Dillard, Presiding Judge. The underlying facts of this case are tragic. In the summer of 2017, two experienced corrections officers were killed in the line of duty by two of the inmates they were transporting. Phillip Beasley witnessed the aftermath of this harrowing ordeal after stopping his vehicle behind the halted prison bus and soon was confronted by the inmates, who threatened him at gunpoint and stole his car. He escaped with his life, and (along with his wife) eventually filed suit against the Georgia Department of Corrections, seeking damages for the emotional distress he suffered as a result of this incident. Specifically, the Beasleys contend that the officers’ failure to abide by certain departmental policies in transporting inmates—which they argue created a “public nuisance”—permits them to sue the GDOC for Phillip’s injuries under the Georgia Tort Claims Act. The GDOC filed a motion to dismiss the Beasleys’ suit on sovereign-immunity grounds, arguing that the assault-and-battery exception to the GTCA’s general waiver of the State’s immunity bars their claims, and the trial court granted it. For the reasons noted infra, we affirm. We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on this motion to dismiss because the question of sovereign immunity is one of law, but we are required to sustain the court’s factual findings if they are supported by any evidence.[1] And as the party seeking a waiver of the State’s immunity, the Beasleys bore the burden of proof before the trial court.[2] So viewed, the record shows that in the early morning hours of June 15, 2017, while transporting 33 prisoners on a bus, two GDOC officers—Sergeants Curtis Billue and Christopher Monica—were tragically killed with their own service weapons after two inmates—Ricky Dubose and Donnie Brown—suddenly breached the security gate and entered the front of the vehicle. The ensuing investigation revealed that the officers violated several GDOC policies prior to and during the transport, including failing to strip search the inmates, use double locks on handcuffs, lock the security gate, remain awake and alert, wear ballistic vests, or conduct the transport after sunrise. Upon escaping, the inmates who killed the officers sprinted toward a vehicle stopped behind the halted prison bus, which was occupied by Phillip Beasley—who was on his way to work. Then, once they reached Phillip’s vehicle, the inmates demanded—with a gun placed firmly against his head—that he exit his vehicle, which he did before running away with the expectation that he would be “shot at any moment.” And as a result of this harrowing experience, Phillip now suffers from PTSD, anxiety, hyper-vigilance, nightmares, sleeplessness, anger, sadness, and estrangement from his wife and children. On June 11, 2018, the Beasleys sent the GDOC notice of their claims and, thereafter, filed suit on June 10, 2019, seeking damages and claiming that the GDOC created a public nuisance, was liable for both negligence and gross negligence, and committed trespass. The GDOC filed a special appearance answer, in which they asserted that the Beasleys’ claims were barred by sovereign immunity, and then proceeded to file a motion to dismiss on the same grounds. And following oral argument, the trial court granted the GDOC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that for each of the Beasleys’ claims, “the actual loss incurred by the Plaintiff is a result of an assault or battery.” So, notwithstanding the numerous policy violations the GDOC officers committed, the trial court found that the Beasleys would never have incurred damages without the inmates’ actions, and the assault and battery fell within the types of losses prohibited by the GTCA.[3] This appeal by the Beasleys follows, in which they argue the trial court erred by (1) failing to recognize that the officers’ conduct constituted a public nuisance, (2) finding that because an assault or battery occurred, the GDOC was immunized from liability for the public nuisance it created prior to the car jacking, and (3) applying the assault-and-battery exception of the GTCA in a way that “ignores established tort principles regarding proximate cause.” Under the Georgia Constitution, the sovereign immunity of our state “may be waived only as provided by the [General Assembly] in a tort claims act or an act of the [General Assembly] which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is waived and the extent of such waiver.”[4] And under this authority, our General Assembly enacted the GTCA, which provides, in relevant part, that [t]he state waives its sovereign immunity for the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment and shall be liable for such torts in the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances; provided, however, that the state’s sovereign immunity is waived subject to all exceptions and limitations set forth in this article.