Dillard, Presiding Judge. Anthony Jernigan appeals his convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, arguing that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to exclude a prior conviction from evidence; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude two photographs that were improper character evidence; and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena a witness and adequately investigate the case. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,[1] the record shows that Hee Sung Kim owns a Metro PCS Store, which is a franchise pre-paid cell phone store in Atlanta. Kim’s store only accepts debit cards and cash, and normally, Kim brings the cash home each evening to deposit in the bank the next morning. On September 4, 2012, Kim left work around 7:00 p.m. and drove home from Atlanta to Johns Creek. When Kim was almost home, he took a left turn through a yellow light and the car behind him followed “real fast.” Kim thought this was strange behavior because if any police officers had been around, the person behind him would have been ticketed. Kim then proceeded into his subdivision, eventually turned into his driveway, and exited his car carrying his “lunch box.”[2] Before entering his house, Kim heard someone yelling; and when he turned around, he saw two men running toward him. When the men approached, one pointed a handgun at Kim and the other grabbed his lunch box, which contained approximately $3,000 in cash; his checkbook; and his wallet. After robbing Kim, the two men ran back toward their car, which was parked nearby, and entered it. Kim then called 911 as he walked toward the suspects’ car. On the evening of the robbery, Jennifer Braynard, Kim’s neighbor, noticed a suspicious looking car outside her home that was parked halfway in a driveway and halfway in the street. Braynard saw two men—who appeared to be in a “big hurry”—run to the car, get inside, and begin driving toward the exit of the neighborhood. Around that time, Braynard’s husband, Scott, arrived home, and, concerned about the situation, left to follow the car in an effort to record its license-plate number. And as Scott turned into the street, he discovered the car, which the police later learned had run out of gas and “stopped dead in the road.” Scott observed two men “sprinting” down the road away from the car; but at some point, the men stopped and returned to the vehicle. One of the men opened the driver’s side door, retrieved something from the car, and threw it to the other man. The men also took something out of the trunk that looked like a bag or clothes before fleeing the neighborhood on foot. Tyler Seymour—a patrol officer with the Johns Creek Police Department— responded to Kim’s 911 call. When he arrived, Seymour pulled behind the suspects’ car, which was still parked on the street, and talked to several witnesses—including Kim and the Braynards. And through the passenger-side window, Seymour observed a multi-colored bag in the front seat, which Kim confirmed was his lunch box. Tanesha Taylor—a crime-scene investigator and evidence technician with the Johns Creek Police Department—also responded to the scene. Taylor retrieved several items from the car, including a CD, a red LG cell phone, Kim’s lunch box (with the money still inside), two hats, a piece of mail addressed to Jernigan, a wallet containing a driver’s license belonging to Michael Hampton, and documents showing that the car was registered to Tanecia Harrell. Later, in executing a search warrant for the car, Detective Robert Hall also discovered a shoe box containing letters addressed to and from Jernigan, as well as “some paperwork of his.” Kim’s assailants were not apprehended by the responding officers. During the investigation that ensued, Taylor sent several of the items found in the suspects’ car to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation to be tested for fingerprints. Hampton’s fingerprints were found on, inter alia, a DVD and CD retrieved from the car, as well as on the front-passenger side door. Jernigan’s fingerprints were found on a certified-mail receipt, an envelope addressed to him, and another item identified as “7F[.]” Item 7F’s label was only partially legible and described it as “ rear something that starts with the letter D and door.” According to Harrell (Jernigan’s ex-girlfriend and the registered owner of the car abandoned by the suspects), Jernigan was the primary driver of the car, and he drove it “quite often.” Harrell believed that Jernigan’s brother may have also driven the car, but she was unaware of anyone else who did so. Regardless, to Harrell’s knowledge, Jernigan was the last person who had the car before it was found at the scene of the robbery. Three defense witnesses, including Jernigan’s brother, testified that they had either driven the car or knew people other than Jernigan who did so, but none of them had ever been to Johns Creek. Following the investigation into the incident, Jernigan and Hampton were charged, via the same indictment, with armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following a joint jury trial, Jernigan was convicted of all charged offenses, and Hampton was acquitted on all counts. Jernigan then filed a motion for a new trial, but the motion was denied following a hearing. This appeal follows. 