Peterson, Justice. Rebecca Dawn Schoicket was granted an out-of-time appeal to appeal the judgment of conviction entered on her guilty plea. In addition to challenging her sentence on one count, she argues that the out-of-time appeal she was granted meant that the trial court should have granted her motion for leave to file an otherwise untimely motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Schoicket argues that Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363 (834 SE2d 769) (2019), recognized that it would be a “logical extension” of our case law to permit the filing of such a motion, because we have stated that the grant of an out-of- time appeal starts the post-conviction process “anew.” Schoicket is correct in that appraisal of our case law, but we decline to extend it to afford her the relief she seeks. As the special concurrence to Collier explained, this Court ignored contrary precedent and statutes in creating out of whole cloth the motion for out-of-time appeal in the trial court, see id. at 379 (Peterson, J., concurring specially), which is the procedural vehicle that forms the foundation of the case law on which Schoicket relies. And following our decision in Collier, we have retreated from broad statements about the effect of a granted out-of-time appeal in order to avoid dispensing unwarranted windfalls. See Kelly v. State, 311 Ga. 827, 830-831 (860 SE2d 740) (2021). A defendant is granted an out-of-time appeal when she shows that her counsel’s ineffective assistance frustrated her right to timely appeal by unprofessionally failing to advise her of that right or by failing to file an appeal she desired. Allowing such a grant to then permit the movant to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea would be an unwarranted windfall with potentially profound consequences for our criminal justice system. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Schoicket’s motion for leave to pursue such relief. However, because we agree with Schoicket that the sentencing court erred in sentencing as to one count, we vacate that count and remand for resentencing. The record shows the following. In October 2016, with the assistance of counsel, Schoicket pleaded guilty to felony murder and other charges in Walton County Superior Court.[1] More than a year later, in December 2017, Schoicket filed a pro se motion for an out- of-time appeal. She subsequently amended that motion and also filed a pro se motion to withdraw her guilty plea. After being appointed new counsel, Schoicket moved for leave to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Schoicket’s motion for an out-of-time appeal, but denied the motion for leave. Despite that ruling, Schoicket’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea the day after the hearing. Schoicket now appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion for leave to file a motion to withdraw her plea.[2] 1. Schoicket argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for leave to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea because the granted out-of-time appeal permitted her to start the postconviction process “anew.” She relies on certain statements in our prior decisions, including one in the special concurrence in Collier that “a logical extension of’ prior statements of this Court would be that a granted out-of-time appeal authorizes the filing of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See Collier, 307 Ga. at 380 (Peterson, J., concurring specially). We agree that permitting such a motion would be a logical extension of our precedent that invented certain post-conviction remedies. Although we should not have invented those remedies in the first place, we decline to invent additional remedies that might further complicate our post-conviction jurisprudence. We begin with a little background. The traditional rule is that motions to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed in the term of court in which the defendant was sentenced, see Brooks v. State, 301 Ga. 748, 751 (2) (804 SE2d 1) (2017), the time period under the common law during which trial courts could generally reconsider their judgments, see Moon v. State, 287 Ga. 304, 305-306 (696 SE2d 55) (2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring). This well-established rule is merely the application of a bedrock common-law principle that applies equally to other criminal motions and in civil cases. See Gray v. State, 310 Ga. 259, 263 (3) (850 SE2d 36) (2020) (common-law rule, which Georgia courts have long-applied, provides that “in absence of a statute providing otherwise, the general principle obtains that a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose was begun during that term” (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted)); see also Smith v. State, 298 Ga. 487, 487-488 (782 SE2d 17) (2016) (rule applicable even if motion construed as motion to withdraw guilty plea or motion for arrest of judgment); Tremble v. Tremble, 288 Ga. 666, 668 (1) (706 SE2d 453) (2011) (applying rule to second divorce decree entered after expiration of term of court in which first decree was entered). This