[5] One exception to the general GTCA waiver provides that the State is not liable for losses resulting from “[a]ssault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, or interference with contractual rights[.]“[6] And the GTCA defines “loss” to mean “personal injury; disease; death; damage to tangible property, including lost wages and economic loss to the person who suffered the injury, disease, or death; pain and suffering; mental anguish; and any other element of actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence.”[7] So, with these guiding principles in mind, we turn to the Beasleys’ claims of error. 1. For starters, the Beasleys argue the trial court erred by concluding that their losses were the result of an assault and battery and failing to recognize the corrections officers’ conduct constituted a public nuisance.[8] More specifically, they contend that the GDOC is liable for the now-deceased officers’ “improper transportation of violent criminals [which] interferes with the use of the public highways” because when the prisoner transport bus stopped, it obstructed the roadway; and “[t]he prisoners created a second obstruction of the highway when they emerged from the bus, unsupervised, and making their escape.” Thus, the Beasleys maintain that the trial court erred by determining, as a matter of law, that these facts did not constitute a public nuisance. At a minimum, they claim that the question of whether the relevant facts constitute such a nuisance is a question for a jury. Finally, the Beasleys assert that affirming the trial court’s decision will “violate the separation of powers” because a public nuisance is a tort, and the GTCA explicitly waives the State’s immunity for the torts of officers and employees. But all of these arguments are unavailing. It is well established that the “nuisance doctrine”[9] for purposes of sovereign immunity allows the State to be held liable for “creating or maintaining a nuisance which constitutes either a danger to life and health or a taking of property.”[10] But this sovereign-immunity doctrine is firmly rooted in the concept that “the government may not take or damage private property for public purposes without just and adequate compensation.”[11] Importantly, personal injury for purposes of inverse condemnation based on a public nuisance does not “constitute personal property that can be taken,”[12] and so “[s]overeign immunity bars any action for personal injury or wrongful death . . . arising from nuisance or inverse condemnation.”[13] And here, we are dealing with personal injuries, not a taking of personal property via a public nuisance.[14] As a result, the trial court properly dismissed the Beasleys’ claims because it correctly determined that the actual losses—or damages—they suffered were solely due to the assault and battery perpetrated by the two inmates.[15] Indeed, the reason for the roadway’s obstruction was unknown until the inmates emerged from the vehicle and approached Phillip; and it was only then that he sustained any damages.[16] It strains credulity, then, to suggest that merely stopping behind a prison transport bus caused Phillip damages or that the violation of GDOC policies damaged him in any way before the inmates actually emerged from the bus and approached him. Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit. 2. Next, the Beasleys argue that the assault and battery committed by the inmates “does not immunize the GDOC from liability for the losses caused by the GDOC’s own tort.” Specifically, they contend that the assault and battery were not “the sole or even the initial cause of the Beasleys’ losses” because the GDOC first created a public nuisance, and the loss could be apportioned among more than one proximate cause. In doing so, the Beasleys claim that the trial court erroneously relied on Department of Human Resources v. Coley,[17] and maintain it should have instead rested its decision on Georgia Department of Transportation v. Heller,[18] which distinguished Coley.[19] In Coley, we determined that when the plaintiff’s losses or damages are caused by or result from an assault or battery, the State is immune from liability for other acts from which the loss did not result.[20] And as previously noted,[21] the Supreme Court of Georgia has adopted this principle.[22] But in Heller, our Supreme Court distinguished Coley—and, by implication, its own opinion adopting the principle—by explaining “the latter event in Coley that led to the plaintiff’s loss was an event for which the State was entitled to sovereign immunity [under the assault-and-battery exception], whereas, here, the opposite is true.”[23] In Heller, the event that caused the plaintiff’s damages was not an event for which the State was immune from liability (i.e., the State’s allegedly improper design of the roadway).