McMillian, Justice. Santiago James Williams appeals his convictions for the murders of Andrew Steven Coleman and Martial “Montrell” Washington. His sole contention is that he is entitled to a new trial because the State’s key witness’s post-trial testimony amounts to newly discovered evidence. We disagree and affirm.[1] The evidence at trial showed that on August 30, 2006, as Williams and others, including Malcolm Bostick, Marcus Fennell, and Gabriel Gulley, were drinking and taking drugs, they discussed the possibility of robbing and killing Coleman. Fennell arranged a meeting with Coleman at a nearby park that night. At the park, Williams and Fennell initiated a drug buy with Coleman and Washington, who arrived together in Coleman’s car, while the others stood by. After the drugs traded hands, Williams shot Coleman. Bostick then ran over and shot Washington. The attackers briefly searched the car, and the group dispersed. Coleman and Washington succumbed to their gunshot wounds. Williams, Bostick, and Fennell were tried separately, with Williams tried first. Gulley moved out of state after the crimes, was never charged in relation to the murders, and testified for the State at Williams’s trial. So that Gulley would not need to travel again for the other two trials, the trial court allowed Gulley’s testimony to be preserved through a video deposition the week after Williams’s trial. In his sole enumeration of error, Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting him a new trial based on newly discovered evidence from Gulley’s post-trial deposition testimony. To obtain a new trial under OCGA § 5-5-23 based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show: first, that the evidence came to his knowledge after his trial; second, that the failure to discover the evidence sooner was not due to his lack of due diligence; third, that the evidence is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict; fourth, that the evidence is admissible and not cumulative only; fifth, an affidavit of the witness or an explanation for its absence; and sixth, that the effect of the evidence would be more than to impeach the witness’s credibility. See Wimberly v. State, 302 Ga. 321, 326 (3) (806 SE2d 599) (2017) (citing Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 491 (1) (271 SE2d 792) (1980)). A defendant fails to meet his burden if he cannot satisfy one of these requirements, and “a trial court’s ruling on such a motion will not be reversed unless it affirmatively appears that the court abused its discretion.” Glover v. State, 296 Ga. 13, 15 (2) (764 SE2d 826) (2014) (cleaned up). Gulley’s deposition testimony was largely the same as his trial testimony, except that during the deposition, Gulley mentioned that he and the other perpetrators spent time with two others named Brian and Gary after the murders. In the order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court concluded that “[t]he discrepancies that defendant points out are relatively minor and do not lead to a conclusion that the witness knowingly gave false testimony.”[2] We see no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Williams failed to show that he was entitled to a new trial. The State elicited the so-called new evidence at Gulley’s deposition by simply asking him what happened, which Williams was also able to do at trial on cross-examination but did not. Williams’s failure to sufficiently cross-examine shows a lack of due diligence. See Smith v. Smith, 293 Ga. 563, 566 (5) (748 SE2d 456) (2013) (in divorce case using same test for newly discovered evidence, husband lacked due diligence because he did not cross-examine wife at trial); Timberlake, 246 Ga. at 491-92 (1); Joyner v. State, 267 Ga. App. 309, 312 (3) (599 SE2d 286) (2004) (lack of due diligence where evidence could have been obtained earlier, such as on cross-examination). Plus, Gulley’s deposition testimony “would only have had the effect of impeaching” his credibility as a witness by demonstrating inconsistencies between his testimony at trial and his deposition, which the trial court correctly concluded were “relatively minor.” See Wimberly, 302 Ga. at 327 (3); Glover, 296 Ga. at 15 (2). Therefore, Williams also failed to make the requisite showing that the evidence was so material that it would probably produce a different verdict. See Wimberly, 302 Ga. at 326 (3). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for new trial. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., not participating.
