Pinson, Judge. An employee abruptly resigned from her position as an associate at a law firm and blocked its access to her firm email account, the firm’s fax line, and client files kept in an online Dropbox account. The firm sued her, and the trial court entered a default judgment in its favor after the employee failed to file a timely answer. But the trial court declined to award any damages after a bench trial on that issue, finding that the firm had failed to carry its burden to prove any damages. The firm appealed, contending that the trial court erred by (1) applying the wrong legal standard to its claims for actual damages and declining to award even nominal damages; (2) failing to recognize that the default judgment “conclusively established” the employee’s liability for punitive damages and attorney fees; and (3) denying the firm’s right to present closing argument at trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment except with respect to the attorney fees. The trial court applied the correct legal standard and did not clearly err in finding that the firm failed to establish its actual damages with reasonable certainty. The court also did not err in failing to award nominal or punitive damages. And the court did not commit reversible error by forgoing closing argument. But because the entry of a default judgment required the trial court to award the firm its reasonable attorney fees, the judgment must be reversed to the extent the court failed to make such an award, and the case must be remanded for a determination of the proper amount of the fee award. Background The relevant facts, which are either undisputed or deemed admitted by virtue of the default judgment, see OCGA § 9-11-55 (a),[1] are as follows. The Cotto Law Group is a Duluth law firm specializing in immigration and personal injury law. In 2017, Vanessa Benevidez was hired as an associate attorney to handle the firm’s personal injury matters. While at Cotto, Benevidez established an account for the firm with Dropbox, an online file-sharing network, to maintain client files. She also arranged for the installation of a fax line for communicating with insurers in these personal injury matters. In January 2019, Benevidez and Mayra Lazano, a paralegal who worked closely with Benevidez, resigned from their employment with the firm by emailing the firm’s principal, Isaac Cotto, notifying him of their immediate resignation.[2] On Benevidez’s departure, the firm no longer had access to its Dropbox account, its fax line, or her firm email account.[3] Three days after the resignations, the firm received letters from two clients, terminating the firm’s services. The next day, Cotto filed suit, claiming that Benevidez and Lazano had “converted [its] client files . . . [and] stole[n], tortiously interfered with[,] and otherwise obstructed [the firm's] access to its client files” in violation of various Georgia statutes. The complaint sought injunctive relief as well as “compensatory, consequential, special, nominal, punitive, and exemplary damages,” and attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. In the months that followed, the trial court granted Cotto temporary injunctive relief. And although Benevidez appeared at the interlocutory injunction hearing, she failed to file a timely answer.[4] Cotto moved for a default judgment, and, although Benevidez then filed an untimely answer and moved to open the default, the trial court rejected these efforts and granted Cotto’s motion for default judgment. A bench trial on damages followed.[5] Cotto presented two witnesses to testify on damages. First, Cotto called Erika Quiroz, the firm’s marketing director, who testified that, as a result of Benevidez’s departure and the firm’s lack of access to its electronic files, she had to “stay in the office and do office work” instead of her usual business development work outside the office. For roughly a month, Quiroz was sidelined from her marketing duties to help “reorganize . . . the operation of the law firm”; she testified that “there were files everywhere in the office and I had to start calling the clients and . . . [let] them know that Ms. Benevidez wasn’t there anymore.” Quiroz testified that she worked 122 hours on this “reorganization” work and that her salary at the time was $15 per hour. She testified further that, in a typical month, she brought in between 20 and 35 new cases and that, during the month she was diverted from her marketing duties, she brought in only ten new cases. On cross-examination, Quiroz admitted that, because Benevidez had been the firm’s only personal injury attorney, it was inevitable that, if she were ever to leave the firm, someone would have to “tend to those files that she was no longer handling.” On redirect, Quiroz agreed that the “real reason” she had to step in to help was that Benevidez had left without providing access to her email and the Dropbox files. Cotto’s other witness was Isaac