common law rule, as applied to motions to withdraw guilty pleas, remains in force today. See Gray, 310 Ga. at 262 (2) (common-law rules remain in effect “except where they have changed by express statutory enactment or by necessary implication”) (citation and punctuation omitted). When a defendant seeks to withdraw her guilty plea after the expiration of that term of court, she must pursue such relief through habeas corpus proceedings. See Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865, 865 (561 SE2d 119) (2002). Applying this traditional rule, Schoicket’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, as a stand-alone motion, would be barred as untimely because it is undisputed that she sought to file it more than a year after the term of court in which the judgment of conviction was entered. See OCGA § 15-6-3 (2) (B) (the terms of court for the Superior Court of Walton County commence on the “[f]irst and second Mondays in February, May, August, and November”). Schoicket argues that she is permitted to file her otherwise untimely motion because the grant of an out-of-time appeal essentially restarted the post-conviction process. Her arguments are rooted in statements made in Ponder v. State, 260 Ga. 840 (400 SE2d 922) (1991), and Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 541 (422 SE2d 543) (1992). But we already have begun to trim back those broad statements. Ponder is the primary case for expanding the record upon the grant of an out-of-time appeal in order to consider previously unraised claims. There, we held that a defendant who is granted an out-of-time appeal should be allowed to file a motion for new trial in order to raise ineffectiveness claims against trial counsel for the first time. See 260 Ga. at 840-841 (1). This Court explained that the grant of an out-of-time appeal should be seen as permission to pursue the postconviction remedies which would be available at the same time as a direct appeal . . . and constitutes permission to pursue appropriate post-conviction remedies, including a motion for new trial. Id. at 841 (1). We note, however, that even by its own terms, Ponder authorized only “appropriate” post-conviction remedies. In Maxwell, we extended Ponder to allow a defendant to pursue a second motion for new trial with appellate counsel despite the fact that the defendant’s first motion for new trial, filed by trial counsel, had been denied. See Maxwell, 262 Ga. at 542-543 (3), disapproved by Kelly, 311 Ga. at 830-831. We stated in Maxwell that the second motion for new trial was permitted because the grant of an out-of- time appeal “start[s] the post-conviction process anew.” Id. at 542543 (3). Allowing a second motion for new trial in Maxwell was an “appropriate” remedy because trial counsel could not have been expected to raise ineffectiveness claims against himself in the first motion for new trial. See Garland v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 203 (657 SE2d 842) (2008); see also Hood v. State, 282 Ga. 462, 463 (651 SE2d 88) (2007) (“[A] lawyer may not ethically present a claim that [the lawyer] provided a client with ineffective assistance of counsel[.]“). We readily acknowledge that our statements in Ponder and Maxwell would naturally lead to the conclusion that, upon the grant of an out-of-time appeal, a defendant who pleaded guilty should be able to file a motion to withdraw that plea, just as a defendant who went to trial can file a motion for new trial.[3] But in Kelly we retreated from what Ponder and Maxwell said, holding that the grant of an out-of-time appeal does not actually start the post-conviction process “anew”; instead, it merely “restore[s] the defendant to the position he occupied at the time he forfeited his right to appeal (or seek other post-conviction relief).” Kelly, 311 Ga. at 830-831. And as Justice Warren recognized in Kelly, and as Ponders core holding teaches us, remedies for ineffective assistance of counsel should be tailored to the particular violation. See Kelly, 311 Ga. at 833 (Warren, J., concurring specially) (“[T]he remedy this Court provided in Maxwell was too broad because it exceeded that which was required to remedy the deprivation of Maxwell’s appellate rights because of an alleged constitutional violation (i.e., ineffective assistance of counsel).”); Ponder, 260 Ga. at 842 (2) (allowing motion for new trial to be filed upon grant of out-of-time appeal because appellate counsel did not have the opportunity to raise ineffectiveness claims against trial counsel until after the time for an appeal had passed). Any suggestion now that the grant of an out-of-time appeal starts the post-conviction process completely “anew” fails to recognize our holding in Kelly, which narrowed Ponder to avoid dispensing unwarranted windfalls to would-be appellants.