1. Jernigan first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We disagree. When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.”[3] In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only resolve whether “a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”[4] Accordingly, the jury’s verdict will be upheld so long as “there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.”[5] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Jernigan’s specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Jernigan argues that the evidence was insufficient to identify him as one of the perpetrators or even show he was present at the scene. And it is true, as the State concedes, that the evidence tying Jernigan to Kim’s robbery is entirely circumstantial—as no witness identified him as being one of the assailants and he was not apprehended by police anywhere near the scene of the robbery.[6] Nevertheless, circumstantial evidence of identity may be sufficient to “enable a rational trier of fact to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”[7] But in order to warrant a conviction based solely upon circumstantial evidence, the proven facts “must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and must exclude every reasonable theory other than the guilt of the accused.”[8] And when the evidence meets this test, “circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence . . . .”[9] It is, of course, for the jury to determine “whether an alternative hypothesis is reasonable, and [when] a jury finds that the circumstantial evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, we will not disturb that finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.”[10] So, when evidence regarding a defendant’s identity is “entirely circumstantial, it need not exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis—only those that are reasonable.”[11] Thus, to set aside the conviction it is “not sufficient that the circumstantial evidence show that the act might by bare possibility have been done by somebody else.”[12] In this case, while no witness identified Jernigan as one of Kim’s assailants, he was the primary driver of the car that the two suspects used in the commission of the crime; Harrell—Jernigan’s ex-girlfriend and owner of the car—testified that Jernigan was the last person in possession of the car; Jernigan’s fingerprints were found on items in the car; and at least one picture of Jernigan was found on a cell phone that was discovered in the car. Harrell also testified that she was unaware of anyone other than Jernigan who drove her car. Furthermore, as discussed infra, the jury also heard evidence that Jernigan previously committed a similar robbery after following the victim home. And while three witnesses testified that they either drove Harrell’s car or knew other unidentified people who did so, they all testified that they had never been to Johns Creek. Suffice it to say, evidence that, at some point, someone other than Jernigan may have driven Harrell’s car, without more, raises only a bare suspicion that someone else was driving Harrell’s car in Johns Creek on the night of the robbery.[13] Under such circumstances, although the State’s case certainly could have been stronger, we cannot say there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Jernigan was one of Kim’s assailants.[14] 2. Jernigan next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude evidence of his prior armed-robbery conviction because it was improper character evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). Again, we disagree. As to Jernigan’s prior conviction, Samuel Danaquah testified that on June 28, 2002, someone in a new car with no license plate followed him home. As Danaquah was ascending the stairs to his apartment, he heard someone say, “Hey, give me what you’re holding.” Danaquah turned around and saw a man holding a gun. When Danaquah attempted to disarm the man, they struggled, and the assailant shot him four times. The armed man then ran to the same car where two other people were waiting, and they fled the scene. Danaquah later realized that the man had stolen his watch during the altercation. Ultimately, Jernigan pleaded guilty to the foregoing armed robbery, and a certified copy of his conviction was presented at trial. In a pre-trial hearing, Jernigan objected to the admission of this other-acts evidence, arguing that the 2002 robbery was improper character evidence. And after hearing arguments from the parties, the trial court ruled that Jernigan’s prior conviction was admissible under OCGA § 244404 (b) to show his intent to commit the crime and identity as one of the robbers. Rule 404 (b) provides, inter alia, that: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Nevertheless, evidence that is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404 (b) may still be excluded under OCGA § 244403 if the evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”[15] And to properly weigh the considerations of these two evidentiary rules and evaluate the admissibility of socalled “other acts” evidence,[16] the Supreme Court of Georgia has adopted a threepart test: “(1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than defendant’s character; (2) the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; [and] (3) the government must offer sufficient proof so that the jury could find that defendant committed the act.”