Dillard, Presiding Judge. These consolidated appeals arise from an action filed by HBN Media, Inc. against SDM Investments Group; Scott Miller, one of HBN’s initial investors and SDM’s principal; and Ed Laine, one of Miller’s business partners.[1] Specifically, HBN sued the defendants, alleging breach-of-contract claims and violations of the Georgia Trade Secrets Act of 1990. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in HBN’s favor, awarding it nominal damages and attorney fees. In Case No. A20A1775, the defendants appeal that judgment, arguing the trial court erred in (1) finding that Miller signed an initial confidentiality agreement in his personal capacity; (2) concluding that they breached a second confidentiality agreement; (3) determining that HBN maintained reasonable steps to keep the information at issue confidential; and (4) awarding HBN attorney fees. In Case No. A20A2036, HBN appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss the appeal in Case No. A20A1775, arguing that the trial court erred in finding (1) the defendants’ delay in filing the trial transcript was reasonable; (2) the delay was not solely caused by the defendants; (3) the delay was excusable because the defendants believed the transcript had been filed and had not received notice from the court that it needed to be filed; and (4) the requirement that a transcript be timely filed does not apply when there is a pending motion for attorney fees. Finally, in Case No. A20A1776, the defendants challenge the trial court’s denial of a motion they filed, which sought reimbursement for Laine’s attorney fees and costs. For the reasons set forth infra, we reverse in Case No. A20A2036, dismiss Case No. A20A1775, and affirm in Case No. A20A1776. The record shows that HBN[2] operates a website for teams of real estate agents and handles “all things electronic and technical for the teams.”[3] One of HBN’s services is to generate leads for real estate agents for potential home buyers, many of whom also have a home to sell. Prior to HBN’s formation, a conference call was held with potential investors, including Miller. An advisory board was also established for HBN, and Miller was appointed to be one of its members. Thereafter, the advisory board held a meeting, at which all of the attendees—including Miller—were required to sign a nondisclosure agreement because HBN’s founder did not want the information being discussed to find its way into the marketplace and result in similar platforms being created. Miller ultimately became an investor and received shareholder updates that included information valuable to HBN. In the end, HBN raised $178,000 to launch its platform; and when it did, SDM also became an investor. In association with SDM’s investment, Miller executed documents on behalf of SDM in a subscription package, which included a confidentiality agreement. It is undisputed that Miller forwarded three shareholder updates to Daniel Reed, his business partner in V-4 Software, a competitor of HBN. Miller acknowledged that he should not have forwarded this information to anyone and that he did not have permission to do so. The information in the shareholder updates was confidential, including, inter alia, revenue, metrics, goals, and a net promoter score.[4] Miller and Reed then used contractors in China to form V-4 Software. Based on the foregoing, HBN filed a complaint against SDM, Miller, and Laine, alleging, inter alia, breach-of-contract claims with respect to the two confidentiality agreements and violations of Georgia’s Trade Secrets Act of 1990.[5] Following a bench trial, the trial court entered its judgment, awarding HBN $20,000 in nominal damages and $241,250 in attorney fees and costs of litigation. The defendants appeal that judgment in Case No. A20A1775, raising the enumerations of error set forth supra. Several months following the final judgment, HBN filed a motion to dismiss the foregoing appeal because, although the defendants’ notice of appeal indicated that a trial transcript would be included in the appellate record, they had yet to file the transcript. The defendants responded to HBN’s motion, and the trial court held a hearing on the matter. Ultimately, the trial court denied HBN’s motion to dismiss the appeal, and HBN appeals that order in Case No. A20A2036. Finally, although Laine was initially named as a defendant, he was ultimately dismissed from the case prior to trial. Even so, the defendants subsequently filed a motion for Laine to be awarded attorney fees and costs, which the trial court denied. And in Case No. A20A1776, the defendants challenge that decision. A20A2036 1. In several claims of error, HBN argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion to dismiss the defendants’ appeal of the trial court’s final judgment in its favor because their failure to timely file the trial transcript was unreasonable and inexcusable. We agree. Although trial courts have “wide discretion when ruling on a motion to dismiss an appeal based on a failure to timely file a transcript, that discretion is not unlimited.”[6] So, with this deferential standard of review in mind, we turn to the case at hand. OCGA § 5-6-48 (c) provides that [n]o appeal shall be dismissed by the appellate court nor consideration of any error therein refused because of failure of any party to cause the transcript of evidence and proceedings to be filed within the time allowed by law or order of court; but the trial court may, after notice and opportunity for hearing, order that the appeal be dismissed where there has been an unreasonable delay in the filing of the transcript and it is shown that the delay was inexcusable and was caused by such party. As to a trial court’s dismissal of an appeal, our Supreme Court has held that “[a] delay in excess of 30 days in filing a transcript after a notice of appeal is filed is prima facie unreasonable and inexcusable, but this presumption is subject to rebuttal if the party comes forward with evidence to show that the delay was neither unreasonable nor inexcusable.”