[4] And the imprecise statement in Maxwell that the grant of an out-of-time appeal “start[s] the post-conviction process anew,” if applied beyond the context of that case, ignores Ponder‘s teaching that only “appropriate” remedies are available upon the grant of a motion for out-of-time appeal. Such a windfall would arise from allowing a defendant to file an otherwise untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea simply because she was granted an out-of-time appeal. As discussed above, longstanding precedent dictates that a defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after the expiration of the term of court in which she was sentenced can do so only in habeas. See Davis, 274 Ga. at 865. And because of this precedent, Georgia does not recognize untimely standalone motions to withdraw a guilty plea. Indeed, we have explicitly rejected efforts to file motions for out-of- time withdrawal of guilty pleas, notwithstanding that we allow motions for out-of-time appeals. See, e.g., Sims v. State, Case No. S21A0587, 2021 WL 3727797, at *2 n.5 (Ga. Aug. 24, 2021) (citing Brooks, 301 Ga. at 751 (2) n.7, and Foster v. State, 294 Ga. 400, 401 (754 SE2d 78) (2014)).[5] It would be strange indeed to prohibit a standalone motion for out-of-time withdrawal of a guilty plea — and direct such a movant to habeas — but then allow precisely the same remedy to another defendant based purely on a demonstration that her separate right to appeal had been frustrated. For decades now, our post-conviction jurisprudence has been described as a “tangle” of “confusing” procedural rules. See Maxwell, 262 Ga. at 543 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part). To untangle it ourselves would be difficult and seemingly disruptive to the system that has developed around it,[6] and we are not called upon in this case to begin to sort out that mess. That we are not doing so today, however, does not require us to add to that mess. And to rule in Schoicket’s favor would make the mess far worse; all defined limits on when a defendant could file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea would be erased.[7] A defendant who pleaded guilty long ago and changed her mind after many years in prison might be able to challenge the voluntariness of a plea if she can show that her right to an appeal was frustrated by her plea counsel.[8] And if that were allowed, the burden would then shift onto the State to prove the voluntariness of a very old plea when it would otherwise be on the defendant. See Kennedy v. Hines, 305 Ga. 7, 9 & n.2 (2) (823 SE2d 306) (2019) (while habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that her guilty plea was not “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,” the State has the burden to prove voluntariness on direct appeal). Given that the passage of years can result in records lost or destroyed, and witnesses may forget, move, or die, the State may not be able to make this showing even when a plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. And if the State fails to do so (and some sort of laches principle is deemed not to apply), the defendant will win an argument she would otherwise lose (and indeed might not be able to raise due to the applicable statute of limitations, see OCGA § 9-14-42 (c)) in habeas. Worse still, the passage of many years could then make it virtually impossible for the State to try the defendant before a jury. This would result in windfall upon windfall for the defendant. To be sure, there are competing concerns involved in postconviction relief procedures — addressing violations of a defendant’s constitutional rights on the one hand, and ensuring finality on the other. But the General Assembly has enacted habeas statutes balancing these competing concerns. See OCGA § 9-14-42 (a), (c) (habeas petition alleging that felony conviction involved “substantial denial” of constitutional rights must be brought within four years). We lack the authority to substitute our policy preferences for those of the General Assembly and thereby allow a defendant to skirt the legislatively established process. Cf. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) (829 SE2d 348) (2019) (overruling a judicially created rule altering the legislature’s jurisdictional requirements for interlocutory appeals); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) (827 SE2d 892) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary exclusion rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Evidence Code); see also Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 842 (4) (848 SE2d 882) (2020) (“[Policy] considerations are best left to be weighed by our General Assembly.”). The dissents argue that our prior holdings support the creation of this additional remedy, but they point only to statements in those cases that were not essential to the holdings. See, e.g., Maxwell, 262 Ga. at 542-543 (3). It is, of course, axiomatic that a decision’s holding is limited to the factual context of the case being decided and the issues that context necessarily raises. Language that sounds like a holding — but actually exceeds the scope of the case’s factual context — is not a holding no matter how much it sounds like one. Ga. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency v. City of Sandy Springs, 337 Ga. App. 340, 340 n.1 (788 SE2d 74) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). Our recent cases have re-affirmed Ponders teaching that only “appropriate” remedies should be granted upon a showing of constitutionally ineffective counsel, yet the dissents’ approach is not tailored to remedying the ineffective assistance that frustrated Schoicket’s right to appeal in the first place. This is not how the United States Supreme Court tells us to remedy Sixth Amendment violations. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (101 SCt 665, 66 LE2d 564) (1981) (“Cases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.”). The dissents correctly point out that, in departing from the holding of Neal v. State, 232 Ga. 96 (205 SE2d 284) (1974), we made the policy decision to create a new out-of-time appeal procedural vehicle, and that we elected in Collier to leave that vehicle in place. But the dissents go astray in suggesting that this means we must necessarily continue making up new policy so long as it follows logically from the policy we’ve already created. The criminal justice system — and especially the structure of our public defender system — has evolved over time to comply with the requirements we have created. The General Assembly has appropriated substantial funds to make that system work. That we did not in Collier undo all of this does not mean that we should keep inventing new requirements for the legal system to comply with. The dissents argue that we should continue trail-blazing because our invented remedy should be made available in an even- handed manner to trial-convicted and plea-convicted defendants alike. But where do we stop? The dissents do not say. And our inventions have never purported to be even-handed; a motion for out-of-time appeal can be granted only if one particular kind of ineffective assistance of counsel claim succeeds, and all sorts of other ineffectiveness claims not raised on direct appeal can be brought only in habeas. For these reasons, we hold today that a granted motion for out- of-time appeal does not confer a right to file an otherwise-untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Schoicket’s motion for leave.[9] We therefore deny her request to remand this case for consideration of the merits of her motion to withdraw. Her remedy, if any, lies in habeas corpus.[10] 2. Schoicket argues that she should not have received a 10-year sentence, running concurrently to the life sentence on the murder count, for tampering with evidence (Count 7), because that count was a misdemeanor. The State concedes this error, which is properly raised on appeal of a conviction, and our review of the record confirms the parties’ contentions. Count 7 charged Schoicket, as the accused, with knowingly concealing a pistol with the “intent to obstruct the prosecution of said accused.” Because she was found guilty of tampering with evidence in her own case, she was guilty only of a misdemeanor and should not have received a 10-year sentence. See OCGA § 16-10-94 (a), (c); see also Byers v. State, 311 Ga. 259, 268 (3) (857 SE2d 447) (2021) (“A person who tampers with evidence of [her] own crime is guilty of only a misdemeanor.”); White v. State, 287 Ga. 713, 717 (1) (d) (699 SE2d 291) (2010) (felony sentence is permitted only when a person tampers with evidence involving apprehension or prosecution of a person other than himself). Accordingly, we vacate the sentence on Count 7 and remand for resentencing on it. Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded. All the Justices concur, except Ellington and Colvin, JJ., who dissent as to Division 1. Ellington, Justice, dissenting in part. In his special concurrence in Collier v. State, Justice Peterson posited that it “would appear to be merely a logical extension of statements we have previously made” to hold that “a granted motion for out-of-time appeal from a guilty plea authorizes not only an appeal but also a motion to withdraw the guilty plea[.]“[11] I agree, although we stopped short of saying so in the majority opinion in Collier because the issue was not then before the Court. Indeed, I would go further and say that such a holding is the logical result, not merely of some of our prior statements, but of our prior holdings, which involved the application of federal and state constitutional law and state statutory law. Now that the issue is squarely presented for our decision, the majority arbitrarily declines to extend to guilty-plea convictions the practice that has long been available for trial convictions – that a granted out-of-time appeal constitutes permission, not just to proceed directly to review by an appellate court, but to start the post-conviction process anew in the court of conviction. In light of the underlying principles concerning post-conviction remedies, there is no reasonable basis on which to treat guilty-plea defendants differently from similarly situated trial-convicted defendants. I therefore respectfully dissent as to Division 1 of the majority opinion. Under Georgia law, a criminal defendant has an unqualified right to appeal directly from a judgment entered on a guilty plea.[12] Compliance with the statutory deadline for filing a notice of appeal is required to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court.