Dillard, Presiding Judge. Steven M. Phillips and Toni L. Phillips appeal from the trial court’s partial cancellation and modification of their notice of lis pendens naming Almont Homes NE, Inc., as a defendant. The Phillipses argue the trial court erred in doing so because (1) the allegations of the complaint “involved” the land described in the lis pendens, and (2) it decided the motion to cancel the lis pendens on the merits of the case. For the reasons set forth infra, we agree with the Phillipses and reverse. The Phillipses filed a complaint against Almont Homes (and other named parties who are not involved in this appeal), alleging that they owned property including a “peaceful, clear-running stream immediately adjacent to [d]efendants’ property.” But in August 2018, the Phillipses noticed “increasing red clay runoff from the adjacent property owned and under development by [d]efendants . . .” And by the end of 2019, between 396 and 570 cubic yards of silt had been deposited into the stream, amongst other debris. The Phillipses alleged the silt deposits had clogged a culvert under a bridge over the stream; and importantly, this bridge provided the main entrance onto their property. They further alleged that Almont Homes was the developer or owner of 109 home sites in the relevant development and owned between 30 and 50 acres of the land. The Phillipses contended the defendants were in violation of laws, ordinances, and rules related to erosion control. As a result, they made claims for trespass, nuisance, negligence, negligence per se, professional negligence, riparian rights, punitive damages, and attorney fees, and also sought injunctive relief. And as to injunctive relief, the Phillipses requested the trial court enjoin the defendants from committing further violations of law, continuing to trespass upon their property, and continuing to maintain a nuisance. They further asked the court to order the defendants to (1) “change development practices immediately,” so as to cease the various alleged violations, (2) “restore the biological integrity” of their property, and (3) take “specific remediation measures which must be undertaken . . . to cease all violations on [d]efendants’ property and the Phillips (sic) property to restore [p]laintiffs’ property to its pre-development condition[.]“ The Phillipses then proceeded to file a notice of lis pendens as to the properties titled to Almont Homes.[1] In turn, Almont Homes sought to cancel the notice on the basis that the Phillipses’ suit did not “involve” the relevant properties. Specifically, Almont Homes asserted that the Phillipses were not entitled to injunctive relief because they had a complete remedy at law, and that even if they were entitled to such relief, their notice of lis pendens was overly broad because it included “individual [l]ots where all activity is complete and which cannot be the subject of any future injunctive relief.” The trial court granted Almont Homes’s motion to cancel in part and denied the motion in part. First, the court explained that the Phillipses were entitled to a notice of lis pendens as to lots owned by Almont Homes which were “currently under construction and/or subject to temporary erosion control measures . . . .” But the court canceled the notice of lis pendens as to “any individual lots where all construction has been completed, a lawn has been established, the property has been inspected and approved by Gwinnett County, a Certificate of Occupancy has been issued by Gwinnett County, and temporary erosion control measure[s] are no longer required.” The court did so after concluding that the Phillipses were “not entitled to the specific injunctive relief sought in the [c]omplaint with regard to any individual lot where such actions had been taken.” This appeal by the Phillipses follows.[2] First, the Phillipses argue the trial court erred in partially granting Almont Homes’s motion to cancel the lis pendens as to individual lots with completed construction when those lots were properties “involved” in the lawsuit. We agree with the Phillipses on this question of law, which we review de novo.[3] Under Georgia law, when property is the subject of a lawsuit, a party may file a notice of lis pendens to alert property owners and potential purchasers that the property is involved in litigation.[4] Importantly, property is “involved” in pending litigation when it is “actually and directly brought into the litigation by the pleadings in a pending suit and as to which some relief is sought respecting that particular property.”[5] And Georgia’s appellate courts have determined that property is “involved” in pending litigation when, inter alia, a plaintiff seeks equitable relief to (1) enjoin a party from continuing activities on their property that result in water damage to the plaintiff’s property, or (2) require measures to prevent further water damage flowing from actions on the defendant’s property onto the plaintiff’s property.[6] Here, the Phillipses asked the trial court to enjoin Almont Homes from committing further violations of law, continuing to trespass upon their property, and continuing to maintain a nuisance. They also requested that Almont Homes be ordered to (1) “change development practices immediately,” so as to cease the various alleged violations, (2) “restore the biological integrity” of their property, and (3) take “specific remediation measures which must be undertaken by [d]efendants to cease all violations on [d]efendants’ property and the Phillips (sic) property to restore [p]laintiffs’ property to its pre-development condition[.]“ In requesting this relief, the Phillipses did so as to all 109 home sites in the development and the 30 to 50 acres of land owned or developed by Almont Homes. Thus, the language of the complaint involved all of the Almont Homes properties, including those upon which construction activities were completed because the Phillipses’ claims were related to water runoff caused by the activities and changes made to those properties. Relatedly, the Phillipses contend the trial court erred in partially granting the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Indeed, in concluding that the Almont Homes properties with completed construction were not “involved” so as to warrant a lis pendens, the trial court determined the Phillipses’ suit did not seek relief as to those lots because they were not entitled to injunctive relief as to those particular portions of realty. And in making such a finding, the court essentially considered the merits of the underlying suit, which the court may not do when assessing whether to cancel a notice of lis pendens.[7] As we have previously explained, “[a] court may cancel a notice of lis pendens if, on its face, the notice does not show that the common law requirements for a valid lis pendens have been met.”[8] That is to say, “the property must be of a character to be subject to the rule; the court must have jurisdiction both of the person and the subjectmatter; and the property involved must be sufficiently described in the pleadings.”[9] But here, the trial court did not determine that any of the common-law elements were lacking, instead concluding that the lots upon which construction was complete would not be subject to injunctive relief and thus that the Phillipses’ complaint did not seek relief as to those portions of property. In other words, the trial court considered the merits of the Phillipses’ claims against Almont Homes to conclude that, notwithstanding a request for relief as to all property owned by Almont Homes, some portions of that property would not be subject to the relief requested. Suffice it to say, this was outside the scope of what the trial court was permitted to consider when faced with a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens.[10] The question for the trial court was not whether the Phillipses could or would ultimately be successful in obtaining their requested relief as to all of Almont Homes’s properties but, instead, whether the common-law elements were met and whether those properties were “involved” in the underlying suit.[11] In that regard, the trial court was only to consider whether the Almont Homes properties were actually and directly brought into litigation by the pleadings in the Phillipses’ lawsuit and whether the Phillipses sought relief with regard to those properties.[12] So, whether the Phillipses can ultimately prevail on their suit to have equitable relief granted as to all of the properties owned by Almont Homes is a question for a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to cancel a notice of lis pendens.[13] Some or all of the Phillipses’ requested equitable relief to “stabilize the Mountain Valley construction site,” “contain the sediment and other pollutants at the site,” and other actions might require steps be taken as to the entirety of the properties owned by Almont Homes,[14] and Almont Homes was not entitled to partial cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the basis relied upon by the trial court.[15] For all these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s partial cancellation of the Phillipses’ notice of lis pendens as to Almont Homes. Judgment reversed. Mercier and Markle, JJ., concur.
