Dillard, Presiding Judge. The State appeals the trial court’s grant of Patrick Middleton’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop resulting in his arrest on charges of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug-related objects. Specifically, the State contends the trial court erred in concluding that because the municipal law enforcement officer initiated the traffic stop of Middleton’s vehicle outside of the municipality’s boundaries, the officer had no jurisdiction; and, thus, the officer was not engaged in the lawful discharge of her official duties at the time of the search and subsequent arrest. For the reasons set forth infra, we agree and therefore reverse the trial court’s ruling. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,[1] the record shows that shortly after 8:00 a.m. on February 15, 2020, Officer Amanda Graw of the Kingsland Police Department was patrolling Interstate 95 just outside of Kingsland, when she observed a silver sedan fail to maintain its lane several times. As a result, Officer Graw initiated a traffic stop. And upon making contact with the driver (whom she identified as Middleton from his driver’s license), Officer Graw noticed a strong marijuana odor emanating from the vehicle. She then asked Middleton to exit the vehicle, at which point she conducted a pat-down search. Thereafter, she began searching the vehicle and asked Middleton if it contained any marijuana. Middleton replied that it did not, and claimed the odor was from him smoking marijuana the previous day. A moment later, Officer Graw found several pills—later determined to be alprazolam[2]—wrapped in plastic, and a small grinder containing marijuana residue. By that time, another Kingsland police officer arrived, and during a more thorough search of Middleton’s person, the second officer found a small digital scale. Subsequently, Officer Graw arrested Middleton on charges of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug-related objects. Middleton filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that because Officer Graw was a Kingsland police officer, she had no jurisdiction to initiate a traffic stop for a traffic violation occurring outside of the Kingsland city limits. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, which began with the State stipulating that the traffic violation and subsequent stop occurred in unincorporated Camden County, and thus, outside the Kingsland city limits. But during the hearing, Officer Graw testified that—in addition to being a police officer for the City of Kingsland—she had been deputized by the Camden County Sheriff’s Office in 2013 and, therefore, had authority to make arrests within the county. Nevertheless, two weeks after the hearing, the trial court issued an order granting Middleton’s motion to suppress, finding that Graw was outside of her jurisdiction when she initiated the traffic stop, and thus, the ensuing search and arrest were unlawful. This appeal by the State follows. In its sole enumeration of error, the State contends the trial court erred in concluding that because Officer Graw initiated the traffic stop of Middleton’s vehicle outside the Kingsland city limits, she had no jurisdiction and, thus, was not engaged in the lawful discharge of her official duties at the time of the search and subsequent arrest. We agree. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we generally must “(1) accept a trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous, (2) construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court, and (3) limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court.”[3] But we review de novo the trial court’s “application of law to the undisputed facts.”[4] So, when, as here, the facts are for the most part undisputed, “we owe no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions.”[5] Bearing these guiding principles in mind, we turn to the State’s specific claim of error. As previously noted, Middleton successfully argued below that Officer Graw—a Kingsland police officer—was not engaged in the lawful discharge of her official duties when she initiated a traffic stop for a violation that indisputably occurred outside of the Kingsland city limits. In support of that argument, Middleton—and the trial court in its order—cited OCGA § 40-13-30, which provides: Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state or of any county or municipality thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall have authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial under this article, provided that officers of an incorporated municipality shall have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of such municipality unless such jurisdiction is given by local or other law.[6] Additionally, we have explained that OCGA § 401330 “specifically limits the arrest powers of municipal officers.”[7] Furthermore, the Constitution of the State of Georgia “expressly prohibits a municipality from exercising its police protection services outside its own boundaries except by contract with the affected county or municipality.”[8] But as noted supra, in this matter, Officer Graw testified during the hearing on Middleton’s motion that she was deputized by the Camden County Sheriff’s Office several years prior to the subject traffic stop. And importantly, county police—including the county sheriff—”have general police power to investigate and make arrests[.]“[9] Furthermore, a deputy sheriff is “an agent of the sheriff and in effecting the proper discharge of his duties is empowered with the same duties and powers.”[10] Nevertheless, in a footnote to its order granting Middleton’s motion to suppress, the trial court acknowledged that Officer Graw had been deputized but noted that it was “not persuaded that Officer Graw’s 2013 deputization by the [sheriff] to act as an agent of the CCSO as part of her riding with CCSO deputies at the time changes its analysis, especially where the State has failed to introduce evidence as to the scope and/or content of said deputization.” But this statement is belied by the record, as Graw explicitly testified—and without contradiction—that, having been deputized, she was authorized to make arrests within Camden County. As a result, the court’s finding that the State “failed to introduce evidence” as to the scope of deputization is clearly erroneous and we owe it no deference.[11] Additionally, although Middleton argues the traffic stop was nevertheless unlawful because Officer Graw was not working with the sheriff’s office at that particular moment, if acting within their jurisdiction (as Officer Graw was here), “all law enforcement officers have the general duty to enforce the law and maintain the peace[, and] [t]hey carry this duty twentyfour hours a day, on and off duty.”[12] So, given these circumstances, Officer Graw was authorized to initiate a traffic stop when she observed Middleton’s vehicle failing to maintain its lane of travel.[13] Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Middleton’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, and therefore, we reverse that ruling. Judgment reversed. Mercier and Markle, JJ., concur.