[13] Upon a finding by the trial court of the county of a prisoner’s current confinement (the habeas court) that the prisoner’s right to a direct appeal was frustrated by the ineffective assistance of counsel, the habeas court may allow an out-of-time appeal under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, OCGA §§ 9-14-40 et seq.[14] In 1974, this Court held that the Act provided an adequate post-conviction remedy to a prisoner seeking relief upon a claim arising from the substantial denial of rights guaranteed by the federal or state constitutions or by the statute laws of the state, including, . . . the denial of the right of appeal or of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Neal v. State, 232 Ga. 96, 96 (205 SE2d 284) (1974) (citations omitted).[15] As we observed in Collier, for decades we have allowed an alternative method to co-exist for a defendant to obtain an out-of- time appeal from a judgment of conviction, despite the principle that “courts have no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements imposed by statute.” Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363, 371 (1) (834 SE2d 769) (2019), quoting Gable v. State, 290 Ga. 81, 85 (2) (b) (720 SE2d 170) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). While at times questioning the propriety of doing so, we allowed this alternative track, which proceeds in the trial court where the defendant was tried and sentenced and which, like the habeas track, excuses a defendant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal, because the required finding – that the defendant’s right to a direct appeal was frustrated by the ineffective assistance of counsel – “is a violation of constitutional magnitude.” Collier, 307 Ga. at 371 (2). We have consistently deemed the grant of an out-of-time appeal to be “the functional equivalent of the entry of a judgment,” even after three Justices joined in Justice Peterson’s special concurrence in Collier, questioning whether the out-of-time appeal process should be maintained. Pounds v. State, 309 Ga. 376, 379 n.5 (2) (b) (846 SE2d 48 (2020).[16] Because the time allowed to initiate post-conviction proceedings begins to run when a judgment of conviction is entered, the grant of an out-of-time appeal, as the functional equivalent of the entry of the judgment, serves to “reset” the trigger date for the time allowed for post-conviction proceedings. See id. at 379 (2) (b); Lay v. State, 305 Ga. 715, 715 n.1 (827 SE2d 671) (2019). That is why we have said that the grant of an out-of-time appeal permits a defendant to start the post-conviction process anew.[17] From our earliest cases on this issue, permission to file an out-of-time appeal included permission to file a motion for a new trial.[18] The defendant’s motion for a new trial did not need to address trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in the failure to perfect an appeal that the defendant desired to pursue, because the trial court necessarily made that determination in granting the request for an out-of-time appeal. A motion for a new trial filed after a defendant was granted an out-of-time appeal could address other aspects of the effectiveness of trial counsel. Moreover, the defendant could raise issues as diverse as asking the trial court to weigh the evidence as the “13th juror”;[19] to consider questions of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in discovery;[20] to consider questions of improper communications with jurors;[21] etc. Now we are tasked with deciding whether, in the case of guilty- plea convictions, permission for the defendant “to start the post- conviction process anew” includes the right to move to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea. That is, is there a second track in the court of conviction for obtaining out-of-time post-conviction relief from a guilty plea, in addition to the habeas track available in the court of confinement?[22] The majority opinion says, “no.” Certainly issues like the weight of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and improper communications with jurors are not small stakes in the arena of constitutional due-process and fair-trial rights. But a motion to withdraw a guilty plea often goes, as in this case, to the very heart of the validity of the waiver of numerous constitutional protections through the entry of a guilty plea.[23] I fail to see a principled reason to deny guilty-plea defendants access to the procedural tool we created. If, as the majority opinion theorizes, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is filed, pursuant to a granted out- of-time appeal, many years after the plea, and lost or destroyed records and dead or forgetful witnesses hinder the State in carrying its burden of proving that a guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, it should be short work for the State to establish the defense of prejudicial delay. See Maj. Op. at 10-11; Collier, 307 Ga. at 374-375 (2). Our judicially created out-of-time appeal procedure has presented Georgia courts with many confounding questions over several decades. At multiple points, we could have retracted our recognition of the out-of-time appeal procedural vehicle and once again adhered to our conclusion in Neal that the General Assembly in the Habeas Corpus Act provided an adequate remedy – and the exclusive one[24] – for the right of appeal frustrated by the ineffective assistance of counsel.