Warren, Justice. In 1988, the Georgia General Assembly enacted OCGA § 40-8-76.1, commonly known as Georgia’s “seatbelt statute,” which requires “[e]ach occupant of the front seat of a passenger vehicle” to “be restrained by a seat safety belt” “while such passenger vehicle is being operated on a public road, street, or highway of this state,” OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (b), subject to exceptions laid out in OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (c). Among other things, OCGA § 40-8-76.1 restricts the use of evidence of a vehicle occupant’s failure to wear a seat safety belt in a legal proceeding: The failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt in any seat of a motor vehicle which has a seat safety belt or belts shall not be considered evidence of negligence or causation, shall not otherwise be considered by the finder of fact on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer, shall not be any basis for cancellation of coverage or increase in insurance rates, and shall not be evidence used to diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a motor vehicle. OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d). Before us now is a set of certified questions from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, all of which pertain to OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d): Does OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an action alleging defective restraint system design and/or negligent restraint system manufacture from producing evidence related to: The existence of seatbelts in a vehicle as part of the vehicle’s passenger restraint system; or Evidence related to the seatbelt’s design and compliance with applicable federal safety standards; or An occupant’s nonuse of a seatbelt as part of their defense?[1] As explained more below, we conclude that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not preclude a defendant in an action alleging defective restraint-system design or negligent restraint-system manufacture from producing evidence related to the existence of seatbelts in a vehicle as part of the vehicle’s passenger restraint system. We further conclude that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not preclude such defendants from producing evidence related to the seatbelt’s design and compliance with applicable federal safety standards. Finally, we conclude that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) precludes consideration of the failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seatbelt for the purposes set forth in subsection (d), even as part of a defendant- manufacturer’s defense. 1. Background The facts recounted in the district court’s certification order include the following: On March 27, 2020, a Jeep Wrangler struck the 2015 Ford SRW Super Duty Pickup truck that Casey Domingue was driving; his wife, Kristen, was a passenger. The resulting collision resulted in serious damage to both vehicles. During the collision, the dashboard airbag on the passenger side of the Domingues’ truck did not deploy and Kristen’s head hit the windshield, causing serious injury to her head, neck, and spine. The Domingues filed suit against Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, alleging negligence and “defective design and manufacture of the subject airbag restraint system,” and claiming personal injuries to Kristen and loss of consortium for Casey. During discovery, the Domingues filed a motion in limine asking the district court to exclude from the scope of discovery and from trial “any evidence in this case, testimony or documentary, concerning the issue of whether Plaintiff Kristen Domingue or Plaintiff Casey Domingue were or were not wearing their seatbelts at the time of the subject collision.” Ford responded that “evidence unrelated to [the Domingues'] actual seat belt use falls outside of [OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d)'s] exclusionary limits” and that the Domingues’ “defect allegations and expert testimony in this case . . . opened the door to the admission of all seat belt evidence.” Ford also contended that “[g]iven the interconnected designs of restraints and airbags, it is pragmatically impossible to try an alleged airbag deployment case[] without discussing the restraint system”; that “it would be impossible to conclude that a differently designed airbag would be safer, or would not be more harmful, without considering occupant seat belt use or nonuse”; and that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) “would be unconstitutional as applied, infringing upon Ford’s substantive due process and equal protection rights under both the Georgia and United States Constitutions” if the district court denied Ford the “fundamental right to show that [Kristen] Domingue was not using the primary component of the restraint system,” as the Domingues had requested. The district court held a hearing on the Domingues’ motion in limine. Afterwards, Ford filed a “motion for certified question” to the district court. The district court then certified its own questions to this Court, which were different than the questions Ford requested, and denied Ford’s motion as moot. On October 19, 2021, this Court “identified what may be a small but potentially significant scrivener’s error in the first sentence of the certified question,” struck the certified question from our docket, and invited the district court to “clarify its question and recertify the question to this Court as it sees fit.”[2] On October 21, 2021, the district court certified to this Court the set of questions set forth at the outset of this opinion. Oral argument was held on February 15, 2022. 2. Analysis To answer the questions before us, we first look to the text of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d). See Premier Health Care Invs., LLC v. UHS of Anchor, L.P., 310 Ga. 32, 39 (849 SE2d 441) (2020) (“A statute draws its meaning . . . from its text.