Ellington, Justice. We granted Christopher Glenn’s petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order revoking Glenn’s probation based on its determination by a preponderance of the evidence that Glenn committed the felony offense of interference with government property by kicking and damaging the door of a police car when he was detained inside. See Glenn v. State, 350 Ga. App. 12 (827 SE2d 698) (2019).[1] Glenn’s claim that he damaged the door in the course of exercising his common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest and detention, which was rejected by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals, raises two substantive questions: whether a person has a common-law right to attempt to escape from the detention resulting from an unlawful arrest and, if so, whether a person may damage government property in such an attempt. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest includes the right to use proportionate force against government property to escape an unlawful detention following the arrest. Because the trial court found that Glenn’s arrest was unlawful but did not then consider whether the force he used in attempting to escape the ensuing unlawful detention was proportionate, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision with direction that the case be remanded to the trial court to make this essential determination. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to revoke Glenn’s probation for violating the conditions of a June 2017 probationary sentence by committing the new offenses of loitering and prowling, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, and interference with government property. At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of three police officers and played about four and a half minutes of video with audio that was recorded by one officer’s body camera. That evidence showed the following. On May 3, 2018, an Athens-Clarke County police officer responded to a “suspicious-person” call in the area of the Oglethorpe Elementary School shortly after students were dismissed at 2:30 p.m. The responding officer drove around the school property in his patrol car, and for a few seconds he saw Glenn walking on the inside of a line of trees and shrubbery that bordered the road behind the school. The officer testified that he radioed to his dispatcher that he was “getting out [of his patrol car] with a subject matching the description given by the initial [911] caller.” The responding officer approached Glenn and called out to him, “let me talk to you real quick.” Glenn asked if he was being detained. The officer responded, “yes,” ordered Glenn to stop walking and to sit down, and radioed for backup. Glenn, who remained standing, asked the officer why he was being detained and said, “I’ll tell you my name. It’s Christopher Glenn. I’m walking home.” The officer told Glenn that he was “conducting an investigation” and that, if Glenn moved, he would be charged with obstruction and, if he tried to flee, the officer would “use force” if he had to. About one minute after the responding officer’s initial contact with Glenn, another officer arrived. Each officer grasped one of Glenn’s wrists, and they began to apply handcuffs.[2] Two more officers arrived in a third patrol car and ran to join the others, followed soon thereafter by another officer in a fourth car. Glenn was handcuffed within two minutes of the responding officer’s initial contact with him. While the first responding officer gripped Glenn’s wrist and arm, the other officers searched his person and removed and inspected the contents of his pockets. After the search, the second officer told Glenn he was going to have to take a seat in his patrol car. Glenn said, “I want you to tell me right here, what am I being detained for?” The third officer told him, “for suspicion of a crime. A sexual assault crime against a minor.”[3] The responding officer testified that, after Glenn had been detained and there were enough officers to maintain control, he left that location to continue his investigation of the suspicious-person complaint at the school.[4] The third officer testified that Glenn was placed in the second officer’s patrol car, and within a few minutes the second officer asked for an ambulance to evaluate Glenn, who had told him that he was dehydrated. An ambulance arrived, and Glenn was placed in the treatment area of the ambulance. The supervising officer soon ordered that Glenn be removed from the ambulance, because Glenn was in custody and his condition would be assessed by jail personnel. Instead of exiting, Glenn grabbed onto a seatbelt, and the officers had to physically drag him to the rear doors of the ambulance. At the doors, Glenn flung himself toward the officers and hit the supervising officer’s head with his own forehead, causing a small abrasion on the officer’s cheek. The third officer testified that Glenn became “dead weight and resistant” as officers took him to a patrol car and tried to put him in through the rear driver side door. An officer reached in from the passenger side and pulled Glenn into the car. Glenn kicked against the driver side door and fell out on the passenger side, landing on the officer who had pulled him in and knocking the officer down. The officers then tried to put Glenn back in on the passenger side, and again another officer had to pull him in from the other side of the car. Glenn kicked against the passenger side door hard enough to damage the hinges and to propel himself out of the car. He stood up on the driver side, and the supervising officer knocked him to the ground. Officers put Glenn in the patrol car for the third time. After the officers tied his legs and secured his feet to the floor, Glenn was taken to the jail. The day after Glenn was arrested, a probation officer requested, and the trial court issued, a warrant to arrest Glenn for violating the conditions of his probation by committing the new offenses of loitering and prowling,[5] obstruction of a law enforcement officer,[6] and interference with government property.