Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge. A jury found Jamie Courtney Wright guilty of two controlled substance offenses and two firearm offenses. Wright appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that: (i) the trial court erred when it admitted (a) statements he made while detained by law enforcement officers without the benefit of Miranda[1] warnings and (b) evidence concerning prior convictions entered after he pled guilty to controlled substance and firearm offenses; and (ii) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. For the reasons that follow, while we reject Wright’s challenges to the admission of statements he made to officers and to the sufficiency of the evidence, we agree that the trial court improperly admitted the facts underlying Wright’s prior guilty pleas, and we reverse his present convictions on that basis. On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. Krauss v. State, 263 Ga. App. 488, 488 (1) (588 SE2d 239) (2003). So viewed, the evidence shows that, in November 2015, a narcotics investigator and other law enforcement officers arrived at a home in Richmond County in search of a fugitive. The homeowner let the officers in and gave consent to search the home. In addition to the homeowner, Wright and another person were in the home at the time. After Wright emerged from a bedroom, the investigator asked him to wait with the other occupants on a screened-in porch. Another officer stood in the yard, “a few feet from the steps leading onto the porch” at that time. Upon entering the room Wright had vacated, which was now unoccupied, the investigator found a black book bag behind the door. On top of the open book bag’s other contents lay a one-gallon plastic bag with more than 47 grams of a green, leafy substance that the investigator initially believed was marijuana but later learned contained a synthetic cannabinoid known as “spice.” The investigator then walked out to the porch, where all three occupants were waiting, and asked “who did the bag belong to.” At that time, the investigator did not describe the bag he was asking about. Wright, the only one to respond, said that the bag was his. To confirm which bag he was asking about, the investigator retrieved the black book bag and asked Wright if it was his. The record contains no indication that any of the bag’s contents were visible to Wright or the others on the porch at that time. Wright responded, “Yeah, that’s my bag and everything in it,” and he added that the others on the porch “didn’t have anything to do with it.” After obtaining Wright’s consent to search the bag, the investigator found a handgun, a digital scale, a rolled-up dollar bill with oxycodone powder on it, and 38 smaller bags of “spice.” During a search incident to Wright’s ensuing arrest, officers also found $605 in small denominations. No personal-use drug paraphernalia — such as rolling papers or smoking devices — was found in the black book bag or on Wright’s person. The investigator testified at trial as an expert in narcotics investigation that everything he found was consistent with distribution and not personal use. Wright testified that he had been dropped off at the home where he was arrested approximately one hour before law enforcement arrived. He claimed that the only bag he had with him at that time was a small red and black bag that contained diapers and other items for his child, and that neither the black book bag at issue here — which he knew nothing about — nor its contents were his. Wright further testified that he had gone into the room where the black book bag was found to look out of a window when the officers arrived. According to Wright, he never told officers that he owned the black book bag but instead simply claimed ownership of the red and black bag he brought with him. At the conclusion of the first part of Wright’s bifurcated trial, the jury found him guilty of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled substance (“spice”), possession of a Schedule II controlled substance (oxycodone), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. During the second part of the bifurcated trial, the trial court admitted Wright’s 2011 convictions and sentences for possession with intent to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, following which the jury found him guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.[2] 1. On appeal, Wright challenges the denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress the investigator’s testimony that Wright made two statements claiming ownership of the black book bag and its contents. He contends that his statements were inadmissible as the products of a custodial interrogation that occurred before officers advised him of his Miranda rights. We disagree.[3] In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court’s rulings on disputed facts unless clearly erroneous, but review the application of the law to the facts de novo. State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882, 884 (723 SE2d 89) (2012). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. State v. Holler, 224 Ga. App. 66, 71 (2) (b) (479 SE2d 780) (1996). “[I]n conducting our review, we may consider trial testimony in addition to the testimony submitted during the motion to suppress hearing.” Thompson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 844, 846 (1) (723 SE2d 85) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). The Fifth Amendment bars the admission of an accused’s statements made during a custodial interrogation, unless he first is advised of and voluntarily waives his Miranda rights. Gardner v. State, 261 Ga. App. 10, 11 (582 SE2d 7) (2003); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444445, 478479 (III) (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). “The issue of whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact, and the trial court’s determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.” Pugh v. State, 323 Ga. App. 31, 36 (2) (747 SE2d 101) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). The test to determine whether a detainee is in custody for Miranda purposes is whether a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would have thought the detention would not be temporary. The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable only after a detainee’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Owens v. State, 308 Ga. App. 374, 378 (2) (707 SE2d 584) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Miranda, 384 U. S. at 477 (III) (explaining that protections of that decision apply “when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”). When making this determination, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation . . . . Whether a suspect is in custody does not depend upon the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Instead, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation. A reasonable person is one neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances. ChavezOrtega v. State, 331 Ga. App. 500, 502-503 (1) (771 SE2d 179) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted); accord Pugh, 323 Ga. App. at 36 (2) (“Unless a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive that he was in custody, Miranda warnings are not necessary.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, “a custodial situation does not arise even if an officer believes he has probable cause to arrest a defendant, where the officer takes no overt step to communicate that belief.” Pugh, 323 Ga. App. at 37 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Arce v. State, 245 Ga. App. 466, 466-467 (538 SE2d 128) (2000) (probable cause for an arrest, standing alone, does not convert a temporary detention into a formal arrest), disapproved in part on other grounds by State v. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 758, 775 & n. 15 (827 SE2d 865) (2019). “[A]s a general rule, one who is the subject of a general onthescene investigation is not in custody though he may not be free to leave during the investigation.” State v. Lucas, 265 Ga. App. 242, 244 (2) (593 SE2d 707) (2004) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Miranda, 384 U. S. at 477-478 (III) (the requirements of Miranda do not apply to “[g]eneral onthescene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the factfinding process” because “[i]n such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of incustody interrogation is not necessarily present”). In that situation, officers may make inquiries “solely to determine whether there currently is any danger to them or other persons” and “may even temporarily detain anyone who tries to leave before the preliminary investigation is completed.” State v. Wintker, 223 Ga. App. 65, 67 (476 SE2d 835) (1996). A detention accompanied by such inquiries does not trigger Miranda‘s requirements “unless the questioning is aimed at obtaining information to establish a suspect’s guilt.”[4] Id. (citations and punctuation omitted); accord Thompson, 313 Ga. App. at 847-848 (1); Lucas, 265 Ga. App. at 244 (2); see Futch v. State, 145 Ga. App. 485, 486, 488-489 (3) (243 SE2d 621) (1978) (a question regarding who owned a closed trunk suspected of containing marijuana, made during an initial on-the-scene investigation involving two suspects at a motel before any arrest, did not require Miranda warnings). Thus, Miranda warnings are not required where a defendant who is not in custody “responds to an officer’s initial inquiry at an on-the-scene investigation that had not become accusatory.” Taylor v. State, 235 Ga. App. 323, 326 (2) (509 SE2d 388) (1998) (citation and punctuation omitted); see id. at 324-327 (1)-(2) (concluding that Miranda warnings were not required when a detective informed the defendant, while standing outside of a store where her purse had been found by a store clerk, “that he was investigating the marijuana found in her purse,” because the detective’s statements did not constitute interrogation “aimed at establishing her guilt,” but rather were focused on assessing the general nature of the situation). Here, the circumstances under which Wright admitted ownership of the black book bag and its contents do not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation for purposes of the Miranda requirements. Three primary factors inform our ruling in this regard. (a) First, Wright has identified no evidence that officers told any of the occupants of the home that they were under arrest or explicitly forbade them to leave the premises.