[25] As the majority opinion intimates with its citation to Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) (829 SE2d 348) (2019), and as Justice Colvin persuasively explicates in her dissent, we have the power to do so. See Maj. Op. at 11. In his special concurrence in Collier, Justice Peterson was rightly critical of the Court’s improper, if “well-intentioned,” incursion into policy-setting territory but warned that unweaving our “tangled mess” of judicially created post-conviction remedies could be “unduly disruptive to the system that has built up around” motions for out-of-time appeals. See Collier, 307 Ga. at 379 (Peterson, J. concurring specially). And the majority opinion now insists that this Court lacks the authority “to substitute our policy preferences for those of the General Assembly and thereby allow a defendant to skirt the legislatively established process.” Maj. Op. at 14. Yet, by allowing out-of-time appeals, we have, repeatedly, already substituted our policy preferences for those of the General Assembly and allowed defendants to skirt the legislatively- established habeas process. And in Collier this Court unanimously opted once again not to terminate the practice. In my view, Schoicket is not asking that we “mak[e] up new policy” and “invent [an] additional remed[y],” as the majority opinion assumes. Schoicket is merely asking that we recognize that the parallel post- conviction process we have already invented includes guilty-plea convictions. Limiting the effect of a granted out-of-time appeal for guilty-plea defendants, because of practical considerations, while continuing to allow trial courts to permit trial-convicted defendants to start the post-conviction process anew, because of amorphous interests in stability and because the General Assembly has tolerated that scheme and indeed “appropriated substantial funds to make that system work,” is no less setting policy than it was to permit the procedure in the first place. See Maj. Op. at17. If we must continue to wait for the General Assembly to “save us from ourselves” (as we have been waiting for decades),[26] at least we can ensure that access to the misbegotten procedure is provided in an even-handed manner. If we are unwilling to do so, we should do as Justice Colvin suggests in her dissent and fix the problem outright. The General Assembly is fully capable of resolving how to allocate funds to make the system work. Indeed, the General Assembly would be freed from having to appropriate, in addition to funds to make the post-conviction system work as it intended when it adopted the Habeas Corpus Act over 50 years ago, additional substantial funds to make our judicially-created parallel system work. I question too whether we as the judiciary can do nothing to ameliorate this tangled mess, at least partially, short of entirely abolishing the procedure. Georgia’s uniform court rules already provide a useful checklist for plea colloquies that incorporate many elements embodied in decisional law of what a defendant must understand in order for a waiver of fair-trial rights to be knowing.[27] Trial courts routinely include in such colloquies the statutory mandate that, before a trial court accepts a guilty plea, the defendant be informed of the four-year (for felonies) or one-year (for misdemeanors) limits, adopted in 2004, for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.[28] If the General Assembly is not inclined to act to entirely clean up the mess we have created, at the very least we could ameliorate some of the issues by adopting a court rule that, before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court should inform the defendant on the record that her ability to file a timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea ends on the last day of the term of court;[29] to specify that date; to inform the defendant that she has a right to a direct appeal; and to specify the date by which a notice of appeal must be filed. In addition, trial courts could be required to inform a defendant that plea counsel is required to represent the defendant, unless either another attorney is substituted in place of plea counsel or plea counsel is allowed by court order to withdraw as counsel, until the later of the end of the term of court or the last day to file a notice of appeal;[30] that plea counsel is required to avoid procedural default of those remedies if the defendant desires to pursue them;[31] and that the defendant is not entitled to file pleadings on her own behalf while she is still represented by counsel.