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). “To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. (citations and punctuation omitted). (a) Does OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an action alleging defective restraint system design and/or negligent restraint system manufacture from producing evidence related to [t]he existence of seatbelts in a vehicle as part of the vehicle’s passenger restraint system? The Domingues contend that the answer to the first question is “yes” because, they say, OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) “is a comprehensive prohibition against the ‘failure to wear a seatbelt’ defense on any question of liability or diminution of damages,” such that “the ‘failure to wear a seatbelt defense’ is not available to any party in a civil action of any nature” and there is “no remaining probative value” for evidence related to a vehicle being equipped with a seatbelt. To support their argument, the Domingues cite Georgia cases that have referenced the “legislative intent” or “legislative purpose” of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) and that have excluded or placed broad restrictions on the consideration of evidence of a vehicle occupant’s failure to wear a seatbelt. See, e.g., King v. Davis, 287 Ga. App. 715, 715-716 (652 SE2d 585) (2007) (stating that “the legislative intent of [OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d)] was to prohibit the admission of evidence that no seat belt was worn for all purposes” and holding that the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury that it could “take into account evidence of the Kings’ alleged failure to use an available seatbelt”); Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 863, 866 (524 SE2d 313) (1999) (stating that “the legislative intent of [OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d)] was to prohibit the admission of evidence that no seat belt was worn for all purposes” and holding that the trial court did not err in “denying admission into evidence that the Crosbys were not wearing seat safety belts at the time of the rollover”), rev’d on other grounds, 273 Ga. 454 (543 SE2d 21) (2001); Denton v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 645 FSupp.2d 1215, 1221-1222 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (stating that OCGA § 408-76.1 (d)’s “express legislative purpose” is to “provide that a failure to use seat safety belts may not be introduced into evidence in any civil action” and instructing the jury that the deceased vehicle occupant’s “use or nonuse of a seat belt on the day of the accident may not be considered by [the jury] on the question of liability nor to reduce any recovery of damages”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Ford, for its part, points to the text of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) and responds that the “plain and unambiguous language of Georgia’s seatbelt statute provides [a] straightforward and unequivocal” answer to this question: “No”—an answer with which amici curiae the Georgia Association of Trial Lawyers (“GTLA”) and the Product Liability Advisory Council (“PLAC”) agree.[3] We also agree that the plain text of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) answers the first certified question, and that the answer is “no.” The text of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not purport to restrict consideration of all seatbelt-related evidence. The text makes clear that the restrictions OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) imposes on evidence pertaining to seatbelts—i.e., that they “shall not be considered evidence of negligence or causation,” “shall not otherwise be considered by the finder of fact on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer,” “shall not be any basis for cancellation of coverage or increase in insurance rates,” and “shall not be evidence used to diminish any recovery for damages”—apply only to “[t]he failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt in any seat of a motor vehicle which has a seat safety belt or belts.” In other words, the statutory restrictions are all predicated on the “failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a safety belt.” It follows that if that evidentiary predicate is not met, the restrictions outlined in OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) do not apply. Because “the existence of seatbelts in the vehicle” is something other than the “failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt,” the predicate of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) is not met, and OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not restrict use or consideration of that evidence. The cases the Domingues cite do not hold otherwise. For example, the Court of Appeals in King reversed an instruction that would have allowed the jury to consider the vehicle occupants’ alleged failure to wear a seatbelt when considering damages— evidence that clearly falls within the ambit of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d)’s restrictions. See King, 287 Ga. App. at 715-716. Likewise, in Crosby, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of evidence that the vehicle occupants were not wearing seatbelts at the time of the crash at issue for, among other purposes, the “limited purpose[] of [] reduction of any damages”—evidence that also falls clearly within the ambit of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d)’s restrictions. See Crosby, 240 Ga. App. at 863-864, 866. And although both cases apply OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) to restrict consideration of seatbelt evidence, neither King nor Crosby appear to grapple with a request to introduce the type of evidence at issue in