[5] Of course, a reasonable person in the occupants’ shoes likely would understand the investigator’s request to wait on the porch as indicating that they were expected to remain there while officers searched the home for the fugitive they sought. No reasonable person, however, would perceive such a detention as anything other than temporary. See Owens, 308 Ga. App. at 378-379 (2) (defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he was detained for 20 minutes, during which time he was neither handcuffed nor otherwise restrained); Arce, 245 Ga. App. at 466-467 (defendant was not in custody while submitting to field sobriety tests, as there was no evidence that the officer communicated anything other than the fact that he was conducting a brief investigatory stop, notwithstanding the existence of probable cause to arrest the defendant); see also generally ChavezOrtega, 331 Ga. App. at 502-503 (1). And even accepting at face value Wright’s repeated assertions that he and the others on the porch were “guarded” by one or more officers “standing watch” over them, the trial court was entitled to find that the officers’ actions in that regard were incident to the occupants’ temporary detention while officers assessed the scene. See Lucas, 265 Ga. App. at 244 (2); Wintker, 223 Ga. App. at 67. (b) Second, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the investigator’s initial question regarding ownership of “the bag” — which the investigator did not otherwise identify at that time — was directed to all three occupants then on the porch, rather than to Wright individually. Such a general request for information to all persons present in a residence (or its curtilage) does not bear the hallmarks of a “custodial interrogation” or questioning aimed at establishing a particular suspect’s guilt, but rather more closely resembles a “general on-the-scene investigation.” See Lucas, 265 Ga. App. at 244 (2); Wintker, 223 Ga. App. at 67; Futch, 145 Ga. App. at 486, 488-489 (3). (c) Finally, the investigator’s second question, in which he showed the black book bag to Wright and asked him to confirm that it was his — while all three occupants remained free to move about the porch — did not change the nature of Wright’s detention. Nevertheless, Wright contends that Miranda warnings were required because the investigator’s second question confronted Wright with the evidence against him and thus was aimed at establishing his guilt of a drug offense. However, Wright has not cited, and research has not revealed, any binding precedent expressly holding that the subjectively accusatory or incriminating nature of an officer’s question (from the officer’s point of view)[6] during an initial, on-the-scene investigation — standing alone — is sufficient to transform a non-custodial situation into a “custodial interrogation” for purposes of the Miranda requirements. We address in turn each of the decisions cited by Wright on this issue. In Lucas, 265 Ga. App. at 243 (2), the defendant (Lucas) gave deputy sheriffs — who sought to serve a warrant on a third party — consent to search his home for the third party while Lucas and another man remained seated in the living area, watched over by one deputy. During the search, another deputy found marijuana and rolling papers on a cookie tray in a bedroom. Id. That deputy confronted the two men with the tray and asked to whom it belonged; Lucas said that it was his and was arrested. Id. The trial court granted Lucas’s motion to suppress his statement on the ground that it was the result of a custodial interrogation conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Id. at 242. The State appealed, contending that Lucas was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he claimed ownership of the tray. Lucas, 265 Ga. App. at 242, 243 (2). This Court affirmed, highlighting that “an objective standard is used to determine custody,” under which “the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person in Lucas’s place would have believed that his freedom was curtailed in a significant way when the deputy asked who owned the marijuana,” and concluding that the trial court was entitled to find that standard had been satisfied. Id. at 244 (2). When read as a whole, we construe Lucas as standing for the proposition that a custodial interrogation may begin when officers confront a temporarily detained person with evidence that, on its