Doyle, Presiding Judge. Following the death of Alvin D. Blount, Jr., Amanda Reeves filed this medical malpractice claim as next of kin and executor of Blount’s estate. Reeves alleged that Dr. Bilal Khan was negligent in performing a cardiac catheterization on Blount, which led to his death. In addition to asserting claims against Khan and Khan’s employer, Middle Georgia Heart and Vascular Center, LLC, Reeves alleged a claim of negligent credentialing against Houston Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Houston Medical Center (“HMC”). HMC filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied after a hearing. The court, however, granted HMC a certificate of immediate review, and this Court granted HMC’s application for interlocutory review. HMC appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying its motion to dismiss because an expert affidavit was required to support the negligent credentialing claim at the time Reeves filed her claim. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Following Blount’s death after a cardiac catheterization performed by Khan, Reeves filed suit and alleged that Khan performed the procedure negligently. Reeves attached the expert affidavit of Dr. Richard Konstance, who had experience in the area of interventional cardiology and cardiac catheterization. Reeves also alleged that HMC was negligent, not vicariously as the employer of Khan, but for credentialing Khan even though HMC knew “or should have known [that Khan] had not performed the requisite numbers of the procedure to be credentialed in that area of practice.” Reeves alleged that Blount’s injuries and death were proximately caused by HMC’s failure to “perform a diligent inquiry of its physicians, including but not limited to [inquiring into] Khan’s medical credentials, and [its] failure to exercise the degree of care, skill, and judgment that is exercised by comparable hospitals in approving an applicant’s request for privileges . . . .” Konstance’s expert affidavit did not opine on the issue of whether Khan should have been credentialed to perform the procedure at issue, and Reeves did not attach any other expert affidavits to the complaint. HMC moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that Reeves’s negligent credentialing claim was subject to the expert affidavit requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), specifically as to the issue of credentialing or granting privileges, and was not supported by the expert affidavit filed by Reeves. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court summarily denied HMC’s motion to dismiss. After the trial court granted a certificate of immediate review, this appeal followed. Whether a complaint alleges ordinary negligence or professional malpractice is a question of law for this Court to decide. On appeal, we conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss. In doing so, our role is to determine whether the allegations of the complaint, when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with any and all doubts resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, disclose with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts; however, we need not adopt a party’s legal conclusions based on these facts.[1] HMC argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion to dismiss because Reeves was required to file with her complaint an expert affidavit specifically supporting her negligent credentialing claim against HMC in addition to Konstance’s affidavit addressing Khan’s breach of the standard of care. A hospital has a direct and independent responsibility to its patients to take reasonable steps to ensure that staff physicians using hospital facilities are qualified for privileges granted. It follows that a cause of action for negligent credentialing of staff physicians and other medical care providers is an independent cause of action that arises out of that responsibility.[2] Based on this premise, this Court has explained that a negligent credentialing claim is not a derivative claim based on respondeat superior wherein the “employer and employee are regarded as a single tortfeasor.”[3] This Court has not addressed whether an expert affidavit regarding negligent credentialing on the part of a hospital is necessary in addition to the expert affidavit filed against an allegedly negligent defendant physician or other professional is required under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a).[4] This Code section states that [i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against . . . [a]ny licensed health care facility alleged to be liable based upon the action or inaction of a health care professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section[,[5]] the plaintiff [is] required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim. As explained in Legum v. Crouch,[6] because HMC is not classified as such a “professional,” the affidavit requirement does not apply automatically as to any claim asserted against it. Rather, the affidavit requirement applies regarding tort claims filed against a hospital . . . when . . . grounded upon the additional averment of acts or omissions requiring the exercise of professional skill and judgment by agents or employees who themselves are recognized as “professionals” [listed in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (g)].[7] HMC contends that based on various statutes and regulations that assign peer review functions to the medical staff of a hospital, we should hold as a matter of law that credentialing is a medical question that calls into question the professional judgment of employees of the hospital. The record, however, does not establish at this stage of the proceedings which employees of the hospital were involved in credentialing Khan.[8] Moreover, in other circumstances, the Supreme Court of Georgia has differentiated between work product generated by a hospital’s peer review process and that of a hospital’s “routine credentialing information.”[9] Thus, we disagree with HMC that in all circumstances a negligent credentialing claim necessarily requires an expert affidavit especially in light of the allegations in the complaint that Khan simply did not have a sufficient number of prior surgeries to qualify for credentialing. Such a decision could have been made summarily by an administrator rather than a medical professional’s judgment. Therefore, based on the record at this stage of the proceedings, we cannot agree that when HMC credentialed Khan it did so via the medical judgment of a professional listed in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (g).[10] Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of HMC’s motion to dismiss. Judgment affirmed. McFadden, C. J., and Hodges, J., concur.
