Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge. Daniel Vallejo, who was convicted of child molestation following a jury trial, appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial. Vallejo contends that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of a prior allegation of molestation made by the victim and that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. Finding no error, we affirm Vallejo’s conviction. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence presented at trial shows that Vallejo moved in with the victim and her mother in August 2013. The victim, who was 15 years old at the time of the abuse, testified that Vallejo began having sex with her in October or November of 2013, and that the abuse, which included vaginal intercourse, continued until October 2014, when she made an outcry to her school guidance counselor. The counselor contacted the police, and Vallejo was arrested. Vallejo was indicted for two counts of aggravated child molestation (for oral and anal sodomy) and one count of child molestation (for vaginal intercourse). At his 2019 trial, the jury found him guilty of child molestation and not guilty of the remaining counts. Vallejo filed a motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel. The trial court denied Vallejo’s motion (as amended) after a hearing. This appeal followed. 1. Vallejo first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding what Vallejo claims was a prior false allegation of child molestation made by the victim against her father. We disagree. “In prosecutions for child molestation . . . , Georgia’s Rape Shield Statute prohibits testimony regarding a complaining witness’s past sexual behavior[, but] it does not prohibit testimony regarding previous false allegations by the complaining witness.” State v. Parks, 350 Ga. App. 799, 811 (2) (830 SE2d 284) (2019), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Hill, ___ Ga. App. ___ (2) (b) (___ SE2d ___), No. A21A1184, 2021 WL 4316022 (2021) (punctuation omitted).[1] See also OCGA § 24-4-412 (a). Before such evidence can be admitted, however, the trial court must make a threshold determination outside the presence of the jury that a reasonable probability of falsity exists. In this context, a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Defendants have the burden of coming forward with evidence at the hearing to establish a reasonable probability that the victim had made a prior false accusation of sexual misconduct. Williams v. State, 266 Ga. App. 578, 580 (1) (597 SE2d 621) (2004) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Parks, 350 Ga. App. at 811-812 (2). “We will not disturb the trial court’s determination on this threshold issue absent an abuse of discretion.” Cheek v. State, 265 Ga. App. 15, 17 (2) (593 SE2d 55) (2003). See also Parks, 350 Ga. App. at 813 (2). Before trial, Vallejo filed a “Motion to Admit False Allegations of Sexual Misconduct by the Alleged Victim,” contending that the victim and her mother previously had falsely accused the victim’s father[2] of child molestation. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which Vallejo presented the testimony of a former sheriff’s office investigator and the victim’s former stepmother. The investigator testified that, in 2005, when the victim was six years old, her mother contacted the sheriff’s office to report the victim’s outcry against her father. The mother reported that the victim told her that the victim’s father “would touch her vagina on the top of her clothes and he would kiss her when he was doing that and told her not to tell.” During a forensic interview, the victim disclosed that her father touched her vagina through her clothing numerous times and kissed her neck and ear. The victim, unprompted by the interviewer, picked up a doll, pointed to its vaginal area, and said, “That’s where he touches me.” The victim also indicated that her mother told her that dolls would be used in the interview. The investigator testified that the mother telling the victim about the dolls was “odd” and raised a “red flag.” However, she also testified that she believed the victim and her mother. The victim’s father denied the allegations. Although the State declined to prosecute, the investigator testified that the district attorney also did not believe that the child was lying. The victim’s former stepmother testified that the victim’s father had not known the victim existed until the victim was around two years old. After a test established his paternity, the victim’s father legitimated the victim, began paying child support, and had visitation every other weekend. The former stepmother testified that she never saw any evidence that the victim’s father had acted inappropriately with the victim and never noticed the victim was afraid to be home alone with her father. In fact, according to the former stepmother, in the weeks before the victim’s outcry, the victim “was getting more comfortable and she wanted to come to our house. And wanted to stay and stay longer[.]” The former stepmother claimed that the victim expressed an interest in living with or spending more time with her father and former stepmother but the victim’s mother told the stepmother “ that would never happen[ ].” The stepmother reported this conversation to the investigator following the victim’s outcry. After the hearing, the trial court denied Vallejo’s motion, finding that the evidence presents only “a possibility of falsehood as opposed to a reasonable probability of falsehood.” In the order denying Vallejo’s motion for new trial, the