face, would lead a reasonable person to believe that his detention no longer would be temporary. Accord Owens, 308 Ga. App. at 378 (2); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 300-301 (II) (A) (100 SCt 1682, 64 LE2d 297) (1980) (the inquiry as to whether in-custody questioning is “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” “focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police”). Here, by way of contrast, the record contains no indication that Wright was expressly confronted with contraband or any other objectively obvious wrongdoing when merely asked to confirm his ownership of the black book bag. Thus, unlike the situation in Lucas, a reasonable person in Wright’s place “neither guilty of criminal conduct” nor “insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances,” ChavezOrtega, 331 Ga. App. at 503 (1), would have no reason to believe that his freedom was curtailed any more than it had been when the first question about “the bag” was asked. See Owens, 308 Ga. App. 378 (2); see also Innis, 446 U. S. at 300-301 (II) (A); ChavezOrtega, 331 Ga. App. at 503 (1) (“Whether a suspect is in custody does not depend upon the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). In Thompson, 313 Ga. App. at 845-846, 847-848 (1), we held that an officer’s question as to “where [Thompson, the defendant] put the vacuums” — made while Thompson was being detained and after he had been identified as a suspect in the theft of vacuum cleaners — “was clearly aimed at establishing his guilt” and thus should have been preceded by Miranda warnings. Notably, however, before he was questioned, Thompson had been found to be in possession of a crack pipe and push rods (which had then been placed on top of a patrol car), and he had admitted to an officer that he recently bought and used crack cocaine. Id. at 847 (1). We concluded that, “[u]nder these circumstances, after producing drug paraphernalia, admitting to owning same, and admitting to recently buying and using drugs, a reasonable person would certainly perceive himself to be in police custody.” Id. No such circumstances are present here. In Gardner, 261 Ga. App. at 11, it was undisputed that the defendant was in custody, and the only question on appeal thus was whether the statement sought to be suppressed “was made in direct response to police interrogation or its functional equivalent.” Gardner thus has no application in this case. Finally, in United States v. LunaEncinas, 603 F3d 876, 877-878, 879 (I), 882-883 (II) (11th Cir. 2010), which involved a prosecution for possession of a firearm by an alien unlawfully in the United States, the federal appellate court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress his answer to an officer’s question about where a gun was located in his apartment. The court (a) highlighted that the defendant at that time had been “detained for a relatively brief period in a neutral, outdoor location” while officers searched the area for a third party and (b) concluded that “a reasonable person in his position would not have understood his freedom of action to have been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest” for purposes of the Miranda requirements. Id. at 882 (II) (citation and punctuation omitted). Luna-Encinas therefore also does not aid Wright’s argument, but rather supports the trial court’s ruling here.[7] All in all, the investigator’s questions about the black book bag in this case did not bear the hallmarks of a “custodial interrogation,” primarily because (a) Wright’s freedom of action had not been “curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest,” Owens, 308 Ga. App. at 378 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted), and (b) the questions did not expressly refer to contraband or otherwise implicate a crime or other wrongdoing and thus lacked an “accusatory nature,” see Thompson, 313 Ga. App. at 848 (1). See also generally Lucas, 265 Ga. App. at 243-244 (2); Wintker, 223 Ga. App. at 68-69 (concluding that Miranda was triggered when the teenage defendant was locked in the back seat of a patrol car — with a handcuffed friend who had been arrested — and asked whether she owned a suitcase containing drugs that officers found in a car in which she had been a passenger and on which a drug dog had alerted, because, under the totality of the circumstances, there was a significant “compulsive aspect” to the “isolated and police-dominated” interrogation) (citation and punctuation omitted). Naturally, it is apparent that the investigator in this case, having found suspected drugs on top of the black book bag’s other contents, subjectively may have perceived his second question as being aimed at establishing Wright’s guilt and that Wright — assuming that he knew of the book bag’s contents — subjectively may have perceived that question in the same way. Those considerations, however, play no part in our analysis, which asks only what a reasonable person neither guilty of criminal conduct nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances would perceive. See ChavezOrtega, 331 Ga. App. at 502-503 (1); see also Innis, 446 U. S. at 300-301 (II) (A). And under that test, there was no objectively accusatory, “compulsive,” or “isolated and police-dominated” aspect to the investigator’s questions. See Wintker, 223 Ga. App. at 68-69; see also Chavez-Ortega, 331 Ga. App. at 503 (1); Taylor, 235 Ga. App. at 326 (2). We therefore affirm the denial of Wright’s motion to suppress. 