the first certified question (the mere existence of seatbelts in a vehicle). Thus, the holdings of King and Crosby do not answer the question at issue here. Nor does Denton, 645 FSupp.2d at 1222, support the Domingues’ argument. There, the trial court allowed certain seatbelt evidence to be admitted, including evidence about “seat belt[] function,” but also instructed the jury not to consider evidence of the vehicle occupant’s failure to wear a seatbelt. Id. at 1222. The Domingues also point to these same three cases—King, Crosby, and Denton—as invoking the “legislative intent” or “legislative purpose” of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d), and argue that they stand for the proposition that seatbelt-related evidence should be broadly excluded. But that does not change our analysis, because those cases do no work in interpreting the text of the statute. Instead, they purport to divine a general “legislative intent” or “purpose” of the statute from the uncodified caption to the 1988 House Bill that enacted OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d). See Crosby, 240 Ga. App. at 864, 866; King, 287 Ga. App. at 715-716; Denton, 645 FSupp.2d at 1221-1222. That caption, in turn, summarized OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) as “provid[ing] that a failure to use seat safety belts may not be introduced in evidence in any civil action and may not be used to diminish recovery of damages and shall not be a basis for cancellation of insurance coverage or an increase in insurance rates.” See Ga. L. 1988, p. 31. But it is “fundamental that the preamble or caption of an act is no part thereof and cannot control the plain meaning of the body of the act.” East Georgia Land & Dev. Co., LLC v. Baker, 286 Ga. 551, 553 (690 SE2d 145) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). Cf. Spalding County Bd. of Elections v. McCord, 287 Ga. 835, 837 (700 SE2d 558) (2010) (noting that “[a]though a preamble is not part of the act and therefore cannot control over its plain meaning, it may be considered as evidence of the meaning of an ambiguous, codified law”).[4] In sum: the text of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not mention, let alone expressly restrict, evidence about the existence of seatbelts in a vehicle.[5] The statute therefore does not preclude introduction or consideration of such evidence at trial. We emphasize, however, that our conclusion is limited to the question of whether the statute itself precludes introduction or consideration of evidence related to the existence of seatbelts in a vehicle. We leave to the district court the determination of whether such evidence would be relevant and otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. (b) Does OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an action alleging defective restraint system design and/or negligent restraint system manufacture from producing evidence related to [] the seatbelt’s design and compliance with applicable federal safety standards? The Domingues’ primary argument with respect to the second certified question is that the “existence of seatbelts and their compliance with federal standards is totally irrelevant to anything in this case other than the alleged failure of [] Kristen Domingue to have worn that seatbelt,” and that admitting such evidence would be “nothing more than a ‘back door’” that would allow Ford to imply to the jury that Kristen Domingue was not wearing her seatbelt. But the Domingues’ argument about the second certified question suffers from the same flaw as their argument about the first: it ignores the text of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d). As explained above, the evidentiary predicate for application of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) is “[t]he failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt.” OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not speak about, let alone purport to restrict, the introduction or consideration of evidence related to a seatbelt’s design or evidence about federal safety standards. We answer the second certified question “no,” again emphasizing that we conclude only that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) itself does not preclude introduction or consideration of evidence related to a seatbelt’s design or evidence about federal safety standards. To the extent the Domingues complain that such evidence is not relevant in a design- defect case or that Ford may argue improper inferences from evidence admitted for proper purposes, the district court can determine, based on the evidence presented and arguments, whether such evidence and arguments would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and proper in this case. (c) Does OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an action alleging defective restraint system design and/or negligent restraint system manufacture from producing evidence related to [a]n occupant’s nonuse of a seatbelt as part of their defense? To begin, we clarify that we interpret the third certified question as asking whether in this type of case—i.e., a case alleging defective restraint-system design or negligent restraint-system manufacture—OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) precludes consideration of evidence related to a motor vehicle occupant’s failure to wear a seatbelt for the purposes set forth in subsection (d), even as part of a defendant-manufacturer’s defense.