[24] But as explained in Division 1 supra, the loss in this case was solely attributable to the second event—the inmates’ assault and battery upon Phillip.[25] Thus, this enumeration is likewise without merit because this case is analogous to Coley and its progeny, rather than Heller. 3. Finally, the Beasleys assert that the trial court’s application of the assault-and-battery exception within the GTCA “ignores established tort principles regarding proximate cause.” And in doing so, they ask us to overturn our current interpretation of the assault-and-battery exception to the GTCA’s general waiver of liability. Specifically, the Beasleys urge us to reconsider our interpretation of this exception because (a) the GTCA was patterned after the Federal Tort Claims Act, (b) the current interpretation is “based on an erroneous statutory interpretation and unsound reasoning,” and (c) adopting the Beasleys’ preferred interpretation would “enhance” rather than “hamper” the “legislative purpose” of the GTCA. We will address each of these contentions in turn. (a) The General Assembly’s “Intent.” The Beasleys encourage us to overrule Coley because—in their view—it strays from the interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, after which the GTCA was patterned. But as our Supreme Court has aptly noted, the GTCA was patterned after the FTCA “in most respects”;[26] and “in most respects” does not mean in all respects.[27] Indeed, as we thoroughly explained in Coley, the assault-and-battery exception within the GTCA is one such distinction.[28] The language of the GTCA assault-and-battery exception is plain and unequivocal—the State has no liability for personal injury; disease; death; damage to tangible property, including lost wages and economic loss to the person who suffered the injury, disease, or death; pain and suffering; mental anguish; and any other element of actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence that are the result of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, or interference with contractual rights.[29] Suffice it to say, we decline the Beasleys’ invitation to interpret the word “losses” in the GTCA assault-and-battery exception as sharing a meaning with “claim”—as used in the FTCA assault-and-battery exception[30]—when the GTCA explicitly provides definitions for these two words.[31] To do otherwise is to engage in judicial policymaking disguised as statutory interpretation. Appellate courts must discern the “intent” of the legislature through the words contained in enacted statutes, and nothing more.[32] (b) Alleged Unsound Reasoning. The Beasleys continue by arguing that the current interpretation of the GTCA’s assault-and-battery exception is “based on an erroneous statutory interpretation and unsound reasoning.” In doing so, they urge us to overrule our decision in Department of Human Resources v. Hutchinson.[33] Specifically, the Beasleys assert that “Georgia courts repeat the same faulty premise each time they apply the assault and battery exception under the GTCA—that courts ‘do not look at the duty allegedly breached by the government, but focus on the act causing the plaintiff’s loss.’” Although the Beasleys correctly cite to Georgia Military College v. Santamorena[34] and acknowledge that Santamorena relied upon Hutchinson for same,[35] they fail to mention that the Supreme Court of Georgia has explicitly adopted this proposition. Indeed, in Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Service Board,[36] our Supreme Court relied upon both Hutchinson and Santamorena to explain that—unlike other subsections within the GTCA’s exceptions provision—the so-called assault-and-battery exception “is not limited in application to acts taken by a State officer or employee but covers all losses resulting from the torts enumerated therein” and “[t]he focus, therefore, is not on the duty allegedly breached by the State but on the act causing the underlying loss regardless of who committed the act.”[37] We are, of course, bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia.[38] So, to the extent the Beasleys ask us to abandon this interpretation of the statute and overrule this progeny of cases, we are not at liberty to do so given our Supreme Court’s explicit adoption and approval of same.[39] (c) Legislative “Purpose.” Finally, the Beasleys contend that if we adopt their “interpretation” of the GTCA, doing so would “enhance” rather than “hamper” the “legislative purpose” of the statute. This is, of course, just an invitation to depart from the plain meaning of the statute and adopt their preferred policy preference.[40] We decline to do so. And more importantly, for the same reasons given in Division 3 (b) supra—i.e., our Supreme Court’s binding precedent—this argument is likewise a nonstarter. For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity. Judgment affirmed. Mercier and Colvin, JJ., concur.
