Doyle, Presiding Judge. Carl Gardei, who previously had been classified as a sex offender in Arizona, filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Gwinnett County Sheriff R. L. Conway and Georgia Bureau of Investigations Director Victor Reynolds, seeking: (1) a declaration that Georgia’s Sex Offender Registration Statute[1] is unconstitutional and that he is not subject to its requirements; and (2) an injunction to bar enforcement of the sex offender statute against him. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely under the two-year statute of limitation for personal injury claims set forth in OCGA § 9-3-33. Gardei appeals, and we affirm for the reasons that follow. In his 2018 petition, Gardei alleges that he pleaded guilty to three counts each of sexual abuse, attempted sexual assault, and kidnapping in Arizona in 1992. Upon his release from prison in 2003, he moved to New Mexico, where he was required to register as a sexual offender. In 2009, Gardei moved from New Mexico to Georgia, registered as a sexual offender here, and complied with the requirement that he re-register as a sexual offender each year. Gardei’s petition seeks a declaration that Georgia’s sex offender registry statute violates the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. Gardei claims that he should not be required to register as a sexual offender and that he is entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the statute against him. He also requests an award of attorney fees and other relief deemed appropriate by the court. Both Conway and Reynolds moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6). The trial granted the motions to dismiss, finding that Gardei’s claims are time-barred by the two-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-33. This appeal followed. “[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.”[2] “A statute of limitation defense goes to the merits of the claim, and is therefore subject to a motion to dismiss under OCGA § 91112 (b) (6).”[3] “A motion to dismiss barred claims is properly granted when a complaint shows on its face that the statute of limitation has run and there is no further showing by amendment or by affidavit that a tolling of the statute is possible.”[4] 1. Two-year statute of limitation. Gardei argues that the trial court erred by applying the two-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-33 to his claims. We disagree. Pursuant to OCGA § 9-3-33, “actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues.” Gardei, however, argues that this Code section does not apply here and that there is no statute of limitation applicable to declaratory judgment actions under OCGA § 9-4-2. But the omission of a specific statute of limitation for declaratory judgment actions does not mean that a party can avoid an otherwise applicable statute of limitation.[5] The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act “is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.”[6] The Act grants “respective superior courts of this state . . . [the] power, upon petition or other appropriate pleading, to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for such declaration.”[7] Thus, a declaratory judgment is a procedural device to determine the legal rights of a party, rather than a substantive claim.[8] And it is the nature of the underlying substantive claim that determines the applicable statute of limitation. Here, as the trial court stated in its dismissal order, “the entirety of [Gardei's] lawsuit rests on the allegation that OCGA § 42-1-12 is unconstitutional and that [the d]efendants’ enforcement of OCGA § 42-1-12 has personally injured him.” Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-33 applies to Gardei’s claims. 2. No continuing violation. Gardei further argues that the limitation period is extended because the defendants’ requirement that he annually renew his sex offender registration each year constitutes a continuing violation. We disagree. “Under [the continuing-violation] doctrine, a plaintiff can sue for actions that occurred outside the applicable limitations period if a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice and the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period.”[9] An analysis of whether an action constitutes a continuing violation “distinguishes between ‘the present consequence of a one[--]time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, and the continuation of the violation into the present, which does.’”[10] Here, the defendants allegedly violated Gardei’s rights in 2009, when he was required to register as a sex offender in Georgia, at which time he “he knew, or should have known, all of the facts necessary to pursue a cause of action.”[11] As the Eleventh Circuit concluded in a similar, albeit unpublished case, the act [Gardei] contends violated his dueprocess rights was his classification as a sex offender subject to . . . registration requirements. This classification will continue to have effects on [Gardei] into the future, but a new act has not occurred every time [Gardei] feels one of those continuing effects. For this reason, the continuingviolation doctrine does not apply to [Gardei's] claim, and the [trial] court did not err [by] dismissing his claim as untimely.”[12] Judgment affirmed. Hodges, J., concurs. McFadden, C. J., concurs in part and dissents in part in Division 1 and dissents as to Division 2.. A20A0818. Gardei v. Conway et al.