[7] Two weeks later, the State filed a petition to revoke Glenn’s probation, listing the same offenses as violations of his probation. After presentation of evidence at the hearing on the revocation petition, the State argued that the evidence showed that Glenn committed the offense of loitering and prowling by “walking along the wooded edge of an elementary school as the school was being let out.” The State argued that Glenn committed the offenses of obstruction and interference with government property by “physically resisting in multiple ways at multiple points in time” while being “detained . . . pending further investigation of the reason for [the officers'] dispatch[,] . . . resulting in property damage that rendered a police squad vehicle unable to close properly.” In addition, the State argued that, even if the arrest was unlawful such that Glenn did not commit the offense of obstruction, the unlawfulness of the arrest would not excuse his behavior in damaging government property. Glenn argued that the evidence instead showed that the responding officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for loitering and prowling, which made the arrest unlawful. He argued that under Georgia law a person is allowed to resist an unlawful arrest with a reasonable amount of force and that it does not matter whether the force used to get away from an illegal detention is directed against an officer or against an object. The trial court determined that the evidence did not support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Glenn had committed the offense of loitering and prowling. Specifically, the trial court found that, on May 3, 2018, the officers did not observe Glenn in a place at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals and found that there was no evidence of any circumstances of the type listed in the applicable statute as warranting alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.[8] The trial court noted that the officers involved failed to give Glenn, prior to arresting him, an opportunity to explain his presence and conduct so as to dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted.[9] The trial court also determined that the evidence did not support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Glenn had committed the offense of obstruction, because there had been no basis to arrest Glenn for loitering and prowling. But the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Glenn had committed the felony offense of interference with government property by damaging the patrol car door. Specifically, the trial court found that, even though Glenn’s arrest for loitering and prowling was unlawful, he had no legal justification for damaging government property once he was in handcuffs and sitting in the patrol car. The trial court stated that damaging the car “kind of goes outside the bounds. . . . [Y]ou’d have a right to come [to court] and . . . attack the validity of the arrest or detainment or obstruction charges.” The trial court granted the State’s petition and revoked Glenn’s probation for a period of 90 days.[10] The Court of Appeals granted Glenn’s application for a discretionary appeal and thereafter affirmed the trial court’s ruling by a split-panel decision. The majority noted that Glenn’s argument was based in part on the right to use force against a police officer to resist an unlawful arrest and also noted that there is a dearth of case law on whether that right extends to the use of force against property to counter an illegal arrest. Glenn, 350 Ga. App. at 15. Without resolving this question, the majority held that “given the lapse in time” between when Glenn was placed in the patrol car and when he damaged the vehicle door, which the majority determined based on the responding officer’s body camera footage to have been at least 15 minutes,[11] “Glenn’s damage to the vehicle was not in response to an immediate need to resist an unlawful arrest, but rather was an intentional act occurring some time after he was detained.” Id. at 16-17, citing Brower v. State, 298 Ga. App. 699, 705 (1) (680 SE2d 859) (2009) (“A premise underlying all the defenses specified in OCGA § 16-3-20 is that the defendant faced circumstances created by external events that demanded prompt, if not immediate, action.” (citations omitted)), disapproved of on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 864 (1) n.17 (834 SE2d 96) (2019). Then-Presiding Judge McFadden dissented, concluding that Glenn did indeed face an “imminent threat” in the form of “immediate and continuing unlawful detention.” Glenn, 350 Ga. App. at 18 (emphasis supplied). The dissent reasoned that “[i]t could not be seriously argued that kidnapping victims must become compliant once they have been restrained and