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown[.]“[17] As a result, the key to determining when the statute of limitation begins to run is “to find when the offender or offense became known.”[18] Importantly, the determination of when the crime was discovered is “a factual one.”[19] In this case, it is undisputed that the State did not indict Countryman until July 20, 2017, more than four years after she allegedly committed computer theft—which, according to the indictment, was some time between July 2007 and October 2011. So, her prosecution is barred by the statute of limitation unless the State can prove that the crime was unknown until July 20, 2013, or later. Here, the State alleged in the indictment, and attempted to prove at trial, that the National Guard (and thus the State)[20] was unaware of Countryman’s computer theft until January 2015. This is when Bolin conducted an audit and discovered that Countryman entered passing grades into iMarc for classes she failed—which, in turn, relieved her from the obligation to pay recoupment. And in denying her plea in bar, the trial court agreed with the State. Our task, then, is simply to determine whether there was any evidence to support this finding of fact.[21] The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that “the tolling period ends when the State has actual, as opposed to constructive, knowledge of both the defendant’s identity and the crime.”[22] And in Riley v. State,[23] our Supreme Court—in addressing an issue it described as novel[24]—held that under OCGA § 17-3-2 (2), a person is “known” to the State when the “State possesses sufficient evidence to authorize the lawful arrest of that person for the crime charged.”[25] In doing so, the Riley Court explained that “[t]he amount of actual knowledge required to lawfully arrest an individual is the familiar ‘probable cause’ standard.”[26] Of course, “probable cause” means: “Facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a[ ] [criminal] offense.“[27] And a “probability” is less than a certainty, but “more than a mere suspicion or possibility.”[28] Thus, when a defendant makes a prima facie case that the statute of limitation has expired, the State “has the burden of proving that it lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for a time sufficient to deem the indictment or other charging document timely.”[29] Although Riley focused on the amount and quality of knowledge that the State must possess regarding the person who committed the crime, rather than knowledge of the crime itself, OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) provides, within the same sentence, that the statute of limitation for a criminal offense is tolled while the person who committed the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown.[30] And given this crucial statutory context, we apply the same “probable-cause-to-arrest” standard set forth in Riley for determining when Countryman’s crime was known to the State.[31] As a result, under the Riley Court’s interpretation of OCGA § 17-3-2 (2), Countryman’s computer theft was actually known to the National Guard, and, therefore, the State, when the State possessed sufficient probable cause to authorize her lawful arrest for the crime. Turning to the circumstances of this case, under OCGA § 16-9-93 (a) (1), [a]ny person who uses a computer or computer network with knowledge that such use is without authority and with the intention of . . . [t]aking or appropriating any property of another, whether or not with the intention of depriving the owner of possession . . . shall be guilty of the crime of computer theft. And OCGA § 16-9-92 (16) defines “use” of a computer as, inter alia, “causing or attempting to cause . . . [a] person to put false information into a computer.”[32] Here, the indictment alleged that Countryman committed the foregoing offense in that she did use a computer network with knowledge that such use was without authority and with the intent to appropriate U.S. Currency, the property of the United States Government, to wit: said accused did use the Georgia Army National Guard computer network to alter her Army education records in such a manner as to avoid reimbursing tuition assistance funds for courses and grades that were not eligible for said funds, contrary to the laws of said State . . . . For purposes of tolling the statute of limitation, the State contends (and the indictment alleged) that Countryman’s crime was unknown to the National Guard until January 2015 when Bolin received and investigated Schofield’s help-desk request and discovered that Countryman avoided recoupment by entering false grades into the iMarc system. Countryman disagrees, contending that the statute of limitation began to run on October 1, 2012, at the latest, when the National Guard switched to the GoArmyEd system. And while Countryman did falsify her grades prior to the National Guard’s switch to the GoArmyEd system, the iMarc system did not reveal who entered each student’s grades (even though information was embedded in the system). But the GoArmyEd system, which the National Guard began using on October 1, 2012, revealed which employee entered grades into iMarc, along with the dates and times of those entries. Given the foregoing, Countryman contends that, regardless of whether the National Guard thought it was a crime for Countryman to enter her own grades, it had actual knowledge of its own database on October 1, 2012, which showed that she did so. As previously noted, the statute of limitation is tolled under OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) until the victim has actual knowledge of the crime.