trial court again stated that it had considered the evidence presented at the hearing and found that Vallejo “had not carried his burden of showing a reasonable probability of falsity.” Vallejo argues that significant evidence of falsity was presented at the hearing and that the trial court abused its discretion in finding otherwise. Of course, “[a]n accused’s assertion that the accusations against him are false does not necessarily raise a reasonable probability of falsity.” Cheek, 265 Ga. App. at 17 (2). See also Parks, 350 Ga. App. at 812 (2). And “the fact that an accusation is not prosecuted” likewise “is insufficient to establish its falsity.” Williams, 266 Ga. App. at 581 (1). See also Parks, 350 Ga. App. at 812-813 (2). Nevertheless, Vallejo contends that there was significant additional evidence of falsity presented at the motion hearing. Relying on dubious inferences drawn from the investigator’s and former stepmother’s testimony, Vallejo maintains that the evidence shows that the victim’s mother had a motive to coach the victim into making false allegations against her father and that the victim was, in fact, coached. However, this argument goes to the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony; indeed, Vallejo has effectively asserted that the trial court should have credited the stepmother’s testimony over the investigator’s. This argument presents no ground for reversal. After observing the witnesses’ demeanor and considering their interests in the case, the trial court found the investigator’s testimony to be credible and concluded that the stepmother’s testimony “did not demand a finding of reasonable probability of falsity.” The testimony at the hearing supports the trial court’s finding that falsity was not established by a reasonable probability. See Williams, 266 Ga. App. at 580-581 (1) (upholding exclusion of evidence of alleged prior false statement where the trial court’s ruling was based in part on the court’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses the court observed in person before ruling on admissibility). See also Parks, 350 Ga. App. at 812-813 (2). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the alleged prior false allegation. We disagree with the dissent’s assertion that in State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 123 (2) (829 SE2d 367) (2019), the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the rule established in Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 137-138 (1) (377 SE2d 158) (1989), requiring the trial court to make a threshold determination that a reasonable probability of falsity exists before evidence of prior false allegations can be admitted. In Burns, the victim admitted that her prior allegation was false, 306 Ga. at 118, and the Supreme Court therefore did not discuss whether the threshold determination requirement remains good law. See id. at 119-126 (2)-(3).[3] The dissent’s reliance on our decision in Ray v. State, 356 Ga. App. 266 (841 SE2d 477) (2020) (“Ray III“), also is misplaced. In Ray v. State, 345 Ga. App. 522, 529 (4) (812 SE2d 97) (2018) (“Ray I“), overruled in part by Burns, 306 Ga. at 124 (2), we held that the trial court erred in excluding as irrelevant evidence that the victim’s aunt had made prior false claims of sexual abuse. We vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with the direction that “the trial court must make the necessary threshold determination regarding falsity.” Id. We further instructed the trial court that “[i]f a reasonable likelihood of falsity exists, evidence of the allegations is admissible, and [the defendant] is entitled to a new trial.” Id. As the dissent notes, at the time of the Burns decision, our decision in Ray I was before the Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of certiorari. In the order vacating our decision in Ray I and remanding the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of Burns, the Supreme Court stated that in Burns, it overruled the holding in Smith “that, as a matter of constitutional law, evidence of a victim’s prior false claims of sexual abuse is per se admissible in a sexual assault case ‘to attack the credibility of the prosecutrix and as substantive evidence tending to prove that the instant offense did not occur.’” State v. Ray, No. S18C1201, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 577, at *1 (Aug. 19, 2019) (“Ray II“) (quoting Smith, 259 Ga. at 137 (1)). The Supreme Court’s decision in Ray II did not refer to the threshold determination requirement established in Smith. See id. When we reconsidered Ray on remand, we focused on the Supreme Court’s overruling of the rule rendering prior false allegations of sexual abuse per se admissible. See Ray III, 356 Ga. App. at 266, 268-270. We described the issue “identified by our Supreme Court” in Ray II as “whether evidence of the deceased aunt’s prior false reports,” which the trial court had deemed inadmissible as irrelevant — without having conducted a determination as to whether there was a reasonable probability that they were false — “should be admissible under [OCGA § 24-4-403 ("Rule 403")].”