[7] And in evaluating the threshold question of whether the delay was unreasonable, “we consider both the length and effect of the delay.”[8] This Court will also consider any delay in transmitting the appellate record unreasonable when it may affect an appeal by: (a) directly prejudicing the position of a party by allowing an intermediate change of conditions or otherwise resulting in inequity; or (b) causing the appeal to be stale, such as, by delaying just disposition of the case, by preventing placement of the case on the earliest possible appellate court calendar, or by delaying the docketing of the appeal and hearing of the case by an appellate court.[9] Indeed, we have repeatedly recognized that “justice delayed for even one day is justice denied to the litigant who was successful in the lower court and who is entitled to his judgment unless the case is properly reversed.”[10] In this case, the trial court entered its judgment in favor of HBN on May 10, 2019, awarding it nominal damages, attorney fees, and costs of litigation. The defendants filed a timely notice of appeal from that judgment on June 7, 2019,[11] which noted, inter alia, that the “[t]ranscript of evidence and proceeding will be filed for inclusion in the record on appeal.” Under such circumstances, the trial transcript was due to be filed by July 7, 2019 (i.e., 30 days later), and any delay past that date would be considered prima facie unreasonable and inexcusable.[12] But on December 17, 2019, when the defendants had still not filed a trial transcript, HBN filed a motion to dismiss their appeal. Specifically, HBN argued that the appeal should be dismissed because the defendants were required to file the transcript by July 7, 2019, at least two terms of this Court had passed since that due date, and the defendants never requested an extension of time to file the transcript. HBN also maintained that the defendants’ five-month delay in failing to file the transcript was unreasonable and inexcusable.[13] And in support of this contention, HBN presented evidence that the transcript was prepared as of January 3, 2019, months before the defendants were required to file it. Then, on February 21, 2020, two months after HBN filed its motion to dismiss the appeal, the defendants—rather than filing the transcript—filed an amended notice of appeal, which emphasized that “Transcript of evidence and proceedings is not required for inclusion in the record on appeal.”[14] The defendants responded to HBN’s motion, and the trial court held a hearing on the matter. Thereafter, on April 8, 2020—eleven months after its final judgment—the trial court denied HBN’s motion to dismiss the appeal. In doing so, the trial court found that (1) the defendants paid the costs for the appeal; (2) their counsel subjectively believed that paying for the transcript and having a discussion with the stenographer at trial caused the trial transcript to be filed; (3) a notice the court sent to the defendants’ counsel “with notice for filing the transcript” was returned to the court for an excusable address issue; (4) a delay in HBN filing the trial exhibits was not solely the fault of the defendants and served to delay docketing of the appeal; (5) the transcript had been filed in the trial court at least by the time of its April 8 order; and (5) HBN “continued to litigate the matter in the trial court, which also delayed the docketing of the appeal.” But none of the foregoing findings by the trial court are sufficient excuses under Georgia law for significantly delaying the docketing of an appeal. Importantly, after failing to file the transcript for five months, the defendants waited two additional months after HBN filed its motion to dismiss the appeal to inform the court that a transcript was suddenly no longer necessary for the appeal. And despite the trial court’s findings to the contrary, paying for a transcript and subjectively believing it had been filed does not relieve an appellant of its obligation to actively ensure that a transcript was filed or to, at a minimum, request an extension to file it. Apparently, the defendants relied solely on a conversation their attorney had with the court reporter at trial in believing the transcript had been filed; but we have repeatedly held that it is not the court reporter’s responsibility to ensure a transcript is filed.[15] So, while it is certainly true that the court’s notice to the defendants of the need to file the transcript was not received due to an excusable address issue, an appellant is not entitled to such a notification before satisfying its statutory duty to timely file a transcript.[16] Additionally, the trial court’s finding that, as of its April 2020 order (almost ten months after the transcript was due to be filed and two months after the defendants notified the court that the transcript was no longer necessary), the transcript had ultimately been filed does not excuse the defendants from the requirement that they file it in a timely manner. Were it otherwise, an appellant could wait as long as it wanted to file a transcript as long as it did so before the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss.[17] And significantly, the defendants never requested an extension to file the transcript.[18] Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that anyone other than the defendants was responsible for delaying the docketing of their appeal. Indeed, even if HBN was late in filing certain exhibits, the defendants could have asked for an extension of time to file the transcript or filed the transcript without the exhibits and moved to supplement the appellate record later.