Brown, Judge. John Doe filed a pro se motion to restrict and seal his criminal records. The trial court denied the motion as well as Doe’s motion for reconsideration. Doe appeals. For the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand with direction. The record shows that in November 2010, and January 2011, Doe was charged with two felony counts of habitual violator, OCGA § 40-5-58, for operating a vehicle without a license; the license revocation stemmed from a string of DUIs. On August 19, 2011, Doe entered a negotiated nolo contendere plea to one count of misdemeanor habitual violator, agreeing to serve 12 months on probation, pay a $1,300 fine, and perform 40 hours of community service, and to waive his Fourth Amendment rights pertaining to search and seizure. The State agreed that it would dead docket the second charge if Doe successfully completed probation at which point the second charge would be nolle prossed. The trial court accepted Doe’s plea and sentenced him accordingly. The State subsequently dead docketed and then later nolle prossed the second charge. On February 5, 2021, Doe, proceeding pro se, filed a form motion to restrict and seal records of felony charges pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (1) and (m),[1] alleging that he is unable to obtain “gainful employment within the Banking and Investment industry” because of the felony charges on his record. In his motion, Doe explained that he was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of habitual violator, which is a lesser included offense of felony habitual violator, and that he, therefore, was entitled to have any record pertaining to the felony charge restricted by the Georgia Crime Information Center, and all agencies maintaining such information in Cherokee County, pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (1). He further requested that all the records of the case be sealed by the Clerk of the Superior Court of Cherokee County pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (m). On April 12, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the motion, during which Doe sought relief pursuant to “revised OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4), as amended by senate bill 288,” which became effective on January 1, 2021. (Emphasis supplied.) Doe testified that he is unable to obtain work as an independent financial advisor because he must disclose the offense to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and the Securities and Exchange Commission, that he has “lost out on dozens of jobs over the last ten years due to this record being publicly available,” and that the charge is not connected to what he does for a living in that it is does not involve dishonesty, theft, or fraud; if the offense is restricted from his record under OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4), it will be removed from his “FIRNA” and SEC disclosure records. According to Doe, “[a]t first glance, it doesn’t look like [he's] been convicted of a misdemeanor traffic violation, but rather, that [he is] a habitual or career criminal, which is not the case.” During the hearing, the trial court acknowledged that it had not “had any dealings with the new statute yet”; asked Doe to email his “opening statement” and “argument,” which the trial court would then forward to the State; and instructed the State to prepare a letter brief in response to the email.[2] During the hearing, the State argued that (j) (1) and not (j) (4) is the applicable subsection, but did not allege that Doe could not argue (j) (4) because his petition was not originally pursued under that subsection. The trial court denied Doe’s motion (the “May 20, 2021 order”), ruling that Doe was not entitled to restriction of his criminal history record under OCGA § 35-3-37 (h) (2) (A) because the nolo contendere plea was not a dismissal, nolle prosse, or reduced violation of a local ordinance. The trial court further ruled that Doe was not entitled to relief pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (1) because his negotiated plea was to a lesser-included offense of the original felony charge, and that the Code section provides for relief only when the individual “‘was convicted of a misdemeanor offense that was not a lesser included offense of the felony charge.’” Represented by counsel, Doe moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order, alleging that under the newly-revised Code section, he is entitled to relief pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4), and that since he seeks relief under that subsection, and not OCGA § 35-3-37 (h), his nolo contendere plea is not a bar to relief. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration (the “June 11, 2021 order”), ruling that subsection OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (1)[3] and not (j) (4) is controlling in this case; the trial court concluded that subsection (j) (4) does not apply because the nolo contendere plea is not a misdemeanor conviction. Doe appeals from the May 20, 2021 order and the June 11, 2021 order. In his sole enumeration of error, Doe contends that the trial court erred in ruling that a nolo contendere plea is not a conviction within the meaning of OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) (A), and that he is, therefore, ineligible for record restriction. Doe further alleges that it is irrelevant under subsection (j) (4) (A) that his plea was reduced from a felony. The State contends that Doe’s appeal presents nothing of substance for this Court to review. In its view, Doe never petitioned the trial court for relief under OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4); Doe’s original pro se petition cited OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (1) only. Accordingly, the State was obligated to do no more than show that subsection (j) (1) was inapplicable, and “the trial court’s only obligation in disposing of this matter was confined to the four corners of [Doe's] petition.” As for Doe’s motion for reconsideration, the State contends that it is in essence a second petition for record restriction, which fails because OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) (C) imposes a two-year waiting period before the filing of a second petition. The State further contends that Doe is not entitled to seek review of the trial court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration because the denial of a post-judgment motion for reconsideration “is a [sic] not itself an appealable order.” Lastly, the State contends that Doe never argued in this Court or below that the trial court erred in declining to address the applicability of OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) in the final judgment disposing of his pro se petition. In sum, the State contends that there is nothing for this Court to review because (a) Doe was not entitled to a ruling with respect to OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) at the time this pro se action became final and (b) the trial court’s post-judgment ruling on the applicability of the subsection is not itself appealable. 1. Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we must consider several of the State’s arguments. (a) First, we address the State’s contentions that (i) the trial court’s post-judgment ruling on the applicability of the subsection is not itself appealable and (ii) Doe never argued in this Court or below that the trial court erred in declining to address the applicability of OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) in the final judgment disposing of his pro se petition. We find these contentions unavailing. Having filed a notice of appeal from the May 20, 2021 order (which is subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)), Doe can also appeal other rulings, including the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (d). See also Roberts v. Windsor Credit Svcs., 301 Ga. App. 393, 394 (1) (687 SE2d 647) (2009). And, given that Doe enumerates as error the issue of the applicability of subsection (j) (4) in relation to the trial court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration, it is immaterial that Doe does not enumerate as error that the trial court erred in declining to address the applicability of subsection (j) (4) in the final judgment disposing of his pro se petition. See Roberts, 301 Ga. App. at 394-395 (1); Threatt v. Rogers, 269 Ga. App. 402, 403 (604 SE2d 269) (2004). (b) We next consider the State’s claim that there is nothing for this Court to review because the trial court’s obligation in considering this matter was limited to the four corners of Doe’s petition which sought relief under OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (1) only. Pretermitting whether the State has waived this argument by failing to make it below,[4] we find it entirely without merit. When the trial court ruled on the merits of Doe’s claim for relief under subsection (j) (4) (A), it impliedly allowed the amendment. Regardless, Doe was entitled to a ruling with respect to OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) irrespective of the filing of his motion for reconsideration because he properly raised the subsection during the hearing and expressly amended his petition, and the State did not object to the amendment or otherwise take exception to the petition on the ground that Doe was limited to the four corners of his petition or that his oral amendment was in substance an unlawful second petition.[5] As Doe explains in his reply brief, the newly-revised Code section had only been in effect for several weeks when he filed his form petition. Doe acknowledges that he “plainly does not qualify for relief pursuant to (j) (1)” and that he immediately notified the trial court at the start of the hearing on his petition that he qualified for relief under (j) (4) (A). The State did not object to proceeding under (j) (4) (A), but chose to argue that (j) (1) applies instead. The trial court even indicated during the hearing that it was not familiar with the amended statute but that it would consider the competing subsections and asked the parties to further brief the issue. As set out in footnote 1, supra, the State in its letter brief acknowledged that Doe was seeking relief under (j) (4) (A) rather than (j) (1), but elected to argue that the latter subsection applied to Doe’s situation. Importantly, the State did not argue that the trial court should deny Doe’s petition because he was requesting relief under a different subsection than the one listed in his petition. Because Doe properly amended his petition to seek relief pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) (A), and because the June 11, 2021 order impliedly allowed the amendment, we find no merit to the State’s contention that the trial court’s obligation in considering this matter was limited to the four corners of Doe’s original petition. 