[4] Id. at 268. We stated that in our previous opinion, we noted that “it may well be that testimony showing that the victim’s deceased aunt, who reported the crimes at issue, had previously made false claims of sexual abuse would be relevant to the veracity of the allegations here.” Id. at 268-269 (citation and punctuation omitted). We vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case with the direction that the trial court hold a hearing to determine “whether, under Rule 403, the probative value of evidence as to the victim’s aunt’s prior false accusation is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” Id. at 270. We agree with the dissent that, following Burns, trial courts must determine the admissibility of false-allegation evidence by applying “the familiar and usual rules of evidence.” See Burns, 306 Ga. at 124 (2). However, this procedure necessarily requires an initial determination of whether the prior allegations were, in fact, false (or, more precisely, that there was a reasonable probability that they were false). As noted previously, in Parks, 350 Ga. App. at 811 (2), we recognized that the constitutional holding of Smith had been overruled in Burns but that the evidentiary holding of Smith remains good law. In that context, we applied the threshold determination test. Id. at 811-812 (2). We believe our analysis was correct in Parks and that the threshold determination requirement remains good law after Burns, contrary to the dissent’s analysis.[5] 2. Vallejo contends alternatively that the victim’s prior allegation against her father was relevant to show the victim’s knowledge of sexual acts and her comfort level with the process of prosecution. Specifically, prior to trial, Vallejo filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of the victim’s “prior sexual assault by her biological father” for the purpose of “inform[ing] the jury that the alleged victim and her mother . . . have a ‘fund of a knowledge’ to make allegations — i.e. they have experience working with police, disclosing alleged abuse, and encouraging a prosecution of the same.” After a hearing, the trial court first found the Rape Shield Statute inapplicable to the evidence at issue, citing Lemacks v. State, 207 Ga. App. 160, 161 (427 SE2d 536) (1993), in support of its ruling. Second, relying on Blackwell v. State, 229 Ga. App. 452, 454 (2) (494 SE2d 269) (1997), the court observed that “Georgia courts recognize a ‘long-standing rule barring introduction of evidence of prior unrelated molestation’” and that one of the few exceptions to this rule occurs “where the evidence is offered to show other possible causes for the victim’s injuries or symptoms.” The trial court therefore ruled that if the State offered evidence of the victim’s injuries or symptoms allegedly caused by sexual abuse, Vallejo could offer evidence of the alleged prior sexual abuse to explain the injuries. Based on Lemacks and Blackwell, as well as OCGA §§ 24-4-401 and 24-4-403, the trial court barred the defense from offering evidence of the prior abuse “simply to explain” the victim’s “vocabulary or ‘fund of knowledge.’” However, the trial court allowed the defense to renew its request to offer evidence of the prior abuse if the State “opened the door to such evidence.” Vallejo argues that the trial court erred by relying on the “long-standing rule” referred to in Blackwell because that rule is based on an application of the rules of evidence as they existed prior to January 1, 2013, well before Vallejo’s trial. Vallejo also argues that the evidence of the victim’s prior allegation is admissible under the new Evidence Code. “The trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 750, 751 (2) (827 SE2d 879) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). Pretermitting whether the trial court erred by relying on either Lemacks or Blackwell,[6] the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence under OCGA §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-402, and 24-4-403. Under OCGA § 244401 (“Rule 401″), “relevant evidence” is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Although OCGA § 244402 provides that, generally, “all relevant evidence shall be admissible,” it also provides that “evidence which is not relevant shall not be admissible.” And even “relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 244403. State v. Stephens, 310 Ga. 57, 59 (1) (849 SE2d 459) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion by excluding irrelevant evidence.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Vallejo contends that if the victim was previously molested by her father, that fact would make it more probable that she would be aware of sexual acts. However, the victim’s description when she was six years old of her father’s acts was very different from the sexual acts she described at trial. At trial, the victim testified to the details of various sex acts in which Vallejo forced her to engage, including vaginal, anal, and oral sex. Contrary to Vallejo’s argument, evidence of the victim’s allegation made ten years prior to her outcry against Vallejo that her father had touched her vagina over her clothes would not have helped explain her knowledge of the multiple, detailed sexual acts that she described at trial. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence of the victim’s prior allegation of molestation by her father to establish her knowledge of sexual acts. Vallejo also contends that the victim’s knowledge of the process of investigating an allegation of molestation is relevant because it explains how she could have devised a plan to remove Vallejo from her life by making a false allegation against him. Vallejo argues that the evidence of the prior allegation would have undermined the victim’s credibility by explaining how a child could have fabricated the allegations against him. Contrary to Vallejo’s argument, evidence that the victim made an allegation of child molestation against her father at the age of six does not tend to (a) show how the victim, at the age of sixteen, would have the knowledge necessary to come up with a plan to falsely accuse Vallejo of molesting her or (b) otherwise call into question her credibility in that regard. Indeed, evidence that the victim had prior experience with the process of making an allegation of child molestation was wholly irrelevant to the issue of whether Vallejo committed the acts alleged by the victim and was thus properly excluded by the trial court. See Jones, 305 Ga. at 753 (2) (c) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding photograph that did not help determine whether the defendant or another man committed the crime). Even if the evidence that the victim had made a prior allegation of child molestation arguably bore some minimal relevance to Vallejo’s guilt in this case, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the minor probative value of any such evidence was “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay [or] waste of time,” which the trial court implicitly did by citing OCGA § 24-4-403 in its analysis. Consequently, even assuming the dissent is correct that the Rape Shield Statute does not bar the admission of the prior allegation evidence, the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence under the applicable evidentiary rules. 3. Vallejo alleges that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in three instances. To prevail on these claims, he must show both that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 694 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If an appellant fails to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test, “it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To establish deficient performance, an appellant “must overcome the strong presumption that his . . . counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct and show that his counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way” in light of all the circumstances and prevailing norms. Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, an appellant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694 (III) (B). “In reviewing a lower court’s determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings, which are upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous; however, we review the lower court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Washington v. State, 276 Ga. 655, 658 (3) (581 SE2d 518) (2003) (citation omitted). After reviewing Vallejo’s claims in accordance with these standards, we conclude that Vallejo has not met his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was ineffective. (a) Failure to object to the State’s comment on the victim’s knowledge of sexual acts. During closing argument, the State discussed the victim’s testimony regarding a specific act of oral sex in which Vallejo forced her to engage, and stated, “I know they grow up fast but that’s just way too much knowledge for a child.” Vallejo argues that his trial counsel’s failure to object to this comment and move either for a mistrial or to reopen the evidence to permit Vallejo to present evidence of the victim’s relationship with a classmate and of her prior abuse by her father amounted to deficient performance. As discussed in Division 2, prior to trial, Vallejo filed a pleading titled, “Notice of Defendant’s Intent to Introduce Acts of Prior Sexual Behavior.” In addition to seeking to admit evidence that the victim made a prior allegation of molestation against her biological father, Vallejo also sought to introduce evidence that DNA testing of the victim’s bed sheet showed that she had engaged in sexual activity with another male during the same time period in which she alleged Vallejo molested her. Vallejo further sought to admit evidence that he confronted the victim about having sex with a classmate. Finding the Rape Shield Statute applicable, the trial court excluded evidence of multiple sources of DNA on the bed sheet but ruled that if the State offered evidence obtained from the bed sheet at trial, Vallejo would be permitted to introduce evidence of the other DNA found on the bed sheet pursuant to the “source of evidence” exception to the Rape Shield Statute. The trial court allowed Vallejo to offer evidence that he and the victim had a conflict concerning her relationship with another student and that the victim made an outcry after Vallejo threatened to obtain her text message history, but prohibited Vallejo from offering any evidence of any sexual or other physical relationship between the victim and another student. Vallejo contends that if his trial counsel had objected to the State’s argument regarding the victim’s knowledge of sexual acts, the trial court “should have” either granted a mistrial or allowed Vallejo to reopen the evidence and present the results of the scientific testing of the victim’s bed sheet and evidence of the victim’s past allegations of molestation against her biological father. We do not agree. In prosecutions for aggravated child molestation and child molestation, Georgia’s Rape Shield Statute prohibits testimony regarding a complaining witness’s past sexual behavior, with limited exceptions. OCGA § 24-4-412. Those exceptions are: (1) Evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or complaining witness’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; (2) Evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or complaining witness’s sexual behavior with respect to the defendant if it supports an inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the complaining witness consented