Doyle, Presiding Judge. The day after Georgia Power technicians serviced the electrical system at Brandreth Farms, a fire broke out in a barn, destroying the barn and other structures, killing multiple horses, and injuring Nathaniel Helms[1] and John Brandreth, the owner of the farm. Brandreth Farms and Brandreth (collectively, “the farm”) sued Georgia Power, alleging that it caused the fire and asserting claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and punitive damages. The trial court denied Georgia Power’s motion for summary judgment and motion to exclude the testimony of the farm’s experts. Helms sued Georgia Power in a separate case, asserting claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and attorney fees, and the trial court granted summary judgment to Georgia Power. In Case No. A22A0165, Georgia Power appeals the trial court’s orders denying its summary judgment motion and its motion to exclude the testimony of the farm’s experts[2]; in Case No. A22A0166, the farm appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion to exclude the testimony of Georgia Power’s expert; and in Case No. A22A0208, the administrator of Helms’s estate appeals the grant of summary judgment to Georgia Power.[3] For the reasons that follow, we reverse in Case No. A22A0165, dismiss as moot Case No. A22A0166, and affirm in Case No. A22A0208. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,[4] the record shows that Brandreth is the sole owner of Brandreth Farms, which is a horse breeding and exhibition business located on property with a barn and other structures, including Brandreth’s residence. On Friday, March 13, 2015, Georgia Power sent technicians to the farm to work on the main barn’s electrical system. The technicians determined that a buried line supplying power to the barn was deficient, but could not be repaired that day. As a result, the technicians installed a “service saver” device to provide power to the barn over the weekend, and they temporarily removed the barn’s electric meter from its base and attached it to the service saver.[5] The following Monday, the technicians detached the meter from the service saver, disconnected the service saver, repaired the buried line, and reinstalled the meter to the barn. They finished their work Monday around lunch. Early the next morning, while standing in his carport, Brandreth saw fire and electrical arcing in the area of the barn where the meter was located. He ran to the barn to save his horses, but five of them died. In addition, the barn, an adjacent arena, and a connecting building were destroyed. Georgia Power, the farm, and the farm’s insurer — National Surety Corporation — sent experts to examine the scene and investigate the cause of the fire. In the debris, they discovered two circuit boards from the barn’s electrical meter located 15 and 21 feet away, indicating that the meter had exploded. They also found other meter components showing that electrical arcing had occurred within the device. The experts engaged by the farm and National Surety concluded that the meter malfunctioned first, initiating a fire that spread throughout the barn. They blamed Georgia Power’s technicians for either damaging the meter during their work or negligently replacing it without noticing that it was defective. Georgia Power, on the other hand, believed that the fire started elsewhere in the barn and later spread to the meter, causing it to arc and explode. National Surety paid the farm $742,131.19 for a portion of its losses and then filed a subrogation action against Georgia Power in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The district court excluded the testimony of National Surety’s causation expert, Edward Brill, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,[6] ruling that so little physical evidence had survived the fire that Brill could not rule out the possibility that the fire had originated elsewhere and then spread to the meter.[7] The court concluded that its job was “to ensure situations with such little evidence do not lead to final expert conclusions based on speculation.”[8] The plaintiffs argued that Georgia Power could be found negligent, even without Brill’s testimony, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in which a jury may infer that the defendant acted negligently if “the occurrence involved would not have occurred but for negligence,” and the defendant was “in exclusive control of the instrumentality.”[9] The district court rejected that argument, however, ruling that “a product failure can occur absent negligence[,] and the meter was not in the exclusive control of [Georgia Power].”[10] In the absence of evidence that Georgia Power’s negligence caused the fire, the district court granted summary judgment to Georgia Power.[11] Meanwhile, Brandreth and the farm sued Georgia Power in Superior Court of Pickens County. Although fact discovery was conducted jointly with the federal case, the farm hired a different causation expert, engineer David Leone. Leone examined the meter’s remains and noted that it was missing two of four small cotter pins used to hold the meter’s prongs in place. Leone theorized that these pins were missing before the fire and had allowed excessive micro-vibrations within the meter, resulting in mechanical wear and failure. Leone further theorized that the damage to the meter had begun with the arcing and was “not a fire-related phenomenon.” Leone could not determine when or how the pins went missing and noted they may have been absent when Georgia Power acquired the meter from the manufacturer. In that event, Leone opined, the technicians should have noticed the missing pins when they moved the meter to work at the barn. Georgia Power moved to exclude Leone’s testimony as too speculative ,[12] but the superior court disagreed, ruling that his opinions were admissible under OCGA § 24-7-702 because he used reliable methods and had “sufficient facts and data” to work with. Georgia Power also moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things that the plaintiffs had no admissible evidence of causation, res ipsa loquitur did not apply, and the district court’s Nat. Surety Corp. ruling was res judicata. The superior court also denied this motion, ruling that Leone’s opinions were sufficient evidence of causation, that the plaintiffs’ res ipsa loquitur theory should go to a jury, and that Georgia Power had “failed to provide clear proof of those parts of the record which are necessary to prove its [res judicata] defense.” At Georgia Power’s request, the trial court certified these orders for immediate