Reese, Presiding Judge. Following a joint bench trial, Abigail Valles and Rafael De La Cruz appeal the denial of their motions for new trial that sought to grant their motions to suppress. Valles and De La Cruz were convicted of one count each of trafficking methamphetamine.[1] Both Valles and De La Cruz argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Because these appeals involve essentially the same facts and questions of law, we consider them together. For the reasons set forth infra, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand. On appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, this court must construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the ruling of the trial court. Furthermore, the trial court’s application of law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review. We may examine not only the evidence in the record of the hearing on the suppression motion, but also the evidence from the trial. However, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. . . The trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.[2] So viewed, the evidence showed the following facts. On April 15, 2017, Investigator Vic McPhie and Investigator Aaron Howard, both with the Newnan Police Department, were in a marked police vehicle in a Walmart parking lot in Coweta County. The investigators were watching the Walmart parking lot due to recent criminal activity of persons illegally entering vehicles in the area. McPhie testified that he and Howard had received information that other “entering auto incidents” had occurred in the area. McPhie further testified that the “average person usually goes into the store[,]” whereas individuals that break into vehicles usually “ jump from parking lot to parking lot in different areas.” He further testified that he saw a silver sport utility vehicle (“SUV”) in the parking lot driven by a male, and containing a female passenger. McPhie testified that occupants of the silver SUV “appeared to be [engaged in the] criminal activity [of] entering autos.” While watching the Walmart parking lot, the investigators noticed that the small silver SUV was moving around to different parking spaces, and that the occupants were looking around the parking lot. Howard testified that for 30-40 minutes, the investigators watched the vehicle move from parking space to parking space, drive around the backside of Walmart “erratically[,]” drive behind an adjacent business, and that no one entered or exited the SUV during that time. McPhie testified that he witnessed the silver SUV drive four routes in various parts of the parking lot. McPhie further testified that based on his “knowledge, training and experience of [the silver SUV] moving from parking space to parking space around the businesses consistently, there could have been other individuals tied in with them located in this parking lot. They could have been the look-out.” Both investigators testified that the movements of the SUV in the parking lot were suspicious. After the vehicle turned around behind another business in the parking lot and began moving, the Investigators activated the police vehicle’s blue emergency lights, and conducted a traffic stop of the SUV. After stopping the SUV, McPhie approached the driver (later identified as De La Cruz), and asked for his license. McPhie testified that De La Cruz told him that he was not carrying his license. During his conversation with De La Cruz, McPhie noticed that the driver spoke very fast while the female passenger (later identified as Valles), “looked straight ahead[ ]” and did not pay attention to McPhie. McPhie then asked De La Cruz to step out of the SUV. After De La Cruz stepped out of the SUV, he told Howard that he “ wanted to make a deal.” De La Cruz gave the investigators permission to search the vehicle. Howard testified that upon searching the vehicle, the Investigators found a “large quantity of methamphetamine[.]” McPhie testified that Valles told him that she and De La Cruz were traveling from Texas to Georgia to deliver methamphetamine. At the motion to suppress hearing, McPhie testified that De La Cruz’s driving did not violate any state laws and he would not have written De La Cruz a ticket for driving in that area. McPhie further testified that he was unaware before the investigators stopped the vehicle that there were illegal drugs in the SUV. Following the suppression hearing, which was held about three months prior to the bench trial, the trial court denied both motions filed by Valles and De La Cruz. After the bench trial, these appeals followed. Turning to the claims of error by both Valles and De La Cruz, they argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress because the stop of their vehicle was not based on reasonable, articulable suspicion. Specifically, both contend that the stop of their vehicle was based on “unparticularized suspicion” or a “hunch[.]“ In its ruling, the trial court noted that Investigator McPhie’s observations of the silver SUV over approximately 30 minutes created sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The trial court, citing Proctor v. State,[3] also noted that “the stop of a vehicle is also authorized merely if the officer observed a traffic offense.” Our precedent makes it clear that the “brief investigative stop of a vehicle is justified when an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver or the vehicle is subject to seizure for the violation of the law.”[4] Further, the reasonable and articulable suspicion must be an objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity, and . . . this determination can only be made after considering the totality of the circumstances. And based upon this holistic approach, the detaining officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.[5] Here, neither investigator provided the specific, articulable facts that rose to the level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. “[A] person’s mere presence in a high crime area does not give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, even if police observe conduct which they believe consistent with a general pattern of such activity.”[6] McPhie testified that he observed the vehicle driven by De La Cruz travel four different routes around the Walmart parking lot in the span of about 30 minutes in an area where vehicles had been recently entered into illegally. Although McPhie testified that based on his knowledge and expertise, the behavior of De La Cruz and Valles while in the Walmart parking lot appeared to be consistent with the criminal activity of entering autos, he did not provide a particularized suspicion that reasonably warranted stopping their vehicle.[7] McPhie merely observed the vehicle containing Valles and De La Cruz traveling around a parking lot known for criminal activity of entering autos and parking in different parking spaces, and McPhie testified that no one entered or exited their vehicle. Further, McPhie testified that the silver SUV did not violate any state laws. [W]here no circumstances at all appear which might give rise to an articulable suspicion (less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice) that the law has been violated, the act of following and detaining a vehicle and its occupants must be judged as an impermissible intrusion on the rights of the citizen. Where this occurs, the penalty exacted by the law is that evidence turned up as a result of such intrusion may not be introduced against the defendant[s] on the trial of [their] case[s].[8] It follows that under the totality of circumstances based on the driving pattern of the vehicle, although the investigators were justified in observing the vehicle, there was insufficient information to indicate that either Valles or De La Cruz were engaged in illegal activity so as to provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop.[9] Thus, the motions to suppress evidence uncovered at the traffic stop should have been granted and the trial court erred in denying the motions for new trial. We remand these cases to the trial court to proceed in a manner consistent with this consolidated opinion. Judgments reversed and case remanded. Markle, J., concurs. Colvin, J., dissents. A20A1465. VALLES v. THE STATE. A20A1466. DE LA CRUZ v. THE STATE.