[17] We review a trial court’s decision “to admit evidence of other crimes for a clear abuse of discretion.”[18] As to the first prong of the foregoing test, the trial court found that the 2002 robbery was admissible to show Jernigan’s intent to commit the crime and his identity as one of the assailants. We will address each of these grounds in turn. (a) Intent. (i) Relevance to an Issue Other than Character. The Supreme Court of Georgia recently explained that “[a]s to intent, a defendant puts his intent in issue when he pleads not guilty unless he takes affirmative steps to withdraw intent as an element to be proved by the State.”[19] And here, although Jernigan pleaded not guilty to the charged offenses, he contends that he affirmatively removed intent as an issue because he denied participation in the robbery altogether. But this argument is a nonstarter. Indeed, relying on Eleventh Circuit cases and applying our new Evidence Code, we have already considered and flatly rejected it.[20] So, intent remained a material issue at trial. Furthermore, under OCGA § 24-4-401, evidence has relevance if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” And when the extrinsic offense is offered to “prove intent, its relevance is determined by comparing the defendant’s state of mind in perpetrating both the extrinsic and charged offenses.”[21] As a result, when “the state of mind required for the charged and extrinsic offenses is the same, the first prong of the Rule 404 (b) test is satisfied.”[22] And here, because Jernigan’s prior and current convictions both involved armed robbery, the same state of mind is required for both offenses, and the first prong of Rule 404 (b) is satisfied.[23] (ii) Rule 403. The second part of the Rule 404 (b) analysis—which requires us to weigh the probative value of relevant evidence against its danger of unfair prejudice—is governed by Rule 403, which provides: Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained that the Rule 403 analysis must be done on a casebycase basis and “requires a common sense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic act and the charged offense.”[24] Our Supreme Court also explained in Olds v. State[25] that “relevance is a binary issue; evidence is either relevant or it is not.”[26] On the other hand, probative value is a range; “all relevant evidence has some probative value, but not necessarily much.”[27] So, while the application of the Rule 403 test is “a matter committed principally to the discretion of the trial courts, . . . the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly.”[28] Significantly, the major function of Rule 403 is to “exclude matters of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect”[29] Lastly, in considering the probative value of evidence offered to prove intent, “these circumstances include the prosecutorial need for the extrinsic evidence, the overall similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense, and the temporal remoteness of the other act.”[30] In this case, the 2002 and 2012 armed robberies were similar in that, in both robberies, Jernigan followed the victim home, robbed them at gun point just outside of his front door, and then fled the scene with the help of accomplices. The only significant difference in the two robberies is that, unlike Kim, Danaquah did not comply with Jernigan’s demands and was shot during the struggle that ensued. But when, as here, the prior and current crime are identical [i.e., armed robberies] and the State introduces defendant’s prior conviction demonstrating that he was previously convicted of an identical crime requiring the State to prove he acted with an identical specific criminal intent, the similarity in the manner of commission of the crimes may be of lesser importance.[31] Indeed, when other-acts evidence is introduced to “prove intent [as opposed to identity] . . . a lesser degree of similarity between the charged crime and the extrinsic evidence is required.”[32] In sum, especially given the lesser importance of the similarity between the two crimes when the other-acts evidence is admitted to prove intent, we are persuaded that the two armed robberies were sufficiently similar to weigh in favor of admission under Rule 403.[33] As to the next consideration under the Rule 403 balancing test, the other-acts evidence was “important to the State’s case, thereby enhancing its probative value.”[34] And here, the State’s evidence in this case—while sufficient to support Jernigan’s convictions—was entirely circumstantial. No witnesses identified Jernigan as one of the assailants, he was not found near the crime scene, and the primary evidence implicating him was that he was likely the only person who would have been driving the car used in the commission of the crime at the time of the robbery. Under such circumstances, the State’s need for evidence that Jernigan committed a similar crime was significant, which weighs in favor of admission under Rule 403.