review. Georgia Power filed an application for interlocutory appeal to this Court, which we granted, and timely filed its notice of appeal, which was docketed in this Court as Case Number A22A0165. Helms, who was at the farm to teach a clinic and sustained burns from the fire while attempting to remove equipment and rescue his horse and others in his care, also sued Georgia Power, asserting claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, respondeat superior, and attorney fees. Georgia Power moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion on the grounds that assumption of the risk barred Helms’s claims. Case No. A22A0165 1. Res judicata/collateral estoppel. Georgia Power contends that the trial court erred by denying its summary judgment motion because res judicata bars the farm’s claims. We agree. The doctrine of res judicata prevents the relitigation of all claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies in identical causes of action. Res judicata prevents a plaintiff from instituting a second complaint against a defendant on a claim that has already been brought, after having previously been adjudged not to be entitled to the recovery sought on that claim. Three prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata applies — (1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.[13] The defendant has the burden of proving res judicata.[14] The farm argues that Georgia Power failed to meet its burden of proving the defense because the record does not contain certified copies of documents in the district court case, that the causes of action are not identical, and that the identity of the parties are not identical.[15] (a) Proof. We find meritless the farm’s argument (and the superior court’s conclusion) that Georgia Power failed to meet its burden of proving the defense of res judicata by “clear proof.” Certainly, “[t]he defense of res judicata must be sustained by clear proof.”[16] And “[t]he record portions submitted must reveal which issues involved in the present suit were put in issue or might have been put in issue in the previous litigation.”[17] “But a final prior certified order or judgment may be sufficient to prove the defense, depending on the circumstances of the particular case.”[18] Here, each page of the copy of the district court’s prior judgment that Georgia Power filed in support of its summary judgment was file-stamped, and the judgment was published.[19] The farm does not contest the authenticity of the district court judgment nor does it specifically challenge the lack of certification for the judgment. Instead, the farm bases its argument on the fact that Georgia Power failed to file certified copies of the record in the district court case, in particular, the relevant insurance policy. But, as in Morgan County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Vantage Products Corp.,[20] the district court’s judgment contains sufficient detail to identify the issue litigated and decided in that case, which was whether Georgia Power’s negligence caused the fire at the farm.[21] Under the circumstances of this case, the superior court erred by finding that Georgia Power failed to provide “clear proof” of its res judicata claim. (b) Identity of parties. A privy is generally defined as one who is represented at trial and who is in law so connected with a party to the judgment as to have such an identity of interest that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right. There is no definition of “privity” which can be automatically applied to all cases involving the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, since privity depends upon the circumstances. Privity may be established if the party to the first suit represented the interests of the party to the second suit.[22] “A party’s insurer stands in the shoes of the insured as to identity of parties or privies.”[23] As the farm’s insurer, National Surety and the farm are privies. As sole proprietor, Brandreth is in privity with the farm.[24] And National Surety asserted and litigated the same negligence claim against Georgia Power that Brandreth and the farm allege in this case.[25] It follows that National Surety, the farm, and Brandreth “[are] in law so connected . . . [and] have such an identity of interest” that they are in privity.[26] (d) Identity of claims. A cause of action has been defined as being the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim. The question in determining identity of cause of action is whether both claims arose from the same set of facts. It is the entire set of facts themselves, once they occur, however, that give rise to the cause of action, regardless of whether the party fails to include certain facts in the first action. In considering the entire set of facts, we focus on the wrong that is asserted.[27] The farm’s complaint in the instant case alleges negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and punitive damages. These claims, including Brandeth’s personal injury claim and the farm’s breach of contract claim, are based on negligence.[28] National Surety’s prior suit against Georgia Power in the district court involved the same set of facts and an identical theory of liability, i.e., that “Georgia Power’s negligent work on the barn’s electrical service equipment caused the fire.”[29] Thus, the instant case and the district court case involve the same set of facts and are based on the same wrong: Georgia Power’s alleged negligence. And athough Brandreth and the farm now seek to recover for personal injuries, punitive damages, breach of contract, and property damages in excess of those sought by National Surety, the newly alleged claims flowed from the exact same wrong, i.e., the fire purportedly caused by Georgia Power’s negligence.[30] Accordingly, the causes of action are the same in the instant case and the prior district court case.[31] In light of the identical causes of action and parties, res judicata bars the farm’s claims against Georgia Power in the instant case.[32] Therefore, the superior court erred by denying summary judgment to Georgia Power. 2. In light of our holding in Division 1, we need not address Georgia Power’s remaining enumerations in this appeal. Case No. A22A0166 3. In this cross-appeal of Case No. A220165, the farm argues that the superior court abused its discretion by denying its motion to exclude the testimony of Georgia Power’s expert, Tony Echols. In light of our holding in Division 1, this appeal is moot and therefore dismissed. Case No. A22A0208 4. Helms contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Georgia Power as to his claims. We disagree. In 2015, Brandreth hired Helms to teach a mounted shooting clinic at the farm on March 17, 2015.