confined[,]” and, therefore, justification would “ obviously preclude [ ]” a charge of criminal damage to property against a kidnapping victim. Id. 1. Glenn contends that the trial court and the Court of Appeals misconstrued Georgia law regarding the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention. Specifically, Glenn argues that in Georgia a person has a common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention with the degree of force necessary to achieve that purpose; that such resistance may include damaging government property in order to escape from an illegal detention; and that a detention following an unlawful arrest continues to be unlawful until such time as lawful process issues. The Georgia General Assembly adopted the common law of England as of May 14, 1776, as Georgia’s own law, except to the extent that Georgia’s statutory or constitutional law displaced the common law, and that adoption remains in force today. See OCGA § 1-1-10 (c) (1)[12]; Barrow v. Raffensperger, __ Ga. __, __ (4) (b) (842 SE2d 884) (2020); Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 411-412 (II) (A), n.9 (801 SE2d 867) (2017). As explained below, with the adoption of the common law, including the law of arrests, Georgia incorporated an affirmative right that was imbedded by 1776 in the common law of England to physically resist an unlawful arrest or escape from an unlawful detention.[13] (a) The common law of arrests. Personal liberty and corresponding limitations on the power to arrest were fundamental to the Magna Carta.[14] Common-law criminal procedure was largely accusatory, rather than investigatory, in nature, and criminal proceedings were generally initiated by crime victims who went before a magistrate to obtain an arrest warrant. See Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 933, 943 (2010). A complainant would appear before a judicial officer authorized to administer an oath, ordinarily a justice of the peace, swear under oath based on personal knowledge that a crime had been committed, and provide evidence showing that a certain person was known, or reasonably suspected, to be the offender. See 1 Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the Crown, pp. 579-580 (1736); 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, p. 287 (1769); Davies, supra, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology at 943-944 & n.28.[15]After considering the complainant’s statement and any other evidence, the magistrate would issue a warrant directing that the offender be arrested and brought in to answer for the charge. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, pp. 132-133 (1765)[16]; 4 Blackstone, supra, p. 287-288[17]; Davies, supra, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology at 943 & n.26. “When a warrant is received by the officer, he is bound to execute it, so far as the jurisdiction of the magistrate and himself extends.” 4 Blackstone, supra, p. 288 (emphasis supplied). See also 1 Hale, supra, p. 581 (A warrant issued by a justice of the peace is ordinarily directed to the sheriff or constable, and “they are indictable and subject thereupon to a fine and imprisonment, if they neglect or refuse it.”). Even when arrested pursuant to a warrant, the accused was to be brought to a justice of the peace who, after a hearing, would examine the accused (without oath) and the witnesses (under oath) and either completely discharge the accused, set a reasonable bail for bailable offenses, or hold him in jail pending trial for nonbailable offenses. 1 Hale, supra, pp. 583-585; 4 Blackstone, supra, pp. 293-294.[18] To protect public safety, warrantless arrests were permitted at common law for felonies,[19] but warrantless arrests for misdemeanors and other petty offenses were only lawful where a peace officer personally witnessed the offense being committed and the misdemeanor amounted to a breach of the peace. See 1 Hale, supra, p. 587 (“A constable may ex officio arrest a breaker of the peace in his view, and keep him . . . till he can bring him before a justice of the peace. . . . But if there be only an affray and not in view of the constable, it hath been held he cannot arrest him without a warrant from the justice[.]“; 4 Blackstone, supra, p. 289 (A constable “may, without a warrant, arrest any one for a breach of the peace, committed in his view, and carry him before a justice of the peace.”).[20] Like other arrestees, a person arrested without a warrant would be taken to the justice of the peace to be discharged, bailed, or jailed. See 4 Blackstone, supra, pp. 293-294. It follows that, after a warrantless arrest, the accused could be lawfully detained after a judicial determination of sufficient grounds for the arrest.[21] (b) The common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention. The common-law right to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest and detention arises in the context of warrantless arrests. One seminal case, The Queen v. Tooley, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (2 Ld. Raym. 1296) (K. B. 1709),[22] was cited by John Adams in June 1769 in his Argument and Report to the Special Court of Admiralty, Boston.