[35] As to temporal proximity, although there was a ten-year time span in between the 2002 and 2012 robberies, our Supreme Court has explained that “the prior crime need not be very recent, especially [when] a substantial portion of the gap in time occurred while the defendant was incarcerated.”[36] And in this case, the State represented to the trial court, without objection from Jernigan, that he robbed Kim only two months after completing his prison sentence for the 2002 robbery. Under such circumstances, given that Jernigan was incarcerated almost the entire time between the two armed robberies, the 2002 robbery was not so remote as to be lacking in probative value.[37] Finally, the trial court gave a lengthy limiting instruction to the jury regarding the purposes for which the other-acts evidence was admitted. Specifically, the court instructed, inter alia, that evidence of the 2002 robbery could be considered only to prove intent and identity and for no other purpose; that the jury may not infer from such evidence that Jernigan is of a character that would commit such crimes; and that Jernigan was on trial for the crimes charged in the indictment and not for any other acts. This instruction reduced the risk of any unfair prejudice resulting from the admission of Jernigan’s 2002 conviction.[38] Given the foregoing, as to the second prong of the Rule 404 (b) analysis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of Jernigan’s 2002 conviction was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Indeed, the similarity between the crimes, the prosecutorial need for the evidence, and the temporal proximity of the crimes all enhance its probative value, while the trial court mitigated any risk of unfair prejudice by giving a limiting instruction. Furthermore, we are mindful that, “[e]ven in close cases, the balance is struck in favor of admissibility in determining whether its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”[39] (iii) Sufficient Proof. As to the final prong of the Rule 404 (b) test, Jernigan pleaded guilty to the 2002 crime, and thus “the third and final requirement, that there be sufficient proof that [he] committed these crimes, has also been met.”[40] In sum, given that each of the three prongs of the 404 (b) test are satisfied and the trial court mitigated any unfair prejudice by giving a limiting instruction to the jury, we cannot say that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence to prove intent in this case. (b) Identity. Because we held in Division 2 (a) that Jernigan’s prior conviction was admissible to prove his intent to commit the crime, we need not address whether this evidence was also admissible to prove his identity as the perpetrator.[41] 3. Jernigan also contends that the trial court erred in admitting two photographs found on the cell phone left in the suspects’ abandoned car because they constitute improper character evidence under Rule 404 (b). This claim likewise lacks merit. Prior to trial, the State informed the trial court that it intended to present photographs found on the cell phone discovered in the car abandoned by the suspects, including one showing Jernigan holding a handgun. Jernigan objected, arguing that they amounted to improper character evidence and were not relevant to the issues at trial. The State argued that this evidence was relevant to show that the cell phone in the assailants’ car belonged to Jernigan. The trial court initially indicated that the State could not present any of the photographs found on the cell phone, but later found that “one or a couple of them [were] probably probative.” The court then stated that some of the pictures were cumulative and instructed the State to “pick two or three.” As to the photo of Jernigan holding the gun, the court found that it went to the weight of the evidence and the jury could decide how probative it was under the circumstances. As to the other exhibit at issue, a picture of a gun found on the phone, the trial court did not provide a specific basis for admitting it. At trial, a detective on the case testified that he executed a search warrant for the cell phone and reviewed call logs and photographs found on the phone. During his testimony, the State submitted several exhibits, including State’s Exhibits 45 and 59, which are the photographs Jernigan now claims were inadmissible. Jernigan reiterated his objection to the admission of this evidence, and the trial court noted the objection for the record, but admitted the exhibits anyway.[42] In the record transmitted to this Court, State Exhibits 45 and 59 are of extremely poor quality, making it difficult to confirm what they depict.[43] Nevertheless, it is apparent from the testimony at trial and the parties’ briefs that Exhibit 45 shows Jernigan holding a handgun and Exhibit 59 is a picture of some kind of gun. But despite Jernigan’s argument that these photographs are improper character evidence, the trial court did not admit Exhibits 45 and 59 for any of the purposes enumerated in Rule 404 (b) or engage in the 404 (b) analysis detailed in Division 2 supra.[44] Additionally, although Jernigan referred to the photographs during the pre-trial hearing as improper character evidence in passing, nothing in the court’s findings or the substantive arguments of the parties indicate that the pictures were being admitted under Rule 404 (b). In any event, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that “[t]he limitations and prohibition on ‘other acts’ evidence set out in OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) do not apply to intrinsic evidence.”