[33] On March 16, 2015, Helms arrived at the farm and unloaded several horses — one he owned and three owned by others– into stalls located in the farm arena. He unloaded and prepared equipment in the arena to be used in the clinic the following morning, set up riding tack and feed outside the stalls where he placed the horses, and moved personal belongings into the guest house, where he stayed the night. Helms also gave lessons at the farm that day. The next morning, Helms was alerted to the fire by lights and screaming, and he immediately rushed towards the barn and arena. Helms ran to the arena from the side farthest from the fire, at which time the barn was “fully engulfed and falling in on itself,” and firefighters were already on the scene, some already spraying water on the fire. When Helms entered the arena, which was also burning, Brandreth had successfully gotten two horses out of the arena. Helms began “hauling gear out,” including his guns and holsters and “stuff” for another person. According to Brandreth, melting plastic was falling around Helms as he hauled gear out of the arena, and Brandreth, afraid that Helms might die, told Helms “to leave.” Helms then realized that there were still horses in stalls, and he tried to release them; one was on the ground and another would not leave the stall. Helms’s horse and another he brought died in the fire, and a third that he brought survived but was severely injured. Helms, who was carried out of the fire by a fireman, sustained serious burns to his feet and left forearm and hand. Helms sued Georgia Power, alleging that it damaged the power meter mounted to the barn while performing repair and restoration work, causing the meter to explode. Helms’s claims include negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, respondeat superior, and attorney fees. Georgia Power moved for summary judgment, in part based on the argument that Helms assumed the risk of injuries. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that assumption of the risk barred Helms’s claims and rejecting his contention that his claim survives under the rescue doctrine. This appeal followed. In Georgia, [t]he affirmative defense of assumption of the risk bars a plaintiff from recovering on a negligence claim if it is established that he, without coercion of circumstances, chooses a course of action with full knowledge of its danger and while exercising a free choice as to whether to engage in the act or not. A defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense must establish that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks. Knowledge of the risk means that the plaintiff has both actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.[34] In the instant case, Helms does not dispute that he assumed the risk of the fire when he entered the arena. Instead, he contends that his claim survives under the rescue doctrine. The rescue doctrine applies when the defendants’ negligent acts or omissions have created a condition or situation which involves imminent and urgent peril to life and property.[[35]] In such instances, those negligent acts or omissions are also negligent in relationship to all others who, in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety under the circumstances, attempt to rescue the endangered life or property by reasonably appropriate means.[36] “[T]he doctrine of rescue necessarily contemplates an assumption of the risk inherent in the peril created by the defendants’ negligence and allows recovery for injuries thereby incurred, for the reason that the defendants were charged with the foreseeability of their negligence attracting rescuers to assume the risks.”[37] The doctrine, however “appl[ies] only if [the plaintiff was] acting simply as a volunteer or bystander.”[38] Here, the trial court concluded that Helms was not at the scene of the fire as a bystander or volunteer. Helms had arrived at the farm the night before to lead a clinic the day of the fire,[39] he gave lessons the evening before the fire, and his lodging at the guest house on the farm was part of his compensation. Nevertheless, his agreement with the farm required him to conduct a clinic, and it in no way imposed a duty or obligation on him to save property or horses from a burning arena.[40] Therefore, there is at least a question of fact regarding whether Helms was acting as a volunteer/bystander for purposes of the rescue doctrine analysis. Our analysis, however, does not end there. Whether or not Helms qualifies as a volunteer or bystander for purposes of the rescue doctrine, it permits him to recover only if, as aforementioned, he, “in the exercise of ordinary care for [his] own safety under the circumstances, attempt[ed] to rescue the endangered life or property by reasonably appropriate means.”[41] The negligence which causes injury or danger to another is negligence also as to the rescuer, and the latter in an effort to save human life will not be barred on the ground that he did not exercise ordinary care for his own safety or even that he assumed the risk of injury to himself unless his actions are so imprudent and beyond what a person in the same circumstances might be expected to do that they must be classified as reckless or wanton.[42] “Whether the rescuer acts rashly or wantonly, except in plain and indisputable cases, is a question for the jury.”[43] Here, Helms’s actions in repeatedly running into the burning arena in this case are plainly and indisputably rash and wanton. When Helms entered the burning arena, firefighters were already at the scene, and some of them were spraying water on the fire. Melting plastic was falling around him as he pulled gear out of the arena. And Brandreth, who had already made valiant efforts to save as many horses as he could, told Helms to leave the area because he was afraid for Helms’s life. Nevertheless, instead of permitting the firefighters to handle the fire and rescue, Helms ran back into the burning arena, with melting plastic falling on him and smoke enveloping the area. Under these circumstances, his actions exhibited “reckless and wanton disregard of the imminent consequences” such that he assumed the risk of his actions.[44] Accordingly, his claims are barred as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment. Judgment affirmed in Case No. A22A0208. Judgment reversed in Case No. A22A0165. Appeal dismissed in Case No. A22A0166. Reese, J., and Senior Appellate Judge Herbert E. Phipps concur.