2. Wright further contends that the trial court erred when, during the first part of his bifurcated trial, it admitted evidence of the facts underlying his 2011 convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The trial court admitted this evidence for the limited purposes of establishing Wright’s knowledge, intent, and lack of mistake and gave the jury limiting instructions to that effect. We agree with Wright that this evidence was improperly admitted. We review a trial court’s decision to admit other acts evidence for abuse of discretion. See State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 159 (1) (773 SE2d 170) (2015); accord Parks v. State, 300 Ga. 303, 305-306 (2) (794 SE2d 623) (2016). The statute primarily applicable to such evidence — OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”) — provides, in relevant part: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . . . Rule 404 (b) “is, on its face, an evidentiary rule of inclusion.” Jones, 297 Ga. at 159 (2). Nevertheless, relevant evidence offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404 (b) may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403″); Jones, 297 Ga. at 158 (1). Thus, for evidence to be admissible under these provisions, the State must make a showing that: (1) evidence of extrinsic, or other, acts is relevant to an issue other than a defendant’s character; (2) the probative value of the other acts evidence is not substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice, i.e., the evidence must satisfy the requirements of Rule 403; and (3) there is sufficient proof so that the jury could find that the defendant committed the act in question. Jones, 297 Ga. at 158-159 (1) (citation omitted). To address the first part of this test, we look to OCGA § 244401, which defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” See Heard v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 84-85 (3) (b) (844 SE2d 791) (2020). “This is a binary question — evidence is either relevant or it is not.” Id. at 85 (3) (b). The second prong of the Jones test — application of Rule 403 — requires a trial court to “undertake in each case a considered evaluation of the proffered justification for the admission of such evidence and make an independent determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by” any of the Rule 403 factors. Jones, 297 Ga. at 163 (3). “In weighing the probative value of other acts evidence, a court may consider a number of factors, including (1) prosecutorial need, (2) overall similarity of the other acts and the acts charged, and (3) the temporal remoteness of the other acts.” Thompson v. State, 308 Ga. 854, 859 (2) (843 SE2d 794) (2020). “[T]here is no mechanical solution for this balancing test.” Jones, 297 Ga. at 163 (3). Rather, “[a] Rule 403 analysis must be done on a casebycase basis and requires a common sense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic act and the charged offense.” Green v. State, 352 Ga. App. 284, 290 (2) (e) (834 SE2d 378) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). Generally speaking, however, the greater the tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable, the greater the probative value. . . . Probative value also depends on the marginal worth of the evidence — how much it adds, in other words, to the other proof available to establish the fact for which it is offered. . . . And probative value depends as well upon the need for the evidence. When the fact for which the evidence is offered is undisputed or not reasonably susceptible of dispute, the less the probative value of the evidence. Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 75-76 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016) (citations omitted). “The major function of [Rule 403] is to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” Sloan v. State, 351 Ga. App. 199, 210 (2) (e) (ii) (830 SE2d 571) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, “the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly.” Olds, 299 Ga. at 70 (2). In that regard, an appellate court reviewing issues under Rule 403 must “look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Sloan, 351 Ga. App. at 208 (2) (e) (citation and punctuation omitted). Wright does not dispute that the State satisfied the third prong of the Jones test; his appellate challenges thus implicate only the first two prongs. During Wright’s trial, an investigator testified that, in June 2011, he stopped a car in which Wright was a passenger (because Wright was not wearing a seatbelt) after watching what appeared to be a drug transaction. Officers searched Wright and found three bags of marijuana with a combined weight of 25.9 grams, a pistol, and $730 in cash in his pants pockets, as well as a digital scale on the car seat where he had been sitting. The investigator did not find any personal-use paraphernalia on Wright at that time. As a result of that encounter, Wright pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.