[6] The text of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) permits only one possible answer to this question: yes. Indeed, the text of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not limit its application to certain types of cases (such as a negligence case, personal injury case, manufacturing-defect case, or design-defect case) or to a certain party (plaintiff, defendant, or third party). See C.W. Matthews Contracting Co., Inc. v. Gover, 263 Ga. 108, 110 (428 SE2d 796) (1993) (rejecting argument that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not apply to negligence per se cases). Nor does the text contain exceptions if the evidentiary predicate—the “failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt”—is at issue. Because OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) precludes “[t]he failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt” from being “considered evidence of negligence or causation,” and because the “failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt” “shall not otherwise be considered by the finder of fact on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer, . . . and shall not be evidence used to diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a motor vehicle,” OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) squarely precludes consideration of a motor vehicle occupant’s nonuse of a seatbelt for those purposes— even as part of a defendant-manufacturer’s defense. Ford argues that this cannot be so, because excluding evidence of seatbelt usage in this particular type of design-defect case (i.e., an action alleging defective or negligent restraint-system design or manufacture) would render OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) unconstitutional as applied to Ford.[7] Specifically, Ford contends that such an interpretation of the statute would violate Ford’s due process and equal protection rights under both the United States and Georgia Constitutions.[8] Pretermitting whether each of the state and federal constitutional claims Ford raises in this appeal were adequately raised in the district court,[9] we decline Ford’s request to determine whether OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) is unconstitutional as applied. First, Ford asks this Court to invoke the canon of constitutional doubt to conclude that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) is unconstitutional as applied. Under that canon of statutory construction, “if a statute is susceptible of more than one meaning, one of which is constitutional and the other not, we interpret the statute as being consistent with the Constitution.” Premier Health Care Investments, LLC, 310 Ga. at 48 (citation and punctuation omitted). But we cannot rely on that canon here, because—as explained above—the text of OCGA § 40-876.1 (d) is clear and is not susceptible of more than one meaning. See Crowder v. State, 309 Ga. 66, 73 n.8 (844 SE2d 806) (2020) (explaining that although “[i]n some cases, the canon of constitutional avoidance allows courts to choose between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that the legislature did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts,” that canon cannot be relied upon to avoid a “potential constitutional issue” when “we can identify only one plausible interpretation of [a] statute”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Because there are not “competing plausible interpretations of [the] statutory text,” the canon of constitutional doubt does not apply. See id.[10] Second, it is not clear that that any of Ford’s constitutional claims—even if properly raised in the district court—are ripe for review. To that end, the district court certified questions from a pre- trial posture and at a point when discovery has barely begun. But an as-applied constitutional challenge like this one will require Ford to show (among other things) that the failure-to-wear-a-seatbelt evidence it seeks to introduce in this case is necessary to its defense. That is an inherently fact-specific theory that requires more factual development than has occurred at this early stage of litigation. Moreover, after this Court answers the certified questions, the district court could conclude that the evidence the parties seek to proffer in this case is inadmissible for any number of reasons not related to OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d), which could make consideration of the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) unnecessary. See Scoville v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 263, 269 (1886) (it is our practice to “[g]ive the benefit of doubts to the co-ordinate branches of government” and “never decide laws unconstitutional, if cases can be otherwise adjudicated”). See also Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 n.7 (751 SE2d 337) (2013). Finally, Ford has claimed violations under both the Georgia and United States Constitutions. If the district court were to conclude—based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case—that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) violates the United States Constitution as applied to Ford, that conclusion could moot the Georgia constitutional questions Ford has raised. And given that there are potential federal constitutional law questions at issue in the pending federal case, we are loath to opine on questions of state constitutional law when the federal court that certified the questions before us did not expressly ask us to do so. To be sure, some of us have serious concerns about the constitutionality of a statute that strips from a defendant the ability to present evidence that could be critical to its ability to present a defense of a product iwt designs and manufactures—including but not limited to being prevented from making arguments related to proximate cause and risk-utility factors[11]—which may occur if a defendant-manufacturer is precluded from raising in a product- liability case about a motor vehicle all (or almost all) evidence related to a vehicle occupant’s failure to wear a seatbelt. But for the reasons explained above, we believe the constitutional questions are not properly presented to this Court for resolution at this time.[12] Certified questions answered. All the Justices concur.
