McFadden, Presiding Judge. After pleading guilty to a felony, Treshia Vernetta Dave was referred to a mental health accountability court program in the superior court. The superior court subsequently terminated her participation in the program, entered a judgment of conviction, and imposed a sentence that included a term of confinement. Before taking those actions, the superior court held a hearing that neither Dave nor her plea counsel attended. Among other things, Dave argues that her right to due process was violated because she was not given notice of that hearing. We agree and find that this was reversible error. So we do not reach Dave’s other arguments. 1. Procedural history. The record shows that on November 6, 2019, Dave, while represented by counsel, entered her guilty plea and the superior court admitted her to the mental health court program. Dave signed a mental health court contract in which she agreed to comply with various requirements of the program. The superior court did not enter a judgment of conviction or sentence at that time. Instead, Dave’s mental health court contract provided that if she was terminated from the program for noncompliance, she would not be allowed to withdraw her plea and instead would be sentenced to five years, with two years to be served in confinement. On February 18, 2021, Dave’s mental health court case manager filed with the superior court a “Notice of Team Decision to Seek Termination.” That filing alleged that Dave had violated numerous conditions of her mental health court participation, including “absconding from [mental health court] supervision[.]” It set a time and place for a superior court hearing on the issue of terminating Dave from the mental health court program. And it stated that the notice had been mailed to Dave, return receipt requested, at her last known address. This filing did not indicate that it had been served on Dave’s plea counsel. The termination hearing occurred on February 25, 2021. Neither Dave nor her plea counsel attended, and Dave’s case manager informed the superior court that the notice mailed to Dave had been returned as undeliverable. At the hearing, the state presented evidence that Dave had violated several conditions of her mental health court contract. On March 1, 2021, the superior court issued an order terminating Dave from the program. Among other things, the superior court stated in the order that Dave was not represented by counsel and acknowledged that the notice mailed to her had been returned as undeliverable. The superior court found that the state had proved the alleged program violations. The superior court noted that she “[did] not always terminate from the program” but that she was terminating Dave’s participation based on her violations and on the fact that Dave had “absconded from the program” and “had not shown up for the hearing for which she has had notice[.]” On March 5, 2021, the superior court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed upon Dave a five-year sentence, with two years served in confinement. Dave filed a notice of appeal on March 31, 2021, represented by new counsel. The next day, a notice was filed with the superior court substituting Dave’s new counsel for her plea counsel. On appeal, Dave argues that her constitutional rights were violated in several respects. The state asserts in response that the case presents issues of first impression. We transferred this appeal to our Supreme Court for that Court to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court returned the case to us after concluding that Dave’s arguments “do not involve a novel construction of any constitutional provision” and “require the mere application of well settled constitutional principles to the facts of her case[.]“ 2. Mental health courts under OCGA § 15-1-16. Under OCGA § 15-1-16, “any court that has jurisdiction over a criminal case in which a defendant has a mental illness or developmental disability, or a co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse disorder, may establish a mental health court division to provide an alternative to the traditional judicial system for disposition of such cases.” OCGA § 15-1-16 (b) (1). A court may refer a criminal case to the mental health court if the defendant “suffers from a mental illness or developmental disability, or a co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse disorder, and the defendant meets the eligibility criterial for the mental health court division[.]” OCGA § 15-1-16 (b) (2). In this case, the superior court referred Dave to the mental health court “[p]rior to the entry of the sentence[.]” OCGA § 15-1-16 (b) (2) (A). The statute also permits a trial court to refer a defendant to a mental health court “ [a]s part of a sentence in a case[,]” OCGA § 15-1-16 (b) (2) (B), or “ [u]pon consideration of a petition to revoke probation.” OCGA § 15-1-16 (b) (2) (C). The appellate record does not specify the condition that qualified Dave for referral to the mental health court. Although Dave describes her qualifying condition in her appellate brief, “[w]e cannot consider facts asserted in briefs that are not a part of the record before us.” Wachovia Ins. Svcs. v. Fallon, 299 Ga. App. 440, 446 (3) (a) n. 3 (682 SE2d 657) (2009). But to qualify, Dave was required to have a mental illness, a developmental disability, or a mental illness co-occurring with a substance abuse disorder. OCGA § 15-1-16 (b) (2). A mental illness is defined as “a disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.” OCGA § 37-1-1 (12). See OCGA § 15-1-16 (a) (2) (the term “mental illness,” as used in the Code section addressing mental health court divisions, “shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 37-1-1″). A developmental disability is defined as a severe, chronic disability of an individual that: (A) Is attributable to a significant intellectual disability, or any combination of a significant intellectual disability and physical impairments; (B) Is manifested before the individual attains age 22; (C) Is likely to continue indefinitely; (D) Results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major life activities: (i) Self-care; (ii) Receptive and expressive language; (iii) Learning; (iv) Mobility; (v) Self-direction; and (vi) Capacity for independent living; and (E) Reflects the person’s need for a combination and sequence of special, interdisciplinary, or generic services, individualized supports, or other forms of assistance which are of lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated. OCGA § 37-1-1 (8). See OCGA § 15-1-16 (a) (1) (the term “developmental disability,” as used in the Code section addressing mental health court divisions, “shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 37-1-1″). Under the statute, “[e]ach mental health court division shall establish written criteria that define the successful completion of the mental health court division program.” OCGA § 15-1-16 (c) (1). “If the mental health court division participant successfully completes the mental health court division program prior to the entry of judgment, the case against the mental health court division participant may be dismissed by the prosecuting attorney.” OCGA § 15-1-16 (c) (2). The statute also contemplates that a participant may be terminated from a mental health court program. See OCGA § 15-1-16 (d) (providing that if a participant “is terminated from the mental health court division, the reasons for the . . . termination may be considered in sanctioning, sentencing, or otherwise disposing of the participant’s case”). But OCGA § 15-1-16 does not set forth any specific procedures for termination. Instead, it tasks the Council of Accountability Court Judges of Georgia with establishing standards and practices for mental health court divisions, and it requires mental health court divisions to “adopt policies and practices that are consistent with the standards and practices published by the Council of Accountability Court Judges of Georgia.” OCGA § 15-1-16 (b) (4) (A). 3. Due process rights to notice of and an opportunity to be heard at the termination hearing. Dave argues that we should reverse the termination order, judgment of conviction, and sentence because the superior court violated her right to due process by terminating her participation in the mental health court program without providing her with sufficient notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard on the state’s termination petition. We agree. In accordance with OCGA § 15-1-16 (b) (4) (A), the Council of Accountability Court Judges of Georgia has promulgated standards that address termination from a mental health court division. See Adult Mental Health Court Standards, § III,