[33] Indeed, we have emphasized that OCGA § 17-3-2 requires that the State have “actual knowledge of a crime; the tolling period is not extinguished when the injured party should have known of the crime.”[34] Here, it is undisputed that the National Guard did not actually know that Countryman entered her own grades in October 2012 merely because that information became available in GoArmyEd; and it is irrelevant whether the National Guard should have known all of the contents of its database. Indeed, under OCGA § 1732 (2), “the statute of limitation does not run while [the crime or] the person who committed the crime is ‘unknown’—it does not say ‘and could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.’”[35] Moreover, even if the National Guard were actually aware that Countryman entered her own grades—with or without authorization to do so—in October 2012, the undisputed evidence shows that it did not become aware that the grades she entered were false until January 2015. This is when Schofield submitted the help-desk request and provided the National Guard with her transcript such that it could, for the first time, compare the transcript with her GoArmyEd records.[36] Indeed, if Countryman had entered her grades accurately, her actions would not have deprived the government of $5,700 in recoupment, and she would not have committed computer theft. Thus, under Riley‘s probable-cause-to-arrest standard, the statute of limitation did not begin to run until “the objective facts known to the [State] establish[ed] a probability that [she] ha[d] been engaged in illegal activity.”[37] And the undisputed evidence shows that Bolin, and therefore the National Guard, did not actually know Countryman’s grade entries were criminal until his 2015 audit. Given the foregoing, the trial court’s factual finding that the National Guard did not have actual knowledge of Countryman falsely entering her grades until 2015 was supported by at least some evidence.[38] And under Riley, the statute of limitation was tolled until that time because the State did not have probable cause to arrest Countryman for computer theft until the National Guard knew that she appropriated government tuition-assistance funds by entering false grades. Simply put, because the National Guard lacked knowledge of Countryman’s crime until 2015, the statute of limitation was tolled until that time under OCGA § 17-3-2 (2), and the 2017 indictment was timely.[39] In its brief, the State argues that we should disapprove of certain cases, some of which are relied upon by Countryman and all of which were decided before Riley. These pre-Riley decisions suggest or expressly hold that a victim has actual knowledge of a crime when he or she becomes aware of the act effectuating the crime, regardless of whether he or she had knowledge that the act was illegal. These cases stem from our 1974 decision in Holloman v. State.[40] According to State v. Robins,[41] Holloman held that “lack of knowledge of the illegality of the act was not sufficient to toll the limitation period, but rather there must be lack of knowledge of the act itself.”[42] And State v. Bragg,[43] which is physical precedent only, cites Robins for the same proposition.[44] Lastly, relying on Bragg, State v. Crowder[45] held that “[t]o avail itself of the tolling provision, the [victim] must have lacked knowledge of the act itself.”[46] Applying these cases to the instant case,[47] it is not unreasonable to conclude that the National Guard knew of the act effectuating the crime for purposes of OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) when it became aware that Countryman entered her own grades, even if it did not know that, in doing so, she committed computer theft. But these cases would not change the outcome in this case because the National Guard learned that Countryman entered her own grades (i.e., the act itself) and that her actions were illegal simultaneously in 2015 when Bolin researched that issue. Nevertheless, even if the National Guard actually knew that Countryman entered her own grades in 2012, but did not know that her actions were illegal, we are bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in Riley, which holds that a crime is known when “the State possesses sufficient evidence to authorize the lawful arrest of that person for the crime charged.”[48] And probable cause to arrest exists where, “based on objective facts and circumstances, a man of reasonable caution would believe that a crime has been or is being committed.”[49] Moreover, the existence of probable cause must be measured by “current knowledge, i.e., at the moment the arrest is made and not in hindsight.”[50] Thus, under Riley, a victim does not have knowledge of a crime for purposes of tolling the statute of limitation until it has actual knowledge that the act at issue is, in fact, criminal and a lawful arrest can be made. As a result, we disapprove of Holloman and its progeny,[51] then, only to the extent that these decisions conflict with the probable-cause-to-arrest standard established by our Supreme Court in Riley.[52] 2. Next, Countryman contends the State failed to prove that she intended to appropriate funds when she entered her grades incorrectly, but, in essence, she argues the State failed to prove that she appropriated funds at all. Again, we disagree. When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must “be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.”