[23] In Tooley, a constable arrested without a warrant a woman whom he suspected of being a disorderly person. Three men armed with swords intervened and attempted to liberate the woman, before and again after the constable took her to and confined her in jail. Outside of the jail, one of the armed men fatally wounded a man who was helping to keep the woman in custody and to protect the constable. A jury found, among other facts, that the woman was not behaving in a disorderly manner when the constable arrested her. Based on the jury’s findings of fact, the court determined that the constable had no legal authority to arrest the woman and therefore was not executing the duties of his office but was instead acting as a common oppressor.” Id. at 352. The court reasoned that an invasion of the liberty of any person was an offense against the Magna Carta and the laws, in which “all the subjects of England” are concerned. Id. at 352-353. Therefore, the court reasoned, the imprisonment of a person without lawful authority, especially under “a colour of justice,” “is a sufficient provocation to all people out of compassion” to use force to rescue a person who is “unlawfully restrained of her liberty.” Id. The fact that the fatal blow was struck after the arrest of the woman was complete and she was confined in jail did not lessen the provocation caused by her unlawful detention. “[C]ertainly the putting her in prison,” the court reasoned, “and not carrying her before a justice, as they should have done, is an aggravation” of the provocation arising from the illegal arrest. Id. The court ruled that the provocation caused by the woman’s unlawful arrest and her continued unlawful detention reduced the offense from murder to manslaughter.[24] As enunciated in Tooley, the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest acted to mitigate the defendant’s culpability for murder. However, when the rule was applied in cases where the defendant was charged with crimes other than homicide related to resistance to an arrest, a finding that a person committed an otherwise criminal act in the course of resisting an unlawful arrest served as a complete defense to such criminal charges. See The King v. Curvan, 168 Eng. Rep. 1213 (1 Mood. 132) (K. B. 1826) (Where a man told a constable that the defendant insulted him, the constable arrested the defendant without a warrant, and the defendant attempted to escape and cut the face of a man who was helping the constable, the defendant was entitled to an acquittal on a charge of obstruction because the arrest was illegal.); The King v. Thompson, 168 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1 Mood. 80) (K. B. 1825) (Where a man told a constable that the defendant, his employee, left the man’s shop without finishing his work and that the man suspected that the defendant had taken the man’s tools, the constable arrested the defendant without a warrant, and the defendant resisted the arrest by stabbing the constable with a knife, the defendant’s assault was excused entirely because the arrest was illegal.). Generally, under the common law, a person cannot be punished for fleeing from or physically resisting an unlawful arrest or escaping from an unlawful detention, so long as the person uses no more force than is necessary to achieve such purpose. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 594 (68 SCt 222, 92 LE 210) (1948) (“One has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest, and courts will uphold the right of resistance in proper cases. . . . If the officer had no right to arrest, the other party might resist the illegal attempt to arrest him, using no more force than was absolutely necessary to repel the assault constituting the attempt to arrest.”); Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U. S. 529, 534-535 (20 SCt 729, 44 LE 874) (1900) (At common law, “[i]f the officer had no right to arrest, the other party might resist the illegal attempt to arrest him, using no more force than was absolutely necessary to repel the assault constituting the attempt to arrest.” (citation omitted)); Prichard v. State, 160 Ga. 527, 529 (128 SE 655) (1925) (“A citizen by common law, and by [Georgia] law, can resist an illegal arrest, and in resistance of such arrest can use such force as may be necessary to prevent the same.” (citations omitted)); Graham v. State, 143 Ga. 440, 445-446 (3) (85 SE 328) (1915) (“If no more than proper force is used by the person sought to be illegally arrested in resistance thereof, he is guilty of no offense.” (citation omitted)); Coleman v. State, 121 Ga. 594, 599 (49 SE 716) (1905) (An unlawful arrest is an assault that justifies the person “in breaking away, resisting, and repelling force with force[,]” but the force that the person can “ thus rightfully use could only be proportionate to that exerted by [the arresting officer], and sufficient to avoid the detention.”).[25] “Every man . . . has a right to shun an illegal arrest by flight. The exercise of this right should not, and would not, subject him to be arrested as a fugitive.” Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. 204, 206 (2) (18 SE 305) (1892). An officer cannot attempt an illegal arrest . . . and then justify the attempt on the ground that the person sought to be arrested would not stand still until the arrest was made, but ran away to avoid it. To call this endeavoring to escape, and to treat it as legalizing what would otherwise be an illegal arrest, would be going round in a circle. Id. at 205-206 (2). When an arrest is lawful, of course, the right to resist an unlawful arrest is not pertinent.