[19] Also, presumably, no trial exhibits were necessary for the appeal when the defendants do not even believe the trial transcript itself was needed. Moreover, it is unclear exactly what the trial court meant when it found that HBN continued to litigate the matter in the trial court after the final judgment was entered. But regardless, the trial court lost jurisdiction to amend or alter its final judgment after the notice of appeal was filed, and as a result, any post-judgment filings or motions by HBN had no effect on when the appeal was ultimately docketed.[20] Suffice it to say, the evidence plainly shows that the defendants are solely responsible for the seven-month delay between when the transcript was due to be filed and when they eventually informed the court not to include a transcript in the record on appeal. Lastly, the trial court—without explanation—summarily concluded that HBN was not prejudiced by the substantial delay at issue, but “a delay is unreasonable if it affects an appeal either by directly prejudicing the position of a party by allowing an intermediate change of conditions or otherwise resulting in inequity, or by causing the appeal to become stale, for instance by delaying docketing and hearing in this Court.”[21] And in this case, the defendants’ notice of appeal was filed on June 7, 2019, but the appeal was not docketed in this Court until April 29, 2020. This means that if the defendants had timely filed the transcript on July 7, 2020, their appeal could have been docketed in this Court’s 2019 April term of court. But because they failed to update their notice of appeal until February 21, 2020, the appeal was not docketed until the 2020 April term of court.[22] So, even if there were no direct prejudice to HBN, the seven-month delay was still unreasonable as it delayed docketing for at least one term of Court.[23] Given the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion in denying HBN’s motion to dismiss the appeal at issue (i.e, Case No. A20A1775).[24] A20A1775 2. Based upon our holding in Division 1 supra, this related appeal is dismissed.[25] A20A1776 3. Finally, the defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to award attorney fees and costs of litigation to Laine—who was dismissed from the case before trial—because HBN had no factual basis to pursue any claim against him at any time.[26] We disagree. On November 30, 2018, prior to trial, HBN voluntarily dismissed Laine from the case with prejudice and with the consent of all parties. Approximately seven months later, on June 24, 2019, the defendants filed a motion for Laine to be awarded attorney fees and costs of litigation, arguing that Laine was entitled to such fees and costs up until the time he was dismissed from the case under OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) and (b) because HBN’s claims against him were wholly unsupported. Specifically, the defendants contended that because Laine paid half of the fees and costs of the entire litigation incurred until he was dismissed, he was entitled to 50 percent of all the fees and costs incurred until that time. In response to the defendants’ motion, HBN primarily argued that it must be denied because it was untimely under OCGA § 9-15-14 (e). Then, on October 2, 2019, the trial court summarily denied the motion. We agree with HBN that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) provides In any civil action in any court of record of this state, reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation shall be awarded to any party against whom another party has asserted a claim, defense, or other position with respect to which there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position. And OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) provides: The court may assess reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation in any civil action in any court of record if, upon the motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was interposed for delay or harassment, or if it finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct . . . But importantly, OCGA § 9-15-14 (e) provides, “[a]ttorney’s fees and expenses this Code section may be requested by motion at any time during the course of the action but not later than 45 days after the final disposition of the action.”[27] And while the defendants were all parties to the motion for attorney fees, in substance, the motion only sought fees for Laine because he had been dismissed from the case. The other defendants were not dismissed from the case and a judgment was entered against them at trial. Those defendants have never suggested that they are separately entitled to attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14. HBN argues that the defendants’ motion for Laine’s attorney fees was properly denied as untimely under OCGA 9-15-14 (e). The defendants did not file a reply brief to address this argument, but below they argued that their motion was timely because it was filed within 45 days of the trial court’s final judgment after trial. But as noted supra, the defendants did not seek attorney fees for Laine until nearly seven months after he was dismissed with prejudice from the case. And as our Supreme Court has explained, it is “clear that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice constitutes a final disposition of the underlying action only as far as the parties involved in the voluntary dismissal are concerned.”[28] Thus, as to Laine, the final disposition of the case was when he was dismissed with prejudice prior to trial, not when the final judgment was entered after trial, during which he was no longer a party to the case. And because the defendants waited seven months to file a motion, requesting attorney fees on behalf of Laine only, the motion was untimely. Under such circumstances, the trial court did not err in denying it.[29] Judgment affirmed in Case No. A20A1776; dismissed in Case No. A20A1775; and reversed in Case No. 20A2036. Rickman, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.