[45] Furthermore, our Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have both set out factors defining this type of evidence: Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to ‘complete the story of the crime’; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.[46] But as with any evidence, “[i]ntrinsic evidence must . . . satisfy Rule 403,”[47] and the application of the test delineated in this rule is “a matter committed principally to the discretion of the trial courts, [and] . . . the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly.”[48] In applying these factors, our Supreme Court has noted that evidence pertaining to “the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and setup of the crime is properly admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.”[49] Furthermore, evidence of other acts is “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the evidence regarding the charged offense if it forms an integral and natural part of the witness’s accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted.”[50] And significantly, this sort of intrinsic evidence “remains admissible even if it incidentally places [the defendant's] character at issue.”[51] Here, the photographs at issue, even if they incidentally placed Jernigan’s character at issue, were admissible intrinsic evidence. Specifically, the challenged evidence “plainly pertained to the chain of events in the case and was linked by time and circumstance with the charged crimes, [rather than prior crimes,] making the information necessary to complete the story for the jury.”[52] Indeed, evidence that a phone—which was found in the car used by the suspects in robbing Kim with a firearm—contained pictures of Jernigan with a firearm and a separate picture of a firearm is inextricably intertwined with other evidence of the charged offenses, which included armed robbery as well as other offenses involving possession of a firearm. Simply put, the photograph of Jernigan on the phone provided another connection between him and the car used in the robbery, and both pictures were relevant to show that he had access to a firearm. Thus, because the exhibits were inextricably intertwined with evidence to show Jernigan’s access to a firearm, the strict requirements of Rule 404 (b) do not apply to the images at issue.[53] As to Rule 403, Jernigan has not articulated how, given the circumstantial nature of the State’s case, the significant probative value of the exhibits at issue was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Indeed, Georgia and federal appellate courts have affirmed the admission of intrinsic evidence far more damaging than the photographs at issue.[54] So, given the foregoing and the deference afforded a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we are unpersuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting State Exhibits 45 and 59 into evidence. 4. Lastly, Jernigan argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to subpoena an alibi witness and to adequately investigate the case. Yet again, we disagree. To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a claimant “must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].”[55] And with respect to deficient performance, a claimant must show that “his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”[56] Moreover, when reviewing counsel’s performance, “we apply a strong ‘presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”[57] Indeed, to show that he was prejudiced by the performance of his counsel, a claimant “must prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”[58] And a reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”[59] Finally, the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations are “reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, but this Court will independently apply the legal principles to the facts.”[60] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Jernigan’s specific claims. (a) Jernigan argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena Rekeana Aldridge to testify at trial because she was with him during the time the robbery occurred. At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Aldridge testified that she and Jernigan were friends and she saw him on the day of the robbery. When first asked when she saw Jernigan, she said “I can’t remember, but he was there for the day.” She later stated that he was there for a long period of time, but it was daytime. Aldridge later testified that he was there during “lunch hours,” but it then “ran into the nighttime.” According to Aldridge, she told Jernigan’s trial counsel everything that she testified to at the hearing, and he asked if he could put her on the witness list for trial. Aldridge stated that she was supposed to come to court for the trial, but she could not be there because she was in a car accident the prior day. Nevertheless, Jernigan’s counsel never subpoenaed her to appear at trial. Kim’s robbery occurred at around 8:00 p.m., and significantly, Aldridge could not provide definitive testimony that she was with Jernigan at that