[26] Further, a person unlawfully arrested has a common-law right to escape from detention following an unlawful arrest. See Francis Wharton, The Law of Homicide § 411, p. 636 (3d ed. 1907) (Under the common law, “[o]ne who makes an illegal arrest has no right to detain the prisoner, and no authority to prevent his escape[.]” (citing Curvan, 168 Eng. Rep. 1213, and Texas appellate decisions); 3 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Criminal Procedure; or, Commentaries of the Law of Pleading and Evidence and the Practice in Criminal Cases, § 162, p. 88 (3rd ed. 1880) (A person “unlawfully arrested is justified in escaping if he can and an attempt to rearrest him will be equally unlawful with the first arrest.” (footnotes omitted)). And “the fact that no resistance or protest was made to the original arrest does not make it legal and deprive the person of the right to attempt to regain his liberty.” Wharton, The Law of Homicide, supra, § 411, p. 636 (footnote omitted). See also Franklin v. Amerson, 118 Ga. 860, 864 (2) (45 SE 698) (1903) (Even if a suspect “did, at first, agree to go with the [officer] to the police barracks, she had the right to withdraw her consent to do so,” where the arrest was unlawful.). Thus, the common-law right to resist an illegal detention continues after an unlawful, warrantless arrest is accomplished. But, as explained above, the right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention is not pertinent to arrests under warrants, and resistance to detention after an arrest warrant is issued or after a judicial determination of sufficient grounds for the arrest would not be grounded in the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest. See Grimes v. Burch, 223 Ga. 856, 858 (159 SE2d 69) (1968). In the context of the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest, we have found no controlling authority for distinguishing between conduct that may harm an officer and conduct that may damage government property. When a person uses injurious force against an officer to resist being arrested, damage to government property, such as the officer’s uniform being pierced by a bullet or a blade, the officer’s radio being damaged during a struggle with the arrestee, or even the officer’s patrol car being damaged, are secondary concerns and less likely to result in separate criminal charges. Notwithstanding the dearth of case law on point, because the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention is framed in terms of the proportionate use of force necessary to resist the force used to arrest or detain a person, we conclude that the right does not distinguish between the use of force against an arresting officer’s person and the use of force against objects, including government property. (c) Effect of Georgia’s constitutional and statutory law on the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention. Having determined that the common law of England circa May 1776 recognized a right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention, including a right to damage government property if necessary, as explained above, we must also determine whether that common-law right has been modified or displaced by Georgia’s constitutional or statutory law. See Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 411-412 & n.9. First, we have found no authority in the Georgia Constitution that expressly restricts the right to use the proportionate force necessary to resist an unlawful arrest or escape from an unlawful detention. The Georgia Constitution, in identical text to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated[.]” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII. Thus, an arrest, which is a seizure of one’s person, must be reasonable. See Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 791 n.6 (750 SE2d 148) (2013) (Paragraph XIII is generally applied in accord with the Fourth Amendment in the context of this guarantee.). This provision of the Georgia Constitution did not displace the common-law right by forbidding, expressly or by necessary implication, the extrajudicial remedy of using proportionate force to resist an unlawful arrest or escape from an unlawful detention. Nor have we found any statutory authority that places limitations on the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or escape from an unlawful detention. The offense at issue in this case, interference with government property, was enacted in 1968. See Ga. L. 1968, p. 1317, § 1 (now codified as OCGA § 16-7-24 (a)). The common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention was a longstanding part of Georgia law by then, and the Code section does not expressly provide that it shall be no defense that the destruction, damage, or defacement of government property was incidental to the defendant’s exercise of the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention. Consequently, we see no basis for concluding that the Code section displaced the common-law right.[27] The Georgia statute that is perhaps most pertinent to the right to resist arrest is OCGA § 16-10-24, defining the offense of obstruction. By its express terms, OCGA § 16-10-24 applies only when the defendant obstructs or hinders a law enforcement officer “in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties[.]” (emphasis supplied). It is well-settled that detaining or arresting a person without authority to do so under the law does not constitute the lawful discharge of the duties of a law enforcement officer, and, therefore, one who resists an unlawful arrest or detention does not commit the offense of obstruction. See Bacon v. State, 347 Ga. App. 689, 690 (820 SE2d 503) (2018) (“A police officer is not discharging his lawful duties when he is making an unlawful arrest, and a person who resists an unlawful arrest does not hinder the officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties. A person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest.” (citations and punctuation omitted)).