Doyle, Presiding Judge. Samuel Perez Herrera was issued a traffic citation for driving without a valid Georgia license in violation of OCGA § 40-5-20. Before trial, the trial court entered an order requiring him to report to the sheriff’s office for fingerprinting or face possible arrest. Herrera appeals the fingerprint order, arguing that it contravenes Georgia law and is unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the order and remand the case. The record shows that on May 8, 2021, the Douglas County Sheriff issued Herrera a “Uniform Traffic Citation, Summons[,] and Accusation” for driving without a valid Georgia license in violation of OCGA § 40-5-20.[1] The citation ordered him to appear in court to answer for the charge on August 6, 2021. On June 29, 2021, the trial court entered the following order: It has come to the attention of this court that the defendant’s fingerprints have not been successfully captured for the . . . charges [alleged in 21ST03898: Driving Without a License]. It is hereby ordered that the defendant return to the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office to be fingerprinted. Failure to abide by this order could result in your arrest. On July 29, 2021, Herrera filed a notice of appeal of the fingerprint order.[2] The trial court did not indicate the legal authority, statutory or otherwise, for the order requiring Herrera to give his fingerprints before his conviction. On appeal, Herrera contends that the order is unconstitutional[3] and that it contravenes the text of OCGA § 40-5-121 (a), which provides in relevant part that a person convicted of the misdemeanor offense of driving without a license as required by OCGA § 40-5-20 “shall be fingerprinted” and that “[s]uch fingerprints, taken upon conviction, shall be forwarded to the Georgia Crime Information Center . . . for the purpose of tracking any future violations by the same offender.”[4] We agree that OCGA § 40-5-21 (a) does not provide a legal basis for a court to require a defendant to give his fingerprints before conviction. Nonetheless, the State argues that the trial court was authorized to impose the pre-conviction fingerprint order under OCGA §§ 17-4-23 (a) (1) and 35-3-33 (a) (1) (A). OCGA § 17-4-23 (a) (1) provides in relevant part that “[a] law enforcement officer may arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance . . . governing the operation, licensing, registration, maintenance, or inspection of motor vehicles . . . by the issuance of a citation. . . .” OCGA § 35-3-33 (a) (1) (A) requires the Georgia Crime Information Center (“the GCIC”) to “[o]btain and file fingerprints . . . on persons who . . . [h]ave been or are hereafter arrested or taken into custody in this state [in certain specified circumstances].”[5] Neither statute speaks to the trial court’s authority to obtain an accused’s fingerprints under these circumstances prior to conviction.[6] Nevertheless, because of the unique procedural posture of this case and the lack of tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal, Herrera did not raise any specific objection to the collection of his fingerprints in the trial court, and the trial court did not have the opportunity to rule on those objections.[7] Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to consider his objections in the first instance. Judgment vacated and remanded. Reese, J., and Senior Appellate Judge Herbert E. Phipps concur.