Cotto. Mr. Cotto testified that, because Benevidez had effectively blocked the firm’s access to her email, the Dropbox account, and the fax line, “we had to go, basically, manual labor and physically go through every single file to communicate with providers and clients.” He testified that he asked Benevidez for the Dropbox information but she never gave it to him, and that ultimately his staff had to figure out the password “through trial and error.” He also testified that five of the firm’s personal injury clients left “within 24 hours” to go with Benevidez. As to the value of those clients’ cases, Mr. Cotto testified that, while he could not “give a dollar amount,” a typical personal injury case “can range from $2,000 to $10,000″; he also opined that Benevidez “would not have taken a case of low value.” Mr. Cotto also testified that the firm had suffered reputational damage with clients and referral sources. In addition, he testified that Quiroz and her administrative assistant were both diverted from their marketing duties to help triage the situation; that Quiroz was paid $3,000 per month and her assistant was paid $2,000 per month; and that, because of their inability to develop business during that time, “our signup numbers went down dramatically.” Mr. Cotto testified that the firm had, up until the trial, spent between $7,000 and $8,000 on attorney fees. On cross-examination, Mr. Cotto acknowledged that, because Benevidez and Lazano were the only staff handling personal injury cases at the firm, if they both left their employment for any reason, someone at the firm “would need to review all of the files in those cases, regardless.” In addition, Mr. Cotto confirmed that his standard engagement letter for personal injury cases provided that, if the client terminated the firm’s services before the case was resolved, the client would be obligated to reimburse the firm at the standard hourly rate for the hours spent on the case. Thus, he admitted, the firm was entitled to seek such compensation from any of the clients who left the firm to engage Benevidez. He also admitted he did not know the “exact” value of the cases lost to Benevidez. On further cross-examination, Mr. Cotto admitted that Benevidez had actually offered him the email and Dropbox account credentials within days after the suit was filed, but he declined to respond. In his words, because he had already retained counsel, “I couldn’t communicate with her at that point.” After Mr. Cotto’s testimony, a recess was taken before Benevidez began calling her witnesses. After the recess, the court announced its finding that Cotto had failed to meet its burden of proof and thus no damages were being awarded. Cotto’s counsel asked for clarification, and the court stated that Cotto had not offered “any specifics about damages.” Cotto’s counsel noted that Cotto had offered testimony about the marketing director’s expenses, but the court replied that Cotto never presented “a number [for] how much money the firm lost[,]” and that evidence amounted to mere “ speculation.” Before the parties were excused, Cotto’s counsel noted that Cotto had intended to ask for punitive damages. Two days after the hearing, the court entered its written order, in which it stated summarily, “The Plaintiff failed to prove damages as required by law.”[6] This appeal followed. Discussion On review of a judgment entered after a bench trial, this Court must uphold all findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. OCGA § 9-11-52 (a); Moses v. Pennebaker, 312 Ga. App. 623, 629 (2) (b) (719 SE2d 521) (2011). “The clearly erroneous test is the same as the any evidence rule. Thus, an appellate court will not disturb fact findings of a trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them.” Id. (punctuation and footnote omitted). On the other hand, the court’s judgment must be reversed “where it is apparent that it rests on erroneous reasoning or on an erroneous legal theory.” CBS, Inc. v. Anointed Hair Studio, Inc., 325 Ga. App. 560, 560-61 (754 SE2d 138) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). Cotto’s contentions on appeal break down into three main arguments: (1) that judged under the proper standard, the evidence Cotto offered was enough to support a reasonable calculation of damages; (2) that the default judgment “conclusively established” Benevidez’s liability for punitive damages and attorney fees; and (3) that the trial court erred in denying Cotto’s right to present closing argument at trial. We review each contention in turn. 1. We take first Cotto’s contention that it proved damages under the proper standard. It is well-settled that, to recover damages as a result of another’s wrongdoing, a party must offer proof sufficient to establish the amount of its losses. Witty v. McNeal Agency, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 554, 562 (5) (521 SE2d 619) (1999). The claimant bears “the burden of showing the amount of the loss, and of showing it in such a way that the [trier] may calculate the amount from the figures furnished.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). “An award of damages cannot be based on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 274 Ga. 633, 634 (2) (555 SE2d 436) (2001). So, although an exact dollar figure need not be proven, Witty, 239 Ga. App. at 562 (5), the evidence must permit the trier of fact to calculate the amount of the loss “with a reasonable degree of certainty.” Legacy Academy, Inc. v. Doles-Smith Enters., Inc., 337 Ga. App. 575, 582 (1) (b) (789 SE2d 194) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accord Molly Pitcher Canning Co. v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 149 Ga. App. 5, 11 (4) (253 SE2d 392) (1979) (noting that “[m]ere difficulty” in fixing the amount of damages is not a “legal obstacle” to their recovery, so long as the evidence permits their calculation with “reasonable certainty”). The requirement to prove damages to a reasonable degree of certainty holds even when liability has been established. In other words, even if a defendant is found liable, an award of zero damages is authorized if the plaintiff fails to offer sufficiently specific or credible evidence to enable the calculation of damages with reasonable certainty. See, e.g., Hart v. Walker, 347 Ga. App. 582, 583-84 (1) (820 SE2d 206) (2018) (affirming trial court’s award of zero damages, despite defendant’s undisputed liability for wrongful eviction and other torts, where plaintiff had offered as evidence of damages only his own testimony and a single motel receipt); Jaraysi v. Sebastian, 318 Ga. App. 469, 477 (2) (733 SE2d 785) (2012), disapproved on other grounds by George v. Hercules Real Estate Serv., Inc., 339 Ga. App. 843, 850 (2) (a) (ii) (795 SE2d 81) (2016) (affirming trial court’s determination that, though landlord may have been entitled to recover repair costs, he had failed to present evidence showing the amount of those costs and was thus not entitled to any recovery); Crawford v. Dammann, 277 Ga. App. 442, 448-49 (3) (626 SE2d 632) (2006) (affirming trial court’s award of zero damages, concluding that testimony about the “approximate” amount of fees wrongfully assessed was “insufficient to prove the amount of [damages] to the requisite degree of specificity”). (a) Cotto contends that the trial court applied “an erroneous legal standard” in assessing its damages claims, but nothing in the court’s oral pronouncement or its summary written order indicates that it applied any standard other than the reasonable-degree-of-certainty test. So this contention fails. (b) Absent application of the wrong legal standard, the question becomes whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that the evidence of Cotto’s alleged damages was insufficient to allow calculation of damages to a reasonable certainty. See OCGA § 9-11-52 (a); Moses, 312 Ga. App. at 629 (2) (b). Putting aside punitive damages and attorney fees, Cotto claims that it was entitled to four different categories of damages, which we will take one by one. (i) Cotto first claims that it was entitled to damages for the five clients that left the firm to engage Benevidez. But Cotto admits it could offer no actual dollar amounts to represent the value of these clients’ matters. Although Mr. Cotto testified that a typical personal injury case “can range from $2,000 to $10,000,” Cotto offered no specific evidence about any of the five “stolen” cases, and thus no basis for making any reasonable estimate of their potential value. Moreover, it is unclear what this $2,000 to $10,000 range even represents. But even assuming it refers to the firm’s contingency fee on successful resolution of the case, and assuming each case would have been successfully resolved, this figure does not necessarily represent the firm’s profit from that case, as it does not take into account any expenses the firm would have incurred in generating that fee. See Legacy Academy, Inc. v. JLK, Inc., 330 Ga. App. 397, 404-05 (2) (765 SE2d 472) (2014) (“To sufficiently quantify lost profits, a finder of fact ‘must be provided with figures establishing the business’s projected revenue as well as its projected expenses.’” (emphasis supplied)).[7] In sum, the trial court’s finding that Cotto failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove this item of damages was not clearly erroneous. See Hart, 347 Ga. App. at 583-84 (1); Crawford, 277 Ga. App. at 448-49 (3). (ii) Next, Cotto contends that it was entitled to recover damages to cover the expenses it incurred in “restoring its client files and communications.” Cotto cites evidence that Quiroz and her assistant were paid $3,000 and $2,000 per month, respectively, and Quiroz’s testimony that she spent a month doing “office work” to help “reorganize . . . the operation of the law firm.” Cotto claims it was entitled to recover $5,000. It is true that “necessary expenses consequent upon an injury are a legitimate item in the estimate of damages.” OCGA § 51-12-7. But the firm would have paid the salaries of Quiroz and her assistant whether they were helping “reorganize” after Benevidez’s departure or performing their normal job duties. So the salaries did not represent any additional cost to the firm.