[32] If a defendant was provided this information, it would be less unfair to rest the responsibility for a procedural default on the defendant’s own shoulders, and the remedies created by statute (a motion in arrest of judgment[33] and habeas[34]) would suffice. I respectfully dissent as to Division 1. S21A0840. Schoicket v. The State. Colvin, Justice, dissenting in part. After we correctly ruled in Neal v. State, 232 Ga. 96 (205 SE2d 284) (1974) that a prisoner seeking to file an out-of-time direct appeal must do so in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, id. at 96, this Court “created out of whole cloth . . . a tangled mess of post- conviction jurisprudence” that permitted prisoners to instead pursue post-conviction relief through a standalone motion for an out-of-time direct appeal in a court of conviction, see Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363, 379 (834 SE2d 769) (2019) (Peterson, J., concurring specially). Today, a majority of this Court acknowledges once again that we should never have invented this procedural vehicle, which has caused headache after headache as courts seek to define the contours of a made-up post-conviction proceeding. See Maj. Op. at 2, 4. Nevertheless, the majority chooses to trim the edges of our jurisprudence rather than to address the root cause of the problem. In my view, it is inappropriate for us to continue waiting for the General Assembly “to save us from ourselves.” Collier, 307 Ga. at 379 (Peterson, J., concurring specially). It is our responsibility, not the General Assembly’s, to fix our own mistakes, and this is particularly true when, as here, the General Assembly clearly addressed the issue more than 50 years ago by providing an adequate and exclusive vehicle for prisoners to obtain post- conviction relief from a substantial denial of their constitutional rights – namely, a habeas petition. See Neal, 232 Ga. at 96 (“Under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, there is provided an adequate post- conviction remedy to a prisoner seeking relief upon a claim arising from the substantial denial of rights guaranteed by the Federal or State Constitutions . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also OCGA § 9-1441 (“[T]his article provides the exclusive procedure for seeking a writ of habeas corpus for persons whose liberty is being restrained by virtue of a sentence imposed against them by a state court of record.”). I see no good reason to require the General Assembly to pass new legislation stating that it really meant what it said when it passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, OCGA §§ 9-14-40 et seq. The law, as written, governs. In explaining the decision not to take any steps toward untangling our post-conviction jurisprudence ourselves, the majority appears to be under the impression that eliminating the standalone out-of-time appeal procedure might be “disruptive to the system that has developed around it,” and that this Court need not eliminate the procedural vehicle to avoid “add[ing] to th[e] mess.” See Maj. Op. at 12-13 & n.6. No doubt, reverting to the status quo as of 1974, when we issued Neal, would disrupt the system to some extent. Indeed, that would be the point – to follow the law set out by the General Assembly rather than the conflicting law we invented. I disagree, however, that the majority has avoided adding to the mess by trimming back some of our precedent. As Justice Ellington notes in his partial dissent, the majority has declined to follow the clear logical import of our precedent. As a result, the majority has created an even more inconsistent legal landscape that favors prisoners found guilty at trial over those who entered a guilty plea – all in an effort to “avoid dispensing unwarranted windfalls.” See Maj. Op. at 2, 10. Let me suggest, however, that receiving an out-of-time appeal without having first prevailed in a habeas proceeding is itself an “unwarranted windfall” – given that the General Assembly did not provide a vehicle for prisoners to seek such relief in the court of conviction and a majority of this Court appears to agree that granting such relief in an “invented” post- conviction proceeding does not comport with the law. See Maj. Op. at 2, 4. That being the case, we should follow Neal rather than our made-up subsequent precedent that has caused no shortage of difficulties. I agree with the majority that “[w]e lack the authority to substitute our policy preferences for those of the General Assembly and thereby allow a defendant to skirt the legislatively established process.” Maj. Op. at 15. Indeed, that is the reason I believe we ought to fix the problem outright and require prisoners seeking an out-of-time appeal and associated remedies to use the habeas procedures that the General Assembly has afforded. Barring that, however, we should follow the logic of our prior holdings as Justice Ellington suggests. Doing so would at least ensure that similarly situated prisoners are treated equally, whether their convictions resulted from a guilty plea or a jury verdict, and that trial courts, litigants, and the public at large can follow our reasoning. Given a choice between the majority’s decision to unfairly narrow our post-Neal precedent and Justice Ellington’s consistent application of that precedent, I would favor the latter approach. In my view, however, neither approach fully comports with the governing law. Accordingly, I separately dissent with respect to Division 1.