[28] It follows that OCGA § 16-10-24 did not displace the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest. Similarly, under Georgia criminal law, a person commits the offense of escaping from custody or confinement, prior to conviction only if the escape is from “lawful custody or lawful confinement.” OCGA § 16-10-52 (a) (emphasis supplied).[29] This Code section, therefore, does not affect the common-law right to resist an unlawful detention by fleeing or escaping. Another criminal offense relevant to detentions and arrests is OCGA § 16-5-41 (a), which provides: “A person commits the offense of false imprisonment when, in violation of the personal liberty of another, he arrests, confines, or detains such person without legal authority.” (Emphasis supplied.) See Holliday v. Coleman, 12 Ga. App. 779, 780 (78 SE 482) (1913) (citing the predecessor provision in Penal Code of 1910, § 106). A law enforcement officer who detains or arrests a person without legal authority may be guilty of the offense of false imprisonment. See Stone v. Nat. Surety Corp., 57 Ga. App. 427, 429-431 (2) (195 SE 905) (1938).[30] A victim of false imprisonment has the right to defend against the violation of his or her personal liberty. OCGA § 16-5-41 (a), therefore, did not displace the common-law right to resist an unlawful detention or arrest. The Georgia General Assembly also recognized false imprisonment as a tort, which subjects the tortfeasor to liability for the victim’s damages. See OCGA § 51-7-20 (“False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty.” (emphasis supplied.))[31]; see also Holliday, 12 Ga. App. at 780 (citing the predecessor statute in Civil Code of 1910, § 4447). Like the criminal offense, the tort of false imprisonment is framed in terms of an unlawful detention.[32] See Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 713714 (2) (348 SE2d 50) (1986) (An action to recover damages for false imprisonment requires proof of a detention “and the unlawfulness thereof’ – in the case of an arrest without process, that the warrantless detention was not “legally authorized under the circumstances.” (citations and punctuation omitted)). But it is a defense to a civil claim for false imprisonment that the detention “is by virtue of a warrant” that is procured, issued, or executed by the defendant in good faith, which “must be determined from the circumstances.” OCGA § 51-7-21.[33] In the case of an unlawful, warrantless arrest, as in this case, OCGA §§ 51-7-20 and 51-7-21 are also consistent with the common-law right to resist. Although the right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention is often considered a form of justification, Georgia’s justification statutes, set out in Title 16, Chapter 3, Article 2, also do not supplant the common-law rule. Generally, “[t]he fact that a person’s conduct is justified is a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct.” OCGA § 16-3-20. A person can claim the defense of justification, for example, against a charge based on acts performed in the course of making an arrest, but only in the case of a lawful arrest. See OCGA § 16-3-20 (4) (The defense of justification can be claimed “[w]hen the person’s conduct is reasonable and is performed in the course of making a lawful arrest.”). In its several sections, Article 2 provides that the defense of justification can be claimed to protect a broad range of interests, such as protecting one’s self or others from bodily harm, see OCGA § 16-3-21; repelling another’s unlawful intrusion into a habitation, see OCGA § 16-3-23; avoiding criminal liability for conduct wrongfully induced by a government officer or employee, see OCGA § 16-3-25; fulfilling one’s duties as a government officer or employee, see OCGA 16-3-20 (2); and exercising the right to reasonably discipline one’s child, see OCGA § 16-3-20 (3). The catchall provision in OCGA § 16-3-20 (6), which provides that the defense of justification can be claimed “[i]n all other instances which stand upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enumerated in” Article 2, shows that the specific provisions are not exclusive. To the extent a statutory defense of justification is at issue in this case, it is not self defense under OCGA § 16-3-21 (a),[34] but an unenumerated defense under the catchall provision. See Glenn, 350 Ga. App. at 16 (“The issue for this Court is whether the defense of justification under the catchall section of OCGA § 16-3-20 (6) is authorized by the evidence in this case.”).[35]Although the Code provides little guidance regarding when a defense stands upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enumerated in Article 2, in light of the broad range of interests protected in the enumerated justification defenses, we conclude that a jury could find that repelling an unlawful invasion of one’s liberty with proportionate force causing damage to property does stand on such footing. See Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606 (409 SE2d 513) (1991) (A jury could have found that the defendant’s decision to drive without a license in order to seek medical help for his wife and their soon-to-be-born child stands on the same footing of reason and justice as the enumerated justification defenses, and the defendant was therefore entitled to his requested jury instruction on the defense of justification under OCGA 16-3-20 (6).).[36] Consequently, we see no basis for concluding that any Code section in Article 2 displaced the common-law right. Although many states have limited or eliminated the common- law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention,[37] after reviewing this State’s constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to detentions and arrests, we conclude that the Georgia General Assembly has not done so and that the common-law rule remains in effect in Georgia, at least with respect to charges of obstruction or interference with government property.[38] And we conclude that the mere passage of time between an unlawful arrest and an attempt to escape from the ensuing detention has no bearing on whether the use of force was proportionate or necessary. Under Georgia law, therefore, a person may damage government property in an attempt to resist an unlawful, warrantless arrest or escape an unlawful, warrantless detention, using no more than proportionate force, even where, as in this case, officers handcuff an arrestee and place him in a patrol car before the arrestee’s property-damaging conduct. 2. Glenn contends that he did not commit the felony offense of interference with government property because he damaged the patrol car only in the course of resisting the officers’ use of force to unlawfully detain him and used no more than proportionate force and, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the revocation of his probation. [The appellate court] will not interfere with a probation revocation unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. In terms of the sufficiency of the evidence, [the appellate court] will affirm the judgment of revocation if the record includes some competent evidence to show that the defendant violated the terms of his probation in the specific manner charged, notice of which must be provided in writing before the probation revocation hearing. However, [the appellate court reviews] questions of law de novo. Caldwell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 471, 472 (758 SE2d 325) (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). Convictions for interference with government property where the defendant damaged a patrol car in the course of resisting an arrest have been affirmed on appeal in cases also affirming convictions of obstruction based on the same conduct.[39] The holding that a conviction of obstruction was warranted in those cases means that the arrest in each case was lawful, so the property-damaging conduct by definition was not in the exercise of the right to resist an unlawful arrest. These cases therefore do not support a conviction for interference with government property in the course of resistance to an unlawful arrest. As recounted above, the trial court ruled that the State failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Glenn’s warrantless arrest for loitering and prowling was in the lawful discharge of the officers’ official duties. The State did not seek review of the trial court’s ruling that Glenn’s warrantless arrest for loitering and prowling was unlawful. Thus, we take that determination as a given and express no opinion whether that determination was correct. Because the officers were not in the lawful discharge of their duties when they handcuffed Glenn and forced him into the patrol car, he did not commit the offense of obstruction. Despite ruling that Glenn’s arrest was unlawful, the trial court determined that Glenn committed the offense of interference with government property, reasoning that he damaged the patrol car “outside the bounds” of the period when he had any right to forcibly resist the arrest. That is, the trial court concluded that, once Glenn was handcuffed and confined in a patrol car, he was obligated to submit to the detention and wait until he could contest the validity of the arrest and detention in court. After reviewing our State’s constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to detentions and arrests, we concluded in Division 1, supra, that the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention remains in effect in Georgia. Under the common- law rule, Glenn’s right to resist an unlawful detention did not evaporate simply because he kicked the car door “some time” after he was initially handcuffed and seated in a patrol car but before he was brought before a judicial officer or an arrest warrant was issued.[40] Thus, the trial court cut short its analysis when it failed to consider whether Glenn used force to resist the officers’ actions that was proportionate under the circumstances. This determination is not for this Court, or for the Court of Appeals, to make in the first instance.[41] Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the Court of Appeals is directed on remand to vacate the order revoking Glenn’s probation and to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment reversed, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur, except Warren, J., not participating.
