McFadden, Chief Judge. After a jury trial, Robbin Haynes was convicted of five counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and giving a false name. Haynes appeals, challenging three decisions of the trial court that largely stem from Haynes’s attempt to pursue a sovereign-citizen type defense. When appointed trial counsel would not assert Haynes’s sovereign-citizen defense, Haynes informed the court that he wanted to represent himself. He argues on appeal that the trial court erred by granting his request because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, but we hold that the trial court adequately informed him of the risks of proceeding without counsel. When Haynes repeatedly made statements based on his sovereign-citizen defense, interrupted the court, and, eventually stated that he was leaving the courtroom, the trial court ordered him to be removed from the courtroom for disrupting the proceedings. Haynes argues on appeal that this violated his right to be present, but we hold that Haynes waived that right through his behavior. After he had been removed from the courtroom, the trial court ordered appointed counsel, who had been acting as standby counsel, to represent Haynes during the trial. Haynes argues on appeal that this violated his right to self-representation. But we hold that, once Haynes’s disruptive conduct made necessary the termination of his selfrepresentation, she had the authority to do so. Finally, Haynes argues that some of his convictions merge, and we agree. So we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand this case for resentencing. 1. Waiver of right to counsel. Haynes argues that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel because the trial court failed to adequately inform him of the dangers of self-representation. We disagree. “[W]hen a defendant challenges an alleged waiver on appeal, it is the [s]tate’s burden to prove that the defendant received sufficient information and guidance from the trial court upon which to knowingly and intelligently relinquish this right. This evidence must overcome the presumption against waiver.” Hamilton v. State, 233 Ga. App. 463, 467 (1) (b) (504 SE2d 236) (1998) (citations omitted). The state met its burden here. The record shows that Haynes wanted to present a sovereign-citizen defense, but the attorney who had been appointed to represent him refused to present it, informing Haynes that such a defense strategy would “do nothing except make the judge and the prosecutor angry.” At the calendar call, counsel informed the court that Haynes wanted to present a sovereign-citizen defense, refused to cooperate with him, would not accept his correspondence, would not discuss the case with him, and did not want counsel to bring clothes for him. The trial court informed Haynes that counsel could not ethically assert defenses that had no basis in law. Haynes responded that “respectfully for the record once again I’m not entrusting what you’re administrating today. Matter of fact I’m the sole owner, the grantor, the principal —” The trial court cut off Haynes, noted that he was being non-responsive, and stated that counsel remained his attorney. The court called the case, and counsel announced that the defense was not ready because Haynes had informed him that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel to participate. The trial court engaged in a colloquy with Haynes and concluded that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The court relieved appointed counsel of his duties and, at Haynes’s request, instructed the appointed attorney to act as standby counsel. “Under Faretta [v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975),] the trial court must apprise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing himself so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” State v. Evans, 285 Ga. 67, 68 (673 SE2d 243) (2009) (citation omitted). Haynes argues that the trial court did not apprise him of the specific dangers inherent in representing himself in his case “such as the rules surrounding admissibility of a defendant’s police statement, the rules governing automobile searches, and merger principles.” But as Haynes acknowledges, the trial court is not required to engage in a formalistic inquiry. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U. S. 77, 88 (II) (124 SCt 1379, 158 LE2d 209) (2004) (“We have not . . . prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel.”). See also Evans, 285 Ga. at 69 (trial court is not required to “probe the defendant’s case and advise the defendant as to legal strategies to ensure that a waiver is intelligently made”). We and our Supreme Court have not articulated precisely how a trial court must apprise a defendant of the dangers inherent in representing himself. But see Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36, 38 (2) (495 SE2d 34) (1998) (noting that although not required, it would be helpful if trial courts asked whether defendants understood the nature of the charges; the lesser included offenses; the range of possible punishments; and the possible defenses and mitigating circumstances). “Rather, the record need only reflect that the accused was made aware of the dangers of selfrepresentation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Evans, 285 Ga. at 68 (citation and punctuation omitted). United States District Courts have guidance from the Bench Book for U.S. Dist. Ct. Judges (6th ed. 2013), which contains a framework that District Courts can follow to ensure a defendant is made aware of the dangers of self-representation so that his waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and intelligent. That framework, which is of course adjusted to federal law, is set out in the margin.[1] Here, the record shows that the trial court warned Haynes that unlike his lawyer, Haynes was neither trained nor skilled in presenting defenses, cross-examining witnesses, or picking a jury; that he was facing a prosecutor who, unlike him, was trained and knew the law; that neither the court nor the prosecutor could give him legal advice, although standby counsel could advise him on procedural matters; that the court reporter was having difficulty hearing him, and that if he presented his own case he would need to speak louder; that he would be held to the same standards of performance as an attorney; that he would not get a new trial simply because he made the decision to represent himself; and that representing himself was a “bad idea.” The court also questioned Haynes about his education and informed him of the sentence he was facing. Simply put, Haynes had been informed . . . of the nature of the charges against him and of the statutory . . . maximum penalties. The record reflects that the trial court, fulfilling its important responsibility in this area, repeatedly apprised him of the dangers to a layman in conducting his own defense. He was well aware [that his sovereign-citizen defense was meritless]. Moreover, an attorney was made available during [his period of self-representation] to respond to any questions of law or procedure that he might have. We find no error in the trial court’s determination that [Haynes] waived his right to appointed counsel and that he voluntarily and intelligently elected to proceed pro se after being fully apprised of the possible consequences. Staples v. State, 209 Ga. App. 802, 804 (3) (434 SE2d 757) (1993) (citations omitted). See also Renfro v. State, 348 Ga. App. 615, 616618 (2) (824 SE2d 75) (2019) (defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel when, among other things, the trial court warned him that selfrepresentation was a bad idea; warned him that sovereign-citizen beliefs are not a successful defense; provided defendant with a copy of the indictment; and allowed counsel to act as standby counsel). Cf. MartinArgaw v. State, 343 Ga. App. 864, 870 (2) (806 SE2d 247) (2017) (trial court did not make defendant aware of dangers of self-representation when she only informed him “that he would be required to abide by evidentiary and procedural rules without the court’s assistance”). 2. Right to be present. Haynes argues that the trial court violated his right to be present at trial. “We will affirm a trial court’s finding of waiver if any evidence supports it.” Cesari v. State, 334 Ga. App. 605, 609 (1) (780 SE2d 56) (2015). Evidence supports the trial court’s ruling to exclude Haynes from the courtroom, so we hold that the trial court did not err. (a) Haynes’s behavior. The record shows that after the trial court had determined that Haynes waived his right to counsel, the court administered oaths to the jury panel, read the indictment, introduced the parties, announced that the court had entered a not guilty plea on Haynes’s behalf, and instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and the state’s burden of proof. The state began asking general voir dire questions when Haynes interrupted that he was “not entrusting the general administrator.” The state continued with general voir dire questions. At the conclusion of the general voir dire questions, the court asked Haynes if he wanted to ask general questions. The following then occurred: THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, Your Honor. I don’t understand these proceedings right now. I don’t understand any of these proceedings. They’re bringing me here against my will in shackles. . . .