[53] And in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only resolve whether “a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”[54] Accordingly, the jury’s verdict will be upheld so long as “there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.”[55] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Countryman’s specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. As previously noted, under OCGA § 16-9-93 (a) (1), [a]ny person who uses a computer or computer network with knowledge that such use is without authority and with the intention of . . . taking or appropriating any property of another, whether or not with the intention of depriving the owner of possession . . . shall be guilty of the crime of computer theft.[56] Here, Countryman argues that even though Georgia’s theft-by-taking statute encompasses all forms of theft, there is no Georgia case in which the defendant has been convicted of theft without intending to—at some point—possess the stolen item or provide it to a third party who is part of a conspiracy. But Countryman was not indicted for theft by taking. And in fact, the word “theft” does not even appear in the indictment.[57] Instead, Countryman was charged with the intent to appropriate funds of the United States Government by altering her education records in such a manner as to avoid reimbursing tuition. Countryman further maintains that, typically, to appropriate something is to “take exclusive possession,” to “set apart or assign to a particular purpose or use,” or “to take or make use of without authority or right.” But even if she is correct in her understanding of the meaning of “appropriate,”[58] this is exactly what she did. The National Guard paid its own funds to St. Leo as tuition assistance on Countryman’s behalf. It is undisputed that, for courses she failed or failed to attend, Countryman was required to reimburse those funds to the National Guard through its recoupment policy. And even though the funds at issue were initially paid to St. Leo, a third party, the school retained the funds and there was testimony that, once recoupment is owed, there is no further involvement by the school in the process. Indeed, as to recoupment, which Countryman indisputably owed, the process was solely between “the military and the soldier.” Simply put, by entering passing grades for classes she failed, Countryman appropriated $5,700 of National Guard funds to herself without authority or right for her exclusive use by eliminating the debt she owed to the National Guard.[59] 3. Finally, Countryman contends that her trial counsel suffered from a conflict of interest when he declined to have opening and closing arguments transcribed. Once again, we disagree. As recently explained by the Supreme Court of Georgia, included within the constitutional right to counsel is “the right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.”[60] And in order for an appellant to prevail on a claim that his attorney was operating under a conflict of interest that violated his right to counsel, he must “show an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his attorney’s performance.”[61] Here, Countryman maintains that her trial counsel declined to request transcripts of opening and closing arguments due to a conflict of interest because he received a significant amount of business from the public defender’s office and was unsure whether that office would disapprove of such a request due to the cost. And at the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel admitted that it is “best practice to ask for opening and closing to be taken down. . . .” But counsel also testified that he was not statutorily required to have opening and closing arguments transcribed, and he could not find a reason to “stray from the default statutory position.” Indeed, our Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he arguments of counsel at trial are not required to be transcribed.”[62] When expressly asked whether he had the impression that the public defender’s office preferred him not to have the arguments transcribed, counsel testified that he “had gotten very unclear feedback on the subject.” Nevertheless, counsel testified that the cost of the transcripts was not a consideration in his decision not to request them. According to Countryman’s trial counsel, he did not request the transcripts because if anything objectionable happened, which he did not expect it would, he could have objected and preserved the objection. And in the context of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, we have held, under similar circumstances, that a defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to have opening and closing arguments transcribed,[63] which is essentially the same as saying that counsel’s actions did not “adversely affect[ ] [his] performance.”[64] Moreover, because counsel testified that he would have preserved any objection to improper argument by the State, any claim that Countryman was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request that those arguments be transcribed is purely speculative.[65] Thus, Countryman has not established that her counsel had an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance.[66] For all these reasons, we affirm Countryman’s conviction. Judgment affirmed. Rickman and Brown, JJ., concur.