[8] Cf. Taft v. Taft, 209 Ga. App. 499, 500 (3) (433 SE2d 667) (1993) (cost of hiring additional workers necessitated by plaintiff’s personal injuries was properly awarded as necessary expenses under OCGA § 51-12-7). The trial court thus did not clearly err by concluding that Quiroz’s and her assistant’s salaries did not constitute damages of this kind. See Hart, 347 Ga. App. at 583-84 (1); Crawford, 277 Ga. App. at 448-49 (3). (iii) Cotto also contends that it should have been awarded its losses attributable to the decline in new cases brought in during the month in which Quiroz was diverted from her marketing duties. Cotto asserts that it “lost $20,000, and likely much more, because of its lack of marketing for an entire month.” This number comes from Quiroz’s testimony that the firm effectively “lost” at least ten new cases—given its typical twenty to thirty-five monthly case originations, versus the ten cases it actually originated during the month in question—combined with Mr. Cotto’s testimony valuing each personal injury case in the range of $2,000 to $10,000. But we have already held that Mr. Cotto’s testimony about the value of actual cases the firm lost to Benevidez was speculative, and that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that it did not allow for calculation of those damages with reasonable certainty. The value of any potential cases the firm may have lost would be at least as speculative. For this reason, there was no clear error in the trial court’s failure to award this item of damages. See Hart, 347 Ga. App. at 583-84 (1); Crawford, 277 Ga. App. at 448-49 (3). (iv) Cotto also contends that the trial court erred by failing to award nominal damages. Again, we disagree. Nominal damages are a form of “general damages,” a term which refers to “those which the law presumes to flow from a tortious act.” MTW Inv. Co. v. Alcovy Props., Inc., 228 Ga. App. 206, 211 (1) (c) (491 SE2d 460) (1997) (emphasis in original). See OCGA § 51-12-4 (providing that “[d]amages are given as compensation for injury; . . . .[i]f an injury is small or the mitigating circumstances are strong, nominal damages only are given”). Because “[t]he law infers some damage from the invasion of a property right,” the right may be vindicated through an award of nominal damages even if the damage cannot be quantified or established by proof. Ga. Power Co. v. Womble, 150 Ga. App. 28, 32 (3) (256 SE2d 640) (1979). See also Williams v. Harris, 207 Ga. 576, 578 (2) (63 SE2d 386) (1951) (“nominal damages are always allowed for any tortious invasion of a property right, though no actual damage results therefrom”). But just because nominal damages may be awarded does not mean they must be awarded. Although a trial court may not under these circumstances reject a claim for nominal damages as a matter of law, see, e.g., Zhong v. PNC Bank, N.A., 345 Ga. App. 135, 142-43 (2) (c) (812 SE2d 514) (2018) (reversal was warranted where it was decided as a matter of law that nominal damages were unavailable without proof of actual damages); Ambort v. Tarica, 151 Ga. App. 97, 97 (1) (258 SE2d 755) (1979) (reversing directed verdict on counterclaim because nominal damages were potentially recoverable), we have on at least two occasions held that a trier of fact may properly decline to award even nominal damages despite the defendant’s liability having been definitively established. See Hodson v. Whitworth, 173 Ga. App. 863, 864 (1) (328 SE2d 753) (1985) (declining to reverse jury’s zero damages award where liability was already established, noting that nominal damages were “authorized but not demanded”); Corrosion Control, Inc. v. William Armstrong Smith Co., 157 Ga. App. 291, 292 (277 SE2d 287) (1981) (declining to reverse zero damages award after bench trial even though nominal damages would have been authorized). Cf. Hooker v. Roberson, 316 Ga. App. 345, 346 (2) (729 SE2d 484) (2012) (reversing where trial court sitting as trier of fact had failed to consider nominal damages because of its error in reconsidering defendant’s liability after the entry of a default judgment). Thus, Cotto’s contention that the trial court was required to award nominal damages here is unfounded. Where nominal damages are authorized, the proper amount of the award is the prerogative of the trier of fact, whose determination is “not [to] be disturbed on appeal, except in extreme cases.” Ponce de Leon Condos. v. DiGirolamo, 238 Ga. 188, 190 (3) (232 SE2d 62) (1977). Particularly given Cotto’s undisputed failure to mitigate its actual damages, we do not view this case as so “extreme” as to warrant disturbing the non-award of nominal damages.
