Doyle, Presiding Judge. At issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the Georgia Lottery Corporation (“GLC”) has exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits filed between coinoperated amusement machine (“COAM”) licensees. Mumtaz M. Alli entered into a contract to lease COAMs from Ultra Group of Companies, Inc., and Ultra later sued Alli in DeKalb County. Alli moved to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction and to refer the case to arbitration under the Georgia Lottery Corporation (“GLC”), and the court denied the motion and transferred the case to Gwinnett County (hereinafter, “the trial court”) . Alli appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to review and correct the prior DeKalb order, arguing that OCGA § 5027102 (d) (2) confers exclusive subjectmatter jurisdiction over disputes between COAM licensees to the GLC for arbitration. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The record shows that Ultra and Alli entered into a contract wherein Alli agreed to lease COAMs[1] owned by Ultra for use in a gas station convenience store owned by Alli. Under their contract, Ultra is a COAM “master licensee,” and Alli is a COAM “location licensee.”[2] Ultra sued Alli in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, asserting claims for breach of contract, conversion of property, money had and received, undercapitalization, and punitive damages.[3] Alli moved to dismiss, arguing that the court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the claims because OCGA § 5027102 (d) (2) confers exclusive subjectmatter jurisdiction over disputes between COAM licensees to the GLC for arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that: (1) it had jurisdiction to hear all of the claims asserted in the complaint; (2) the GLC did not have jurisdiction to hear the undercapitalization and punitive damages claims because they are not COAM claims; and (3) the GLC’s jurisdiction over COAM claims under OCGA § 5027102 (d) (2) is not exclusive.[4] After the DeKalb court granted Alli’s subsequent motion to transfer venue to the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Alli filed in Gwinnett a motion under Uniform Superior Court Rule 19.1 (I),[5] seeking to “review and correct” the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, compel arbitration under OCGA § 5027102 (d). The trial court denied the motion in a onepage order, but granted Alli a certificate of immediate review. This Court granted Alli’s interlocutory application, giving rise to this appeal. On appeal, Alli argues that OCGA § 5027102 (d) confers exclusive jurisdiction over claims between COAM licensees to the GLC and that the trial court erred by not dismissing the case for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction or referring the parties to arbitration. We disagree. “Where, as here, a case turns on statutory interpretation and resolution of questions of law, we apply a de novo standard of review.[6]“ [I]n all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly. In so doing, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words. Where the language of a statute is plain and susceptible to only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly. In fact, where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden[7]. The GLC regulates COAMs pursuant to the statutory framework established in OCGA § 502770 et seq.OCGA § 5027102 (d) provides that the GLC shall have jurisdiction of all disputes between and among any licensees or former licensees whose licenses were issued pursuant to this article relating in any way to any agreement involving coin operated amusement machines, distribution of funds, tortious interference with contract, other claims against a subsequent master license holder or location owner, or any other claim involving coin operated amusement machines. . . . The statute does not state that COAMs have exclusive jurisdiction over COAM contract claims between licensees, and “[a] court of law is not authorized to rewrite the statute by inserting additional language that would expand its application.”[8] The General Assembly could have vested the GLC with exclusive jurisdiction,[9] and it elected not to do so. The jurisdiction of superior courts in Georgia is vested by the Constitution of the State of Georgia and by statute.[10] And “neither the legislature nor a judge can limit the jurisdiction of a superior court.”[11] Accordingly, the superior court properly concluded that Ultra’s claims are within its subject-matter jurisdiction.[12] Judgment affirmed. Brown, J., and Senior Appellate Judge Herbert E. Phipps concur.