[8] Immediately before testimony about the 2011 incident, the trial court gave a limiting instruction, telling the jury that it could consider evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by Wright only “insofar as [such evidence] relates to” knowledge, intent, and lack of mistake in the current case, “and not for any other purpose.” The court repeated this instruction during the jury charge. For the reasons that follow, the evidence was improperly admitted on all three bases. (a) Knowledge. For purposes of Rule 404 (b), “knowledge” refers either to a special skill, such as safe-cracking, bombmaking, or document forgery, or to specific knowledge based on past experience such as a trespass conviction used to establish a defendant’s knowledge that he was not welcome on the premises. See Paul S. Milich, Ga. Rules of Evidence § 11:17, p. 348 & n. 1 (2019-2020 ed.), cited in Rouzan v. State, 308 Ga. 894, 899 (2) (843 SE2d 814) (2020) (concluding that prior guilty pleas to voluntary manslaughter and burglary were not relevant to the defendant’s “knowledge” in a prosecution for murder and a gun-possession offense); United States v. Walters, 351 F3d 159, 161, 164-167 (I)-(II) (A) (5th Cir. 2003) (in a prosecution for making and sending a bomb, evidence that the defendant possessed a book entitled “The Anarchist’s Cookbook” was properly admitted under Rule 404 (b) to show that the defendant “had the knowledge to construct the destructive device used to commit the crimes alleged in the indictment”) (punctuation omitted); United States v. Garcia, 880 F2d 1277, 1278-1279 (11th Cir. 1989) (in a prosecution for making a false statement on a loan application, evidence that the defendant previously signed a third party’s name on a document purporting to sell the third party’s apartment to the defendant was properly admitted under Rule 404 (b), as it showed that the defendant “had the ability to prepare documents purporting to bear signatures which were faked”).[9] Moreover, “a defendant’s knowledge may be at issue where it is an element of the charged crime; that is, when knowledge itself is part of the statutory definition of the crime, and thus must be proven by the prosecution.” Green, 352 Ga. App. at 289 (2) (c) (citation and punctuation omitted). For example, in a prosecution for reckless conduct, the defendant’s knowledge of his and his sexual partners’ HIV status “was highly probative and relevant as to whether he . . . knew that he was [HIV-]positive at the time he engaged in sexual relationships with the victims.” Davis v. State, 342 Ga. App. 889, 894 (1) (806 SE2d 3) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). And in a prosecution for misdemeanor obstruction of an officer, prior instances of obstruction may be relevant to show that the charged act of obstruction was knowing and wilful, as required by the relevant statute. See Green v. State, 339 Ga. App. 263, 265-267 (1) (a) (793 SE2d 156) (2016). Knowledge is also properly in issue when the defendant claims that he or she was unaware that a criminal act was being perpetrated. In such cases, the hypothesis justifying the admission of otheracts evidence is similar to that invoked with intent: the likelihood that repeated instances of behavior, even if originally innocent, will have resulted in [the] defendant’s having the requisite state of knowledge by the time of the charged crime. Green, 352 Ga. App. at 289 (2) (c) (citation and punctuation omitted). Where no special knowledge or talent is required to commit the charged crime, however, other acts should not be admitted simply to show that the defendant is “capable” of committing the charged offense. Id. at 289-290 (2) (c) (citing Paul S. Milich, Ga. Rules of Evidence § 11:17, pp. 340-341 (2018-2019 ed.)).[10] There is no allegation that any special knowledge or skill was required for any of the offenses at issue here. See Rouzan, 308 Ga. at 899 (2); Davis, 342 Ga. App. at 894 (1). Moreover, Wright did not claim that he was unaware that items in his possession contained drugs and a gun — he merely disclaimed ownership of the black book bag outright. See Green, 352 Ga. App. at 289 (2) (c). Under these circumstances, Wright’s knowledge was not at issue in this case, and the trial court therefore erred in admitting the other acts evidence on this basis. See Rouzan, 308 Ga. at 899 (2); Green, 352 Ga. App. at 289 (2) (c); Davis, 342 Ga. App. at 894 (1). (b) Intent. The first prong of the Rule 404 (b) test is met wher