to the conduct complained of in the prosecution; (3) Evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or complaining witness’s sexual behavior with respect to the defendant or another person if offered by the prosecutor; and (4) Evidence whose [sic] exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. OCGA § 24-4-412 (b). Even if the evidence of the scientific testing of the bed sheet were relevant to the victim’s knowledge of sexual acts, it was inadmissible unless it fell within one of the limited exceptions in the Rape Shield Statute. See White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 118 (2) (823 SE2d 794) (2019) (no relevance exception to Rape Shield Statute). On appeal, Vallejo has not established that any exception to the Rape Shield Statute would have applied here if his trial counsel had objected to the prosecutor’s statement regarding the victim’s sexual knowledge and asked the trial court to reopen the evidence. Furthermore, as discussed in Division 2, evidence of the victim’s prior allegation against her father is not relevant to explain her knowledge of the sexual acts that she described at trial. Therefore, that evidence would not have been admissible even if Vallejo’s trial counsel had objected to the State’s argument regarding the victim’s sexual knowledge. “The failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.” White v. State, 307 Ga. 882, 889 (3) (c) (838 SE2d 828) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Vallejo therefore has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance on this ground. Furthermore, Vallejo has not carried his burden of showing that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to move for a mistrial. “Whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and the trial court’s exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless a mistrial is essential to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 189 (6) (850 SE2d 110) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Vallejo has not demonstrated that the trial court would have granted a motion for a mistrial based on the State’s passing comment made during closing argument if his trial counsel had requested one. “Because the trial court would have acted within its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial, the failure of [Vallejo's] trial counsel to make a motion that the court was authorized to deny does not establish ineffective assistance by that counsel.” Id. at 190 (6) (citation and punctuation omitted). (b) Failure to object to the State’s misstatement of the law of reasonable doubt. Vallejo next alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s purported misstatements of law regarding reasonable doubt made during closing argument. Specifically, Vallejo takes issue with the following: If you believe the defendant is guilty . . . you’re authorized to convict. If you believe the defendant is guilty but you wish to have a little more evidence, you’re still authorized to convict because everything you’ve heard about this case you heard in this courtroom. So if you believe he’s guilty, and you wish you had a little more, you still believe he’s guilty. You’re authorized to convict. Relying on Debelbot v. State, 308 Ga. 165, 167 (839 SE2d 513) (2020), in which the Supreme Court held that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a prosecutor’s “obviously wrong” description of reasonable doubt during closing argument, Vallejo contends that his trial counsel’s failure to object here constituted deficient performance. In his estimation, if trial counsel had objected, the trial court “would have informed the jury that it would instruct [the jury] on the law of reasonable doubt and that [the jury would be] bound to follow those instructions.” At the motion for new trial hearing, one of Vallejo’s lawyers testified that, although he also believed the State’s attempt to define proof beyond a reasonable doubt was misleading, he believed he had sufficiently addressed the issue in his closing argument. During closing argument, the lawyer told the jury: At the end of the day the Judge will tell you, at the end of the day if your minds are wavering, your minds are unsettled or unsatisfied that is a doubt of the law and you have one duty and that’s a duty to acquit. If your minds are wavering, unsettled or unsatisfied that is a reasonable doubt. And that’s a doubt of the law and you have to acquit. I don’t care what [the prosecutor] says, he’s wrong. The Judge will tell you the law and that’s what it is. The record shows that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt. The trial court further charged the jury that it was bound to follow the court’s instructions. “[T]he making of objections falls within the realm of trial tactics and strategy and thus usually provides no basis for reversal of a conviction.” Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 516 (9) (705 SE2d 649) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). Furthermore, the trial court correctly charged the jury on reasonable doubt, and “we presume that jurors follow the law.” Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 400 (4) (830 SE2d 110) (2019). Thus, any error in the State’s characterization of reasonable doubt was cured by the trial court’s instructions to the jury. See Draughn v. State, 311 Ga. 378, 383 (2) (b) (858 SE2d 8) (2021) (where the jury charge explained presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt accurately and at length, any error in the State’s characterization of reasonable doubt was cured). “Assuming without deciding that [Vallejo's] trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to the prosecutor’s statements about reasonable doubt, [Vallejo] has failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different but for those statements.” Id. (footnote omitted). Consequently, Vallejo has failed to establish prejudice, and this claim of ineffective assistance fails. (c) Failure to challenge “partial match” evidence. At trial, a Georgia Bureau of Investigation forensic biologist testified that DNA on a white towel[7] found in the victim’s bathroom matched Vallejo’s DNA. DNA from another individual was identified on the same towel. The forensic biologist testified that for: [t]he second individual I only obtained three markers at three different locations. So just to put that into reference we tested for 16 locations and were able to only obtain information at three locations. So that means that that person was only contributing a very, very small amount of DNA to the sample. But the information that was there at those three locations matched back to the profile of [the victim]. Vallejo alleges that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to move to exclude any mention of a “partial match” between the second DNA profile on the towel and the victim’s known DNA profile. Vallejo argues that his trial counsel should have moved to exclude this “partial match” evidence, which he characterizes as “misleading and scientifically invalid,” pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-403, or challenged its scientific reliability pursuant to Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525 (1) (292 SE2d 389) (1982). Our review of the record shows that trial counsel employed a different strategy to challenge this evidence. At the motion for new trial hearing, all three of Vallejo’s trial attorneys testified that they found the “partial match” evidence misleading. However, trial counsel also testified that they did not consider a Harper challenge an appropriate means by which to contest the evidence. Instead, counsel challenged this evidence by aggressively and thoroughly cross-examining the GBI forensic biologist, calling a defense expert to rebut the testimony of the forensic biologist, and attacking the credibility of the “partial match” testimony in closing argument. On cross-examination, Vallejo’s trial counsel elicited testimony from the GBI forensic biologist that she could not say to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the victim’s DNA was on the towel. In fact, she testified that she would disagree with any argument made by the State “that this towel in fact identifies [the victim's] DNA. Vallejo’s expert agreed. During closing argument, Vallejo’s trial counsel highlighted the misleading nature of the testimony, noting that “it took . . . cross-examination of that witness . . . to actually bring forth to you, well, when I say match, I don’t really mean match, I don’t know [whose DNA] that is.” We cannot say this strategy was unreasonable. “A defendant who contends a strategic decision constitutes deficient performance must show that no competent attorney, under similar circumstances, would have made it.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 148 (3) (g) (829 SE2d 321) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Counsel’s reasonableness is evaluated in conjunction with the attendant circumstances of the challenged conduct and judged from counsel’s perspective at the time with every effort made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. at 143-144 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Thus, deficiency cannot be demonstrated by merely arguing that there is another, or even a better, way for counsel to have performed.” Id. at 144. Vallejo’s trial counsel pursued multiple avenues by which to challenge the “partial match” testimony: cross-examination, testimony by Vallejo’s expert, and closing argument. Vallejo’s claim that his trial counsel should have challenged this evidence through other means is merely an argument that there was another, or better, way for counsel to have performed. Consequently, Vallejo has not demonstrated that his trial counsel performed deficiently, and this claim of ineffective assistance also fails. 4. Finally, Vallejo argues that the cumulative effect of errors by the trial court and trial counsel warrants a new trial. “Although we may now consider whether the cumulative effect of errors requires a new trial, where . . . there are not multiple errors, there can be no cumulative error.” Williams v. State, 358 Ga. App. 152, 157 (c) (853 SE2d 383) (2021). The only potential error that we have either found or pretermitted was trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s statements regarding reasonable doubt during closing argument. Because we have found only one potential error at trial on the grounds asserted by Vallejo, Vallejo’s claim of cumulative error fails. See id. Judgment affirmed. Dillard, P.J., and Mercier, Reese, Brown, and Hodges, JJ., concur. Gobeil, J., concurs fully and specially. Pipkin, J., concurs fully in Divisions 3 and 4, and concurs specially in Divisions 1 and 2. Doyle, P.J., concurs fully in Divisions 3 and 4, and joins in judgment only with Judge Pipkin in Divisions 1 and 2. Pinson, J., concurs in Divisions 2, 3, and 4, and concurs in judgment only in Division 1. Rickman, C.J., Barnes, P.J., Miller, P.J., and Markle, J., concur in Divisions 2, 3, and 4, and dissent without opinion in Division 1. McFadden, P.J., dissents. In the Court of Appeals of GeorgiaA21A1110. Vallejo v. The State.