2. Doe contends that the trial court erred in ruling that a nolo contendere plea is not a conviction within the meaning of OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) (A), and that he is, therefore, ineligible for record restriction. We agree. OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) (A) provides as follows: When an individual was convicted in this state of a misdemeanor or a series of misdemeanors arising from a single incident, provided that such conviction was not for any offense listed in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, and such individual has completed the terms of his or her sentence and has not been convicted of any crime in any jurisdiction for at least four years prior to filing a petition under this subparagraph, excluding any conviction for a nonserious traffic offense, and provided, further, that he or she has no pending charged offenses, he or she may petition the court in which the conviction occurred to restrict access to criminal history record information. Such court shall maintain jurisdiction over the case for this limited purpose and duration. Such petition shall be served on the prosecuting attorney. If a hearing is requested, such hearing shall be held within 90 days of the filing of the petition. The court shall hear evidence and shall grant an order restricting such criminal history record information if it determines that the harm otherwise resulting to the individual clearly outweighs the public’s interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available. Thus, subsection (j) (4) (A) allows a defendant to request record restriction access to criminal history records where the defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor provided that the defendant has completed the terms of his or her sentence and has not been convicted of any crime in any jurisdiction for at least four years prior to filing a petition.[6] If the defendant satisfies these requirements, the trial court must then “weigh the benefits of a proposed judicial action against the harms.” Doe v. State, 347 Ga. App. 246, 253 (4) (819 SE2d 58) (2018). In this case, Doe pleaded nolo contendere to the misdemeanor of habitual violator, and the trial court concluded that a nolo contendere plea is not a conviction. On the contrary, it is well settled that a “plea of nolo contendere constitute[s] a conviction.” State v. Pitts, 199 Ga. App. 493, 494 (2) (405 SE2d 115) (1991). See generally OCGA § 17-7-95 (“Plea of nolo contendere”). As we explained in Pitts: In Wright v. State, 75 Ga. App. 764 (1) (44 SE2d 569)[(1947),] it was held that a plea of nolo contendere differs from a plea of guilty only in that it cannot be used against the defendant in any other court or proceedings as an admission of guilt, or otherwise, or for any purpose, and it is not a plea of guilty for the purpose of effecting civil disqualifications. In other words, the plea itself cannot be used in another case as an admission of guilt. Nevertheless, in Nelson v. State, 87 Ga. App. 644, 648 (75 SE2d 39)[(1953),] a defendant sentenced under such a plea was held to have been adjudged guilty and convicted. This accords with general law that a sentence based on a plea of nolo contendere is a conviction but that the plea is technical only and does not constitute an admission of guilt in any other case, not even in a civil case involving the same act. (Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Id. at 493-494 (2). See also State v. Rocco, 259 Ga. 463, 466-467 (1) (384 SE2d 183) (1989) (indicating that plea of nolo contendere is a conviction). Because the trial court erred in concluding that a plea of nolo contendere is not a conviction under subsection (j) (4) (A), it did not proceed to apply the statutory balancing test. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Doe’s petition for record restriction under OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) (A), and remand the case back to the trial court to weigh the competing interests of the harm to Doe’s privacy against the public’s interest in access to Doe’s criminal record. Compare Doe, 347 Ga. App. at 253 (4).[7] 3. The trial court also concluded that Doe was not entitled to restriction of his criminal record history information under OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (1) because his negotiated plea was to a lesser-included offense of the original felony charge, and that this subsection allows record restriction only when the individual was convicted of a misdemeanor offense that was not a lesser included of the felony charge. Although Doe challenges this ruling,[8] given our conclusion in Division 1 (b) that Doe properly amended his petition to seek relief only under OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (4) (A), we need not address the trial court’s conclusion as to OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (1). Judgment reversed and remanded with direction. Doyle, P. J., and Reese, J., concur.