precise time. And consistent with Aldridge’s testimony, Jernigan’s trial counsel testified that he did not think he needed to subpoena her because “[s]he was definitely willing to testify.” Indeed, when asked if the absence of a subpoena was the reason Aldridge was not at trial, counsel testified “[i]f she was in an accident, she couldn’t have come because she was in an accident.” Defense counsel also explained that, while Aldridge’s testimony would have been helpful, it was not conclusive. Ultimately, Jernigan’s counsel testified that he remembered speaking with Aldridge, but did not recall her providing any “information that there was an alibi.” Specifically, defense counsel stated, “I’ll put it bluntly. I did not, from that conversation, walk away thinking that there was an alibi defense . . . .” Based on the foregoing, Jernigan cannot show that his counsel was deficient for failing to subpoena Aldridge or there was a reasonable likelihood the outcome of his trial would have been different if she had testified. First, defense counsel’s decision not to subpoena Aldridge was reasonable because she willingly agreed to testify on Jernigan’s behalf without one and counsel had no reason to believe otherwise. Second, even if defense counsel had subpoenaed Aldridge, it appears that she still would have been unable to testify due to her car accident. Third, even if she could have appeared after a continuance, she did not remember exactly when Jernigan left her home and could not testify definitively that she was with him at 8:00 p.m. So, given the equivocal nature of Aldridge’s testimony, the trial court was entitled to credit the testimony of Jernigan’s counsel that she did not provide him with information justifying an alibi defense.[61] As a result, this ineffective-assistance claim is without merit.[62] (b) Jernigan also maintains that his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the case. Specifically, Jernigan argues that—based on the testimony of Latosha Smith at the motion-for-new-trial hearing—his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate certain phone call logs from the night of the robbery.[63] According to Smith, she was with Jernigan for about an hour outside of the apartment complex where Aldridge lives on the evening of the robbery.[64] Smith testified that Aldridge used her cell phone twice to call his own phone in an attempt to locate it. Jernigan’s trial counsel testified that he did not remember if he investigated the call logs for Smith’s phone, but he explained that his chosen trial strategy was to present witnesses to testify that the car used in the robbery was “a community-type car; that everybody used [it].” On appeal, Jernigan contends that his counsel should have investigated Smith’s phone call logs, which he presented at the motion-for-new-trial hearing to show that there was at least one unanswered call from Smith’s phone to Jernigan’s phone during the relevant time period. But whether Jernigan had a missed call during the time when he was allegedly committing an armed robbery is not necessarily exculpatory. Indeed, the State presented evidence that the cell phone was left by the suspects in the abandoned car and testimony that Jernigan misplaced his phone or had missed calls during the robbery could have bolstered the State’s case. And Jernigan’s counsel testified that if he thought evidence would be more damaging to his client than beneficial, he would not present such evidence. Suffice it to say, Jernigan cannot show that his counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the call logs was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made the same decision under the circumstances. As a result, he cannot establish that his counsel was ineffective in this respect.[65] Lastly, Jernigan argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether Harrell’s car had been reported stolen to impeach her testimony that she had not made such a report. And during opening statements, Jernigan’s attorney told the jury that Harrell reported her car stolen a few days before the robbery. Indeed, during her testimony, Harrell admitted that she initially lied to police about her car being parked at a certain apartment complex because she was afraid of getting into any trouble. But contrary to trial counsel’s representations, Harrell testified that she never reported her car stolen. Even so, Jernigan argues that his counsel should have investigated further to obtain a police report to confirm that Harrell did report her car stolen. Jernigan also asserts that it hurt the strength and credibility of the defense when his counsel made claims that were flatly denied by Harrell. But at the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Jernigan did not present evidence that any further investigation would have revealed that—despite her sworn testimony otherwise—Harrell reported her car stolen a few days before the robbery.[66] Moreover, absent concrete evidence that Harrell’s testimony was false, questioning Harrell on the matter would have only served to highlight trial counsel’s prior misstatement.[67] As a result, this claim of ineffective assistance is also without merit. For all these reasons, we affirm Jernigan’s convictions. Judgment